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ABSTRACT 
An empirical examination of bank risk taking, following the financial 
crisis of 1997/1998, in ten Asian countries is undertaken. The major motivation is 
that prior research generally examines banks in developed countries by using 
capital market risk measures, and very little has been done in the context of 
developing countries, particularly when few banks are listed in the capital 
markets, such as in the case of many countries in Asia. 
The thesis consists of four essays and employs two datasets of Asian 
banks. The first essay examines the relation between accounting and capital 
market measures of risk using a sample of 46 listed banks from Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan and Thailand during 1998-2003. Using the same dataset, the second essay 
investigates the presence of bank moral hazard and the disciplining factors of risk 
taking. The third essay examines the impact of the introduction of deposit 
insurance (the Blanket Guarantee Scheme - BGS) and the changes in capital 
regulation on bank risk taking using a sample of 65 Indonesian private banks 
during 1995-2003. Using the same dataset to the third essay, the fourth essay 
investigates the relation between ownership structure and bank risk taking along 
with the impact of the regulatory changes on this relation in Indonesia. 
A panel data methodology is used throughout this thesis. A standard fixed-
effects and random-effects regression analysis is implemented, and the results 
from the pooled OLS are also presented for comparison. Data from several 
sources and databases are collected, and a balanced panel is employed. 
vii 
The results suggest that, in Asian banks, selected accounting ratios are 
related to capital market risk measures. Therefore, these ratios may be used 
interchangeably and complementarily with their associated capital market risk 
measures in the analysis of bank risk taking. This finding is important, as most 
Asian banks are not publicly listed. Moreover, moral hazard exists, indicating that 
market and regulatory disciplines are insufficient to prevent banks from taking 
excessive risk and exploiting the safety nets. Bank self discipline (charter value) 
appears to play a limited role in mitigating risk taking. 
Evidence from Indonesian banks suggests that the introduction of deposit 
insurance in 1998 increases leverage risk, whereas a lower capital requirement 
during the sub-period 1998-2000 raises leverage risk and liquidity risk. Bank 
moral hazard exists following the adoption of the BGS, and the extent of moral 
hazard is stronger under a lower capital requirement. In addition, ownership 
concentration is positively related to overall risk, but negatively related to credit 
risk and liquidity risk. When deposit insurance is introduced and capital 
requirements are changed, the Listed and Insured Banks show a greater reaction 
than the Unlisted and Insured, and Unlisted and Uninsured Banks. We also 
document that government ownership concentration significantly affects bank risk 
taking. In general, the results seem to be driven by selected government 
intervention and poor economic conditions following the 1997/1998 crisis. These 
findings are important because Indonesia is typical of Asian countries where the 
economy and the banking system are highly correlated, and government 
intervention would be most pronounced during economic crises. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
The 1997/1998 banking crises in several countries in Asia suggest that we 
need to have a better understanding of bank risk taking. The crises caused huge 
losses in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand. 
Lindgren et al. (1999) assert that the gross costs of the bank restructuring in these 
countries are massive (e.g., between 15 and 45% of GDP). Studies such as 
Suetorsak (2006), Corsetti et al. (1998), Krugman (1998) and McKinnon and Pill 
(1998 and 1999) have indicated that prior to the crises, Asian banks took 
excessive risk taking or moral hazard, and these then led to the Asian collapse. By 
having a better understanding of bank risk taking, we may be able to control it, 
and, therefore, avoid recurrent banking crises. 
Previous studies have identified several factors affecting bank risk taking. 
These include, for example, charter value (e.g., Keeley, 1990; Galloway et al., 
1997), the introduction of deposit insurance (e.g., Wheelock, 1992; Karels and 
McClatchey, 1999; Gueyie and Lai, 2003), capital regulation (e.g., Jacques and 
Nigro, 1997; Rime, 2001), ownership structure (e.g., Saunders et al., 1990; Chen 
et al., 1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000), and market discipline (e.g., Hannan and 
Hanweck, 1988; Park and Peristiani, 1998). 
Although these studies have contributed to our understanding of bank risk, 
continued research on this topic is encouraged for the following reasons. First, the 
existing studies generally examine banks in developed countries, and very little 
1 
has been done in the context of developing countries. Second, the existing 
literature mostly uses capital market risk measures. Consequently, when few 
banks are listed in the capital markets, such as in the case of many countries in 
Asia, we do not have much know ledge on bank risk taking in these countries. 
The present study contributes to the literature by examining empirically 
bank risk taking through four essays using two datasets of Asian banks. The first 
dataset consists of a sample of 46 (capital market) listed banks from 10 countries 
in Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand) during the period 1998-2003. This 
dataset allows us to examine the relation between accounting and capital market 
measures of risk (Essay 1), and the presence of bank moral hazard and the 
disciplining factors of risk taking (Essay 2). 
The study on the relation between accounting and capital market measures 
of risk is important because bank risk taking can be assessed using both 
accounting information and market measures. Banking authorities and financial 
analysts have relied on accounting information (e.g., CAMEL ratios) in evaluating 
1 . bank risk and performance. Market measures such as the ones that are generated 
from capital market data (e.g., total return risk, systematic risk and non-systematic 
risk) have also been widely used in the analysis of bank risk taking and they may 
provide a better assessment due to their forward-looking capabilities.2 By 
examining the relation between accounting and capital market measures of risk in 
banks across Asian countries, we extend the existing studies on this issue that are 
1 CAMEL ratios refer to a set of accounting ratios that are widely used to assess Capital adequacy, 
Assets quality, Management, Earnings (profitability), and Liquidity of banks. 
2 For a discussion on forward-looking capabilities of market measures of risk see for example 
Kwan and Laderman (1999) and Flannery (1998). 
2 
predominantly country specific in a developed economy setting [see, e.g., 
Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) and Mansur et al. (1993) for US banks, and 
Elyasiani and Mansur (2005) for Japanese banks]. 
Our study becomes more interesting because banks are the main source of 
finance for business in the private sector in Asian countries, and significant 
differences exist across these countries in banking activities, capital adequacy 
requirements, and deposit insurance protection. In addition, not many Asian banks 
are listed in the capital markets, and, if listed, they are operating within a range of 
capital market sophistication. By considering these country-specific 
characteristics, the results of this study can be useful in the analysis of bank risk 
taking across Asian countries, particularly in determining the most appropriate 
risk measure. As stated by Elyasiani and Mansur (2005), if the two types of risk 
measures (accounting and capital market measures of risk) are strongly related, 
they can be treated as substitutes. However, if the two risk measures are not 
closely related, the use of both rather than either of these risk measures as a basis 
for policy are suggested to avoid conflicting recommendations since each measure 
may add different information. 
The research on bank moral hazard and the disciplining factors of risk 
taking is appealing because moral hazard is a long standing issue in Asian banks 
and previous studies only explore evidence from before the crises. In examining 
the presence of bank moral hazard, following Gueyie and Lai (2003) the present 
study employs the Duan et al. (1992) bank risk shifting framework which can also 
be used to investigate the effectiveness of market and regulatory disciplines. This 
study then explores the role of bank self discipline (charter value) in limiting bank 
3 
risk taking, in which both accounting and capital market measures of risk are used 
for this purpose. It also includes an empirical assessment on which type of deposit 
insurance (implicit versus explicit guarantees) that encourages bank moral hazard. 
The second dataset contains a sample of 65 Indonesian private commercial 
banks over the period 1995-2003. This study specifically examines Indonesian 
banks because they have a unique setting that allows us to examine the impact of 
deposit insurance and capital regulation respectively on bank risk taking. 
Following the crisis, banks in this country experienced major regulatory changes, 
including the introduction of the Blanket Guarantee Scheme (BGS), akin to 
deposit insurance, in 1998, and changes in bank capital regulation. In 1998, the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) requirement was reduced from 8% to 4%, 
then back to 8 % in 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes in 
Essay 3. The discussions also include an empirical evaluation on whether bank 
moral hazard exists following the adoption of the BGS and when a lower capital 
requirement is implemented. 
Furthermore, Indonesian banks have a highly concentrated ownership. 
Therefore, it is possible to examine the relation between ownership concentration 
and bank risk taking. Since previous studies indicate that regulatory changes 
affect the relation between ownership structure and bank risk taking (see, e.g., 
Saunders et al., 1990; Chen et al., 1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000), we also 
explore the impact of the regulatory changes (the introduction of the BGS and the 
changes in capital regulation) on the relation between ownership structure and risk 
taking in Indonesian banks. This study also extends the existing literature by 
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examining the impact of government ownership concentration on bank risk 
taking. The empirical analysis of these issues is provided in Essay 4. 
Because very few Indonesian banks are listed in the capital market, we 
only use accounting risk measures in Essays 3 and 4. In addition, similar to Essay 
2, we also employ the Duan et al. (1992) bank risk shifting framework in 
examining the presence of bank moral hazard following the regulatory changes in 
Essay 3. However, this only applies for the sub-sample of Listed Banks. 
1.2. Research Questions 
The research questions of the present study are as follows: 
Essay 1: 
Is there any significant relation between accounting and capital market measure of 
risk in Asian banks? 
Essay 2: 
Does bank moral hazard exist in Asian banks? Are market, regulatory and bank 
self disciplines effective in mitigating risk taking in Asian banks? Which type of 
deposit insurance (e.g., implicit or explicit guarantees) encourages moral hazard in 
Asian banks? 
Essay 3: 
Does the introduction of the BGS affect bank risk taking in Indonesia? Do the 
changes in capital regulation affect bank risk taking in Indonesia? Does bank 
moral hazard exist following the adoption of the BGS and when a lower capital 
requirement is implemented in Indonesia? 
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Essay 4: 
Does ownership concentration affect bank risk taking in Indonesia? Do the 
regulatory changes (the introduction of the BGS and the changes in capital 
regulation) affect the relation between ownership structure and bank risk taking? 
Does government ownership concentration affect bank risk taking? 
Based on the above research questions, the present study can be outlined 
as follows: 
Figure 1.1 Outline of the Study 
Essay 1 - Asian Banks 1998-2003 
Capital Market Risk Measures ~ ~ Accounting Risk Measures ~ 
-
Es ~. A say 2 - Asian Banks 1998-2003 
Bank Risk Shifting 
[Examining bank moral hazard, market Charter Value 
and regulatory disciplines, and (Market-to-book-equity ratio) ~ 
the impact of implicit and explicit [Examining bank self discipline] 
deposit insurance on bank moral hazard] 
Es say 3 - Indonesian Banks 1995-2003 
Regulatory Changes Bank Risk Shifting 
[Blanket Guarantee Scheme and the [Examining bank moral hazard 
Minimum Capital Adequacy following the regulatory changes -
Ratio of 4%] Listed Banks] 
.. 
Es say 4 - Indonesian Banks 1995-2003 
Ownership Concentration 
[Including an analysis on the impact of 
the regulatory changes on the relation Government Ownership +-between Ownership Concentration and Concentration 
bank risk taking] 
• 
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1.3. Research Method 
Data from several sources and databases are collected, and a panel data 
methodology is employed throughout this thesis. This methodology is chosen 
because it offers major advantages that can improve our estimations. Baltagi 
(2001) and Hsiao (1986) have documented the major advantages of a panel data 
methodology. These include, for example, controlling for individual 
heterogeneity, reducing problems of data multicollinearity, eliminating or 
reducing estimation bias, and capturing the dynamic relationships between 
independent variables and dependent variables. 
There are two panel data models: fixed-effects and random-effects. The 
fixed-effects model includes an intercept for each firm to capture firm-specific 
effects (at), and coefficient estimates reflect within-firm variation. This model 
may use the within regression estimator, or the Least Squares with Group Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) estimator that allows the intercept terms to vary cross-
sectionally across banks over time. The random-effects model assumes firm-
specific effects are random variables and models them as part of the error term 
(µt). This model is based on both variation between firms and variation within 
firms, and uses a generalized least square (GLS) in estimations. 
Basically, the fixed effects model can be stated as: 
(1.1) 
while the random-effects model can be written as: 
Yit = a + /J'xit + cit+ µi (1.2) 
where Yit are the dependent variable for bank i at time t, a is the constant intercept 
term, ai are the bank-specific intercept terms, /J' is the vector of the regression 
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coefficients, Xit = represents the independent variables, £i represent the 
idiosyncratic error terms for banks over time, and µi is the bank-specific error term 
in the random-effects model. 
The present study will examine both the fixed-effects and random-effects 
models. For a comparison purpose, the results based on the pooled data will also 
be presented. A pooled model has a single, overall intercept term (a). The model 
is estimated by simple ordinary least squares (OLS). Thus, it is usually called a 
pooled OLS model. To determine the most appropriate model between the pooled 
OLS and the fixed-effects, one can use the F-test. This test has a null hypothesis 
of homogeneity of individual-specific effects (Baltagi, 2001 and Greene, 2003). 
Moreover, the appropriateness of the pooled OLS relative to the random-effects 
can be examined with the Breusche and Pagan Langrange Multiplier (LM) test 
(Greene, 2003). Large values of the LM test statistic (distributed as chi-square) 
favour the random-effects. 
Greene (2003) asserts that the crucial distinction between the fixed-effects 
model and the random-effects models is whether the unobserved individual effect 
embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model. In 
particular, the fixed-effects model is an appropriate specification if there is 
correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the independent 
variables, otherwise the random-effects model is appropriate. Hausman' s (1978) 
specification test can be used to select the most appropriate model between the 
fixed-effects and the random-effects (Baltagi, 2001, Wooldridge, 2002 and 
Greene, 2003). Large values of the Hausman statistic (distributed as chi-square) 
favour the fixed-effects. 
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If the Hausman test can not be performed due to the difference of the 
variance and covariance matrices is not positive definite or model fitted on the 
data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test, one can use an 
augmented regression test which is asymptotically equivalent to the Hausman test 
(Baltagi, 2001 and Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The results of this test can be 
provided in the form of the chi-square statistics or the conventional F-test (see, 
e.g., Owusu-Gyapong, 1986) in which larger values of the chi-squares or F 
statistics favour the fixed-effects. In this thesis, the results of an augmented 
regression test are presented in the form of the chi-square statistics. 
This study uses a balanced panel to ensure that the results are due to the 
specific bank risk taking factors, rather than the different mix of banks included in 
the sample. However, in very limited cases we also use an unbalanced panel, but 
this is mainly in order to handle data outlier issues, or due to the data availability 
problems.3 
1.4. Organization of the Study 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Each essay is presented in a 
specific chapter. In particular, Essay 1 is included in Chapter 2, Essay 2 in 
Chapter 3, Essay 3 in Chapter 4, and Essay 4 in Chapter 5. The last chapter 
(Chapter 6) presents conclusions and implications. 
3 For example, when examining the sub-sample of Indonesian banks in Essay 1, to handle data 
outliers problems, we adopt an elimination outlier procedure which leads to an unbalanced panel 
for several variables (see Section 2.4.3 and Table 2.5). Moreover, due to the data availability 
problems in Essays 3 and 4, particularly for the variable LLRGL (the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-
to-gross-loans) in the full sample and the sub-sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks, we also 
use an unbalanced panel. 
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Chapter 2 
Accounting and Capital Market Measures of Risk: 
Evidence from Asian Banks during 1998-2003 
2.1 Introduction 
Banks are evaluated using both market risk measures and accounting 
information. The appropriate measure for assessment depends on its purpose and 
the conditions within which it is applied. For example, if a well-diversified 
investor is considering adding a bank stock to the portfolio, the bank's beta will 
be used as the appropriate measure of risk. On the other hand, if a bank regulator 
is assessing the financial health of a bank, a CAMEL rating, made up of 
accounting variables, is preferred. 
However, these measures may be differentially impacted by the economic 
environment and their relative importance may change over time. Jahankhani and 
Lynge (1980), Lee and Brewer (1985), Brewer and Lee (1986), and Mansur et al. 
(1993) find significant relations between accounting ratios and capital market 
measures of risk in US banks. Elyasiani and Mansur (2005) examine the same 
issue, but use Japanese banks. While most prior studies are country specific, the 
Asian crisis and its associated contagion effects highlights the need for a set of 
accounting and market risk measures that are applicable across countries. 
Research on Asian banks is important because they are the predominant 
source of finance for businesses in the private sector.4 Because alternative sources 
of funds are not available, when corporations encounter financial difficulties, the 
4 Chang (2004) indicates that East Asian banks are used to support the real sector in pursuing 
economic development. 
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impact on the banks' balance sheet may be greater than in countries with more 
developed financial markets. Hence, using accounting measures of risk may be 
problematic. 
Banks in this region experienced the banking crisis of 1997/1998, and 
bank restructuring programs continue in several of the Asian countries. 5 
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand were seriously impacted by the 
banking crisis, while Hong Kong, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and 
Taiwan were less affected. 
The banking structures, regulatory environments, capital adequacy 
requirements and market sophistication are not homogenous across these 
countries. Table 2.1 shows the regulations for engaging in non-traditional 
commercial banking activities such as trading in securities, and participation in 
insurance and real estate. Each country follows the Basel Accord, but Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Philippines and Sri Lanka require a higher minimum capital standard. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand 
have explicit deposit insurance but only Taiwan uses risk-based premiums.6 
Moreover, in developing countries, managerial control is highly 
concentrated. Claessens et al. (2000) examine the separation of ownership and 
control within financial and non-financial publicly traded.East Asian corporations. 
More than two-thirds of the firms are controlled by a single shareholder, and 
separation of management from ownership control is rare. 
5 Williams and Nguyen (2005) and Klingebiel et al. (2001) provide a discussion on bank 
restructuring programs following the crisis. 
6 Data sources include the Annual Reports/Official Websites of the Central Banks/Banking 
Authorities of each country, the 2003 World Bank Database on Bank Regulation and Supervision, 
and Bank Indonesia. 
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Table 2.1 Banking Structure and Regulatory Environment of the Sample Countries 
Hong South Items Kong, Indonesia Malaysia Pakistan Philippines Singapore Korea Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand China 
A. Banking Structure (2003) 
Commercial banks * 134 138 25 43 24 115 54 22 86 31 
a. Locally incorporated 23 127 25 23 13 5 14 11 36 13 
b. Non-locally incorporated 111 11 - 20 11 110 40 11 50 18 
Total assets (USD million) 806,963 137,967 165,783 64,975 11,155 213,151 663,771 10,278 765,839 172,294 
Total loans (USD million) 246,379 51,736 93,582 17,280 6,294 100,802 360,317 5,318 397,783 119,940 
Total deposits (USD million) 453,938 106,595 113,949 32,045 6,937 114,200 409,366 7,241 448,807 136,273 
Loans-to-asset ratio 30.53 37.50 56.45 26.59 56.43 47.29 54.28 51.74 51.94 69.61 
Deposit-to-asset ratio 56.25 77.26 68.73 49.32 62.19 53.58 61.67 70.46 58.60 79.09 
Loans-to-deposit ratio 54.28 48.53 82.13 53.92 90.73 88.27 88.02 73.44 88.63 88.01 
B. Bank Activities 
Securities u Pr p p u u p p p R 
Insurance p R R R p p R R Pr R 
Real Estate u Pr R Pr p R Pr Pr Pr R 
Bank Owning Non-financial Firms p R R R p Pr R R R R 
C. Capital Requirement 
Minimum Capital-Asset Ratio 10% 8% 8% 8% 10% 12% 8% 10% 8% 8.50% 
Consistent with the Basel Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Is CAR a function of credit risk? Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No No 
Is CAR a function of market risk? Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No No 
D. Depositor Protection Schemes 
Explicit deposit insurance No BGS BGS No Yes No Yes Yes Yes BGS 
Risk-based deposit insurance No No No No Yes No 
*For Hong Kong, commercial banks refer to Licensed banks; for Taiwan commercial banks refer to Domestic banks, Medium business banks and Foreign banks. 
Definitions of permitted activities (Panel B): Umestricted (U) = a full range of activities can be conducted by the bank. Permitted (P) = a full range of activities 
can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in subsidiaries. Restricted (R) = less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or 
subsidiaries. Prohibited (Pr) = the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries. The definitions are based on Barth et al. (1997). Deposit 
Insurance (BGS) denotes Blanket Guarantee Scheme. 
Overall, these differences may affect bank risk management in the respective 
country, and in tum, may affect the link between accounting and capital market 
measures of risk. The present study pools 46 listed banks operating in ten Asian 
countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand) during the period 1998-2003. Panel data 
methodology takes into account individual bank heterogeneity, and we find that 
several accounting and market risk measures are significantly related. The standard 
deviation of the before-tax return on assets (SDROA) and the loan-loss-reserves-to-
gross-loans ratio (LLRGL) are significantly related to total return risk. Moreover, the 
loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans ratio (LLRGL) and the gross-loans-to-total-assets 
ratio (GLTA) exhibit the expected significant relation with non-systematic risk. 
These selected accounting and capital market measures of risk can be useful in the 
analysis of bank risk taking across Asian countries. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Beaver et al. (1970) is a pioneering work on the contemporaneous association 
between accounting measures and capital market measures of risk. Their study uses a 
sample of 307 non-financial firms in the US over the 1947-1956 and 1957-1965 
periods. They employ market beta as the measure of market-determined risk, and 
seven financial ratios (dividend payout ratio, growth in total assets, leverage ratio, 
current ratio, asset size, earnings variability, and accounting beta) as the measures of 
accounting-determined risk. Using a simple correlation (rank correlation and product-
moment correlation), they find significant association between market beta and 
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accounting risk measures such as dividend payout, financial leverage, earnmgs 
variability and accounting beta. 
Following Beaver et al. (1970), other researchers examined further the 
relation between accounting and capital market risk measures in non-banking firms. 
These include, for example, Hamada (1972), Gonedes (1973), Beaver and Manegold 
(1975), Lev (1974), Breen and Lerner (1973), Melicher (1974), and Ismail and Kim 
(1989). In general, these studies document that certain accounting ratios have a 
significant relation with capital market risk measures. 
In the banking context, Pettway (1976) seems to be the first study that 
explores the relation between accounting and capital market measures of risk. In 
particular, he explores the relation between accounting and capital market measures 
of risk by considering the impact of the bank's capital position and other accounting 
variables on market beta and the price-earning ratio. Using a sample of 38 large US 
banks and holding companies over the period 1971-1974, Pettway finds that the 
amount of bank equity is significant in the determination of a bank's market beta in 
1974 and of a bank's price-earning ratio in 1972 and 1974. 
Pettway and Sinkey (1980) use both accounting and market information to 
develop an early warning-system that may be useful in developing on-site bank 
examination priorities. A discriminant analysis model and the market model are used 
in implementing accounting data and market data, respectively. Then, a dual-
screening technique is introduced. They find that both the accounting and market 
screens produce early warning signals that precede the start of the examinations that 
led to the sample banks being classified as problem institutions. 
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Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) examine a sample of 95 commercial banks and 
bank holding companies in the US over the period 1972-1976. When market beta is 
used as the dependent variable, they find that the dividend payout ratio, the 
coefficient of variation of deposits, and the loan-to-deposits ratio are statistically 
significant, and the accounting variables explain 26% of the variability in systematic 
risk. When total return risk is used as the dependent variable, all variables except the 
loans-to-deposits ratio are found to be statistically significant, and 43% of the 
variability in the dependent variable is explained. 
Rosenberg and Perry (1981) examine 124 large US banks, over the period 
March 1969 - June 1977. Systematic and residual risks are used as dependent 
variables and a number of accounting variables are employed as independent 
variables. They find that among the important simple predictors of beta are size, 
dividend yield, equity capitalization, and the asset-to-long-term-liability ratio. The 
most important simple predictors of residual risk are earnings variability, leverage in 
the capital structure, and a measure of accounting beta. In the multiple regression 
models, the signs of the descriptors are generally the same for the prediction of beta 
and residual risk, but the relative magnitudes are often significantly different. 
Lee and Brewer (1985) employ 12 quarters of data to investigate a sample of 
44 US banks and bank holding companies over the period 1979 - 1982 using cross-
section and time-series methodologies. Within each quarter, for each bank, the market 
risks are estimated using the market model based on daily return data for each bank 
and the S&P500 index. They find that when systematic risk is used as the risk 
measure, the volatile liability ratio, leverage, and dividend payout ratio have the 
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expected signs and are significant. When total risk is used as the dependent variable, 
most estimated coefficients have the expected sign, and several are statistically 
significant. 
Brewer and Lee (1986) examine a sample of 44 US bank holding companies 
over the period 1979-1983. They use a multi-index market model based on daily 
return data to derive market, banking industry, and interest rate risk measures. Risk 
sensitivities of bank stocks are also investigated by comparing banks in California, 
Chicago, New York, and "Other" geographic areas. They find a significant 
correlation between accounting-based measures of equity risk and market-based 
measures of equity risk. In particular, the coefficient on the book-capital-to-assets 
ratio has a negative sign and is significantly different from zero in both the market 
and industry equations. The after-tax-net-income-to-assets variable is positive and 
only significantly different from zero in the interest rate equation. In all models, both 
the purchased funds ratio and the loans-to-assets ratio are statistically significantly 
positive. However, neither the standard deviation of the after-tax-net-income nor the 
charge-offs ratio have a statistically significant effect on the three market measures of 
risk. They also find that the equity values of New York City banks are relatively more 
exposed to market and industry sources of risk than are California and Chicago 
banks. 
Karels et al. (1989) examme the relation between total, systematic, and 
unsystematic risk and an accounting measure of risk proxied by the capital adequacy 
ratio. They use a sample of 24 US banks over 30 quarters during 1977 - 1984. They 
argue that higher capital adequacy ratios provide a greater buffer against default and, 
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therefore, imply less risk. They find that, as expected, the coefficients of correlation 
between the capital adequacy ratio and systematic risk are negative in each of the 30 
quarters. The relation between the capital adequacy ratio and the total risk measure is 
also negative but not statistically significant. However, the signs of the coefficients 
between the capital adequacy ratio and unsystematic risk are mixed. 
Mansur et al. (1993) examine 59 US banks, selected at random, over the 
period 1986-1990. Using the market beta as the dependent variable, they report that 
only the loan-loss-reserve-to-total-loans ratio and the coefficient of variation of 
deposits are statistically significant. In this model, the independent variables explain 
35% of the variability in systematic risk. Moreover, using total return risk as the 
dependent variable, only the liquidity ratio is found statistically significant, and it 
explains 24% of the variability in total risk. Overall, these studies reveal that 
accounting and capital market risk measures are significantly related for US banks. 
Hassan (1993) examines the relation between accounting and capital market 
risk measures in a study on the off-balance sheet (OBS) risk of large US commercial 
banks. A sample of 32 banks over the period 1984-1988 is tested using a pooled cross 
section and time series analysis. He finds that the on-balance sheet measures of risk 
have the expected signs. In particular, when systematic risk is used as the dependent 
variable, the ratio of total liabilities over total assets and the ratio of loan loss reserves 
to total loans show significantly positive signs, whereas the Herfindahl index of 
diversification of bank's asset portfolio exhibits a significantly negative sign. Using 
the standard deviation of bank equity return as the dependent model, the ratio of loan 
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loss reserves to total loans and the ratio of cash dividend to net income show the 
expected positive and negative signs respectively and are statistically significant. 
McAnally (1996) examines the relation between accounting and market risk 
measures in a study concerning whether Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
No.105 (FAS105) footnote disclosures of off-balance sheet financial instruments and 
derivatives provide risk-relevant information. A sample of 499 US commercial bank 
holding companies over the period 1990-1992 is investigated using Meta-analysis and 
generalized least squares (GLS) regressions.7 It is found that the coefficients on bank 
assets accounts are positive under both the market and industry betas,8 and the 
coefficients on liabilities accounts are generally consistent with the prediction. 
Moreover, the balance sheet accounts explain 42% and 43% of the cross-sectional 
variation in market beta and industry beta, respectively. 
Elyasiani and Mansur (2005) investigate a sample of 52 Japanese banks over 
the period 1986-1996. A multi-factor GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedastic) model is used to estimate the market, interest rate, and 
foreign exchange rate sensitivities for banks. The link between market measures of 
risk and accounting variables is examined cross-sectionally using OLS and ridge 
regression techniques. They find that accounting variables contain some explanatory 
power in describing bank market risk and foreign exchange risk. In particular, under 
7 McAnally (1996) describes meta-analyses as an analysis in which the results of prior studies (often 
by other researchers) are included in later models. Reported regression coefficients from the previous 
studies become the dependent variable(s) in later models where an overall or "meta" model is built and 
tested. 
8 Market beta is estimated for each fiscal year by regressing daily returns for each bank on the NYSE-
AMEX equal-weighted daily return, whereas industry beta is estimated by regressing daily returns for 
each bank on the S&P 500 Bank Composite Index return. 
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the market beta model, the coefficients pertaining to cash-and-due-from-banks, 
assets-held-in-trading-and-dealing accounts, provisions for credit loss, deposits of 
customers, and non-interest expense are all found to be statistically significant, with 
signs consistent with expectations. Moreover, non-interest income, and foreign 
exchange denominated assets affect the foreign exchange rate beta in a positive and 
negative direction, respectively. 
Elyasiani and Mansur (2005) state that compared to the work of McAnally 
(1996), which uses a sample of US banks, the relation between market beta and 
accounting variables is weaker for the Japanese banks than their US counterparts. 
They argue that this is because Japanese banks engage in a broader set of activities 
including investment and mortgage banking and ownership of stocks in commercial 
firms. As a result, the riskiness of Japanese banks tends to show less sensitivity to 
bank-related corporate decision variables. 
In general, the existing literature shows that, for banking firms, certain 
accounting ratios have a relation with capital market risk measures. In addition, the 
extent of this relation may be affected by the regulatory environment in a particular 
country. 
2.3 Data and Method 
2.3.1 Data, Sample and Method 
The present study examines a sample of 46 listed banks from Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, and Thailand over the period 1998-2003. The accounting data are sourced 
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from BankScope and Osiris databases (except Indonesia whose data are obtained 
from the banks' published financial statements).9 The capital market data including 
daily stock price, the daily dividend yield, and the daily price index of the relevant 
markets were obtained from Datastream. 
To be included in this study, we apply the following sample selection criteria 
(see Appendix 2.1). 1° First, the bank is a commercial bank, and listed in the capital 
market of its country of domicile. We limit our study to commercial banks in order 
to compare our results with prior studies that also examined commercial banks. 
Similarly, Laeven (1999) focuses on commercial banks and excludes finance 
companies and merchant banks because he suggests commercial banks have more 
freedom to choose their business mix and face similar restrictions across countries. 
Second, the banks must be locally incorporated in each country. Inclusion of the 
branch offices of foreign banks in our sample may bias the findings because we can 
only examine a part of the bank (i.e., the branch offices). 11 Third, the bank has a 
December accounting year-end. The use of the same accounting year-end allows a 
more precise examination of the relation between accounting risk measures and 
capital risk measures (that are also calculated annually based on the December year-
end position). Finally, to be included in our sample, the bank's accounting data must 
9 The accounting data for Indonesia come from the banks' condensed financial statements (CFS) for 
the December positions. In Indonesia, commercial banks publish their CFS in the national newspapers 
in March, June, September and December of each year. We only use the December reports because 
they are audited. 
10 We also check the integrity and consistency of the data in applying the sample selection criteria. 
11 In a study on benchmarking of the commercial banking system in PR China, Laviziano (2001) also 
requires a criterion that the bank is locally incorporated. 
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be available from BankScope or Osiris (or from published financial statements for 
Indonesian banks), and the bank's capital market data must be obtainable from 
Datastream over the study period. 12 Based on the above criteria, we are able to 
develop a balanced panel of 46 banks from the 10 Asian countries for the six-year 
period 1998-2003 (see Appendix 2.2). 
As stated in Chapter 1, the present study uses a panel data methodology that 
includes both the fixed-effects and random-effects models. This methodology can 
improve our estimates since prior studies such as Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) and 
Mansur et al. (1993) indicate that their results suffer from the problem of 
multicollinearity. The results from a pooled OLS are provided for comparison 
purposes. 
2.3.2 Dependent Variables 
Previous studies use capital market measures of risk as dependent variables. 
With the exception of Brewer and Lee (1986), researchers mostly employ a single 
index market model. The present study also uses a single index market model to 
consider the availability of the data. Moreover, following Karels et al. (1989), we 
examine three capital market risk measures: total risk, systematic risk and 
unsystematic risk. 
Consistent with prior studies, we use Markowitz's (1952 and 1959) model in 
defining the capital market risk measures. In particular, Markowitz views the 
12 As described later, certain accounting risk measures (SDROA and CVCSTF) are estimated using a 
three-year moving window of annual observations. Therefore, we require that their input data are 
available from 1996 to 2003. 
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riskiness of a portfolio in terms of the variance of portfolio's return. 13 In this regard, 
the total return risk of the security, a 2(Ri), as measured by the variance can be written 
as: 
(2.1) 
The first term, /Ji 2 d(Rm), is called the systematic risk (non-diversifiable risk) 
while a 2(t:i), is called the specific (diversifiable or idiosyncratic) risk. Moreover, to 
estimate the systematic risk or market beta, we refer to the market model developed 
by Sharpe (1963 and 1964) as follows: 
(2.2) 
where Rir is the rate of return on security i on time t, O.i is the intercept, /Ji is the 
market beta coefficient for security i, Rmris the (relevant) market return on time t, and 
t:u is the disturbance term assumed to be normally distributed with mean of zero and 
We determine the bank's total risk on a per annum basis by computing the 
standard deviation of the daily stock returns, and multiplying by the square root of the 
trading days for the year. To estimate the beta for each bank for each year during our 
study period, the daily bank stock returns are regressed on the daily (relevant) market 
returns by using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression. We calculate the daily 
market returns for the relevant markets using the daily price index data from 
Datastream. Finally, non-systematic risk is defined as the annualized standard 
deviation of errors from the market model. For each year during our study period, we 
13 In the banking context, Neuberger (1991) has shown that the volatility of bank stock returns provide 
a good measure for bank risk. 
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multiply the standard deviation of errors from the market model (based on the OLS 
regressions) by the square root of the trading days to annualize the measure. 
2.3.3 Independent Variables 
The present study employs a slightly different set of independent variables 
compared to previous studies. As in Elyasiani and Mansur (2005), the choice of these 
variables has been basically dictated by availability of data. In particular, we use the 
standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets (SDROA) as the first 
independent variable.'Following Shiers (1994), we estimate SDROA in a three-year 
moving window of annual observations. 14 Brewer and Lee (1986) have also used a 
similar variable (i.e., the standard deviation of after-tax net-income-to-asset ratio), but 
it is computed for the whole period of their study (1979-1983). We expect that 
SD ROA will be positively related to the capital market risk measures. 
The second independent variable is a financial leverage ratio: the book-value-
of-equity-to-total-assets ratio (EQTA). Previous studies such as Pettway (1976), 
Jahankhani and Lynge (1980), Brewer and Lee (1986), and Karels et al. (1989) show 
that the financial leverage ratio is an important determinant of capital market risk 
measures, and a higher degree of financial leverage increases financial risk. Thus, we 
expect an inverse relation between EQT A and the capital market risk measures. 
The third independent variable is the gross-loans-to-total-assets ratio (GLTA) 
as used by Brewer and Lee (1986), and Mansur et al. (1993). This variable may 
14 Shiers (1994) uses a five-year moving window of annual observations. However, due to the data 
limitations we use a three-year approach. Other researchers such as Brailsford et al. (2002) also use a 
three-year estimate. 
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indicate the riskiness of banks' asset quality or credit risk. However, a high value for 
this ratio may also indicate a liquidity problem if a modest cash amount or fixed 
assets are the only items available for the remaining assets. Therefore, this ratio is 
expected to contribute positively to the capital market risk measures. 
The next independent variable is the loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans ratio 
(LLRGL). This ratio has been used by Mansur et al. (1993) and Hassan (1993). While 
GLTA may be used to estimate both credit risk and liquidity risk, LLRGL is only 
suitable to measure credit risk.15 More specifically, this ratio reflects management's 
estimate of exposure to credit risk, in which a higher ratio reflects a higher degree of 
expected loss in the loan portfolio. Thus, a positive relation between LLRGL and the 
capital market risk measures is expected. 
We also use the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets ratio (LIQATA) as an 
independent variable. Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) and Mansur et al. (1993) use a 
similar ratio (cash-and-due-from-banks-to-total-assets ratio) to measure bank 
liquidity. Basically, the greater the ratio, the less is the risk of illiquidity. Therefore, 
we expect an inverse relation between this ratio and the capital market risk measures. 
The coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds (CVCSTF) is 
the last accounting variable in our study. Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) and Mansur 
et al. (1993) also use this variable, but denote the ratio as the coefficient of variation 
of deposits. Similar to SDROA, this measure is estimated in a three-year moving 
window of annual observations. Since the volatility of banks' source of funds may 
15 Furlong (1988) also indicates that LLRGL measures loan risk or asset risk. For a discussion on the 
relation between loan-loss experience and bank risk taking, see, for example, Keeton and Morris 
(1988) and Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991). 
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increase bank liquidity risk and lead to instability in earnings, we expect a positive 
relation between this variable and capital market risk measures. 
The present study also includes country dummy variables (DCOUNTRY) to 
control for the difference in banking structure and regulatory environment, and 
economic and political features in the. respective country that may affect the relation 
between accounting and capital market measures of risk. 16 In implementing the 
dummy variables, Indonesia is used as the numeraire country. 
2.3.4 Empirical Model 
This study tests empirically the extent that accounting ratios explain capital 
market risk measures (CMRM). Specifically, the following general model is 
proposed: 
CMRM = a0 + a1 (SD ROA) + a2 (EQTA) + a3 (GLTA) + a4 (LLRGL) 
a=15 
+ a5(LIQATA) + a6(CVCSTF) + L DCOUNTRY +error (2.3) 
a=? 
where 
CMRM = total return risk, systematic risk or non-systematic risk, 
respectively. 
SDROA = the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets 
estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. 
EQTA the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets. 
GLTA = the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets. 
16 We thank an anonymous referee from the Journal of Banking and Finance for making this 
suggestion. 
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LLRGL = the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. 
LIQATA = the ratio ofliquid-assets-to-total-assets. 
CVCSTF = the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds 
estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. 
DCOUNTRY= country dummy variables. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Rank Transformation 
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for the raw variables in the sample. 
Total return risk as measured by the standard deviation of market returns (annualized) 
has a mean (median) of 65.98% (49.70%). The mean and the median of systematic 
risk is the same at 0.93. Moreover, the mean (median) of non-systematic risk as 
measured as the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression (annualized) 
is 58.19% (40.55%). Both total return risk and non-systematic risk show a highly 
skewed data distribution, and both exhibit substantial variation across the sample as 
indicated by their standard deviations of 55.13% (total return risk) and 55.61 % (non-
systematic risk). 
The independent variable distributions are highly skewed and exhibit a 
problem with outliers. Among the independent variables, only GLTA has a more 
normal data distribution as reflected by its skewness of 0.06. However, this variable 
still has a problem of outliers, as shown by its extreme maximum value of 137.30%. 
This value is attributable to Bank Danamon, an Indonesian bank. In 1998, Bank 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Capital Market Risk Measures and the Accounting Risk Measures. 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the raw variables. The study uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia over the 
six year period 1998-2003 (balanced panel). Total return risk is the annualized standard deviation of the banks' daily stock returns. Systematic risk is the beta of 
the banks' stock returns. Non-systematic risk is the annualized standard deviation of residual errors from the market model. SDROA is the standard deviation of 
the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. EQTA is the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets. GLTA 
is the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. LI QA TA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF 
is the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated over a three-year moving window of annual observations. All variables are presented 
as a percentage. There are 276 observations. 
Variables Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
Total return risk 65.983 49.702 55.134 14.831 532.805 4.120 
Systematic risk 0.932 0.933 0.411 -0.267 1.981 -0.102 
Non-systematic risk 58.185 40.552 55.606 11.390 529.222 4.175 
SD ROA 3.163 0.508 9.407 0.010 71.154 5.109 
EQTA 6.755 7.975 13.703 -126.596 25.322 -7.049 
GLTA 56.464 57.925 15.910 9.058 137.302 0.057 
LLRGL 7.041 4.648 8.347 0.659 60.353 3.566 
LIQATA 27.333 24.366 15.552 5.143 76.379 0.713 
CVCSTF 14.348 10.297 12.345 0.666 66.517 1.557 
Danamon had large gross loan exposures and loan loss reserve of Rp31.2 trillion and 
Rp18.8 trillion, respectively compared to Rp22.7 trillion in total assets. 
SDROA and EQTA have means (medians) of 3.16% (0.51 %) and 6.76% 
(7.98%), respectively, and these distributions are also highly skewed. The mean and 
median of EQT A reveals the average capital ratios of Asian banks in our sample are 
generally below 8%. This may be because several banks had negative capital in 
certain years during our study period, as reflected by the minimum value of EQTA of 
-126.60%. 17 
The mean (median) for LLRGL is 7.04% (4.65%). At a glance, these values 
show that the provisioning levels of loan losses in the sample seem to be adequate. 
However, looking at the minimum value of this variable (0.66% ), we could argue that 
some banks still have problems of inadequate loan loss reserves. The distributions of 
two liquidity ratios, CVCSTF and LIQ AT A, also exhibit skewness, but to a lesser 
extent compared to the other independent variables. These variables have a mean 
(median) of 14.35% (10.30%) and 27.33% (24.37%), respectively. 
The descriptive statistics show that, in general, our data are highly skewed, 
and contain outliers and negative values. The negative values preclude logarithm or 
square root transformation of the data to achieve normality. Therefore, following 
Kane and Meade (1998), we use the rank transformation treatment of outliers. 18 
17 We find that all banks that have a negative capital ratio come from Indonesia. These include the five 
banks (Lippa, Bii, Permata, Danamon, and Niaga) that were recapitalized by the Indonesian 
government following the 1997 /1998 crisis. The minimum value of EQT A of -126.60% is attributable 
to Bank Danamon in 1998. 
18 Rank transformation has been used in many studies. See, for example, Iman and Conover (1979), 
Cronan et al. (1986), Cheng et al. (1992), and Zou et al. (2003). 
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In employing rank transformation, for the vector [Xt,J, X1,2, ••• ,X1,n] of variable 
X for year t, we replace each value of X1 with its corresponding rank (ranging from 1 
to n in ascending sequence) divided by n+ 1. After aggregating the observations, we 
will have pooled data that are uniformly distributed between zero and one.19 Kane 
and Meade (1998) argue that rank transformation can solve some of the 
methodological problems of accounting based financial ratios, particularly non-
normal distributions, outliers, and negative ratios. 
2.4.2 Regression Results 
Table 2.3 presents the results based on the pooled OLS and panel data 
regressions including both the fixed-effects and random effects models. A series of 
specification tests (the F test, the LM test and the Hausman test) are conducted to 
determine the most appropriate specification. In each model (the total return risk, 
systematic risk and non-systematic risk models), the F test indicates that the fixed-
effects specification is better than the pooled OLS, whereas the LM test suggests that 
the random-effects specification is superior to the pooled OLS. The results of the two 
tests imply that the bank-specific effects are significant in our study, and hence the 
use of pooled OLS regression results may be biased. Therefore, we focus on panel 
data regressions and use the Hausman test to select the best model from the fixed-
effects and the random-effects results. The Hausman statistic is small and 
insignificant, except for under the systematic risk model. Despite this exception, the 
19 For more detail explanation concerning the rank transformation method, see Appendix 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 Estimated Coefficients from Regressing Capital Market Risk Measures on Accounting Risk Measures and 
Country Dummy Variables, Years 1998-2003 
Total return risk is the annualized standard deviation of the banks' daily stock returns. Systematic risk is the beta of the banks' stock returns. Non-
systematic risk is the annualized standard deviation of residual errors from the market model. SD ROA is the Standard deviation of the before-tax return on 
assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. EQTA is the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets. GLTA is the ratio of 
gross-loans-to-total-assets. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. LIQAT A is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF is the 
coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated over a three-year moving window of annual observations. Indonesia is the numeraire 
country and nine country dummy coefficients are used as 
a=15 L DCOUNTRY and the dummy coefficients range from a7 to a15. 
a=7 
a=15 
CMRM = Cl() + a1 (SDROA) + a2 (EQT A) + a3 (GLT A) + f14 (LLRGL) + ~(LIQAT A) + Cl() (CVCSTF) + L DCOUNTRY +error. 
a=7 
Dependent variables: Total return risk Systematic risk Non-systematic risk 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed 
variables: W! OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects 
Constant 0.546*** 0.363*** 0.607*** 0.314** 0.477*** 0.402*** 0.527*** 0.320*** 
(0.078) (0.117) (0.088) (0.151) (0.112) (0.140) (0.092) (0.108) 
SD ROA + 0.207*** 0.120 0.163** 0.030 0.030 0.033 0.212*** 0.086 
(0.079) (0.106) (0.084) (0.078) (0.072) (0.066) (0.082) (0.106) 
EQTA -0.031 -O.o25 -0.037 0.014 0.007 -0.005 0.009 --0.004 
(0.076) (0.115) (0.078) (0.124) (0.150) (0.111) (0.085) (0.121) 
GLTA + 0.138* 0.049 0.098 -0.008 0.022 0.014 0.186** 0.087 
(0.074) (0.085) (0.068) (0.100) (0.107) (0.091) (0.078) (0.076) 
LLRGL + 0.164** 0.155** 0.162*** 0.261 ** 0.015 0.118 0.116* 0.157*** 
(0.068) (0.061) (0.056) (0.112) (0.092) (0.086) (0.059) (0.058) 
LIQATA 0.021 -0.017 0.009 -0.042 -0.072 --0.043 0.027 0.013 
(0.076) (0.099) (0.073) (0.119) (0.127) (0.102) (0.068) (0.084) 
CVCSTF + 0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.015 0.044 0.018 0.051 0.020 
(0.043) (0.045) (0.039) (0.056) (0.066) (0.054) (0.047) (0.048) 
Hong Kong -0.440*** (dropped) -0.452*** -0.082 (dropped) -0.146 -0.418*** (dropped) 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.115) (0.115) (0.074) 
Malaysia -0.610*** (dropped) -0.609*** -0.073 (dropped) -0.110 -0.629*** (dropped) 
(0.048) (0.051) (0.113) (0.121) (0.050) 
Pakistan -0.129 (dropped) -0.147* 0.073 (dropped) 0.024 --0.108 (dropped) 
(0.085) (0.084) (0.113) (0.129) (0.074) 
Random 
Effects 
0.603*** 
(0.087) 
0.134 
(0.086) 
--0.004 
(0.085) 
0.131** 
(0.063) 
0.141 *** 
(0.050) 
0.022 
(0.060) 
0.030 
(0.043) 
--0.429*** 
(0.076) 
-0.623*** 
(0.054) 
-0.134** 
(0.069) 
(.).) 
....... 
Table 2.3 (continued) 
Dependent variables: Total return risk Systematic risk Non-systematic risk 
Philippines -0.451 *** (dropped) -0.456*** -0.205 (dropped) -0.209* -0.411 *** (dropped) -0.421 *** 
(0.068) (0.073) (0.128) (0.126) (0.076) (0.083) 
Singapore -0.556*** (dropped) -0.562*** 0.195* (dropped) 0.181 -0.662*** (dropped) -0.673*** 
(0.052) (0.055) (0.113) (0.113) (0.051) (0.053) 
South Korea -0.096*** (dropped) -0.101 *** 0.126 (dropped) 0.070 -0.139*** (dropped) -0.137*** 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.095) (0.101) (0.040) (0.038) 
Sri Lanka -0.358*** (dropped) -0.370*** 0.284** (dropped) 0.210* -0.421 *** (dropped) -0.430*** 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.117) (0.115) (0.063) (0.066) 
Taiwan -0.268*** (dropped) -0.275*** 0.171 (dropped) 0.069 -0.327*** (dropped) -0.325*** 
(0.095) (0.096) (0.130) (0.128) (0.096) (0.100) 
Thailand -0.371 *** (dropped) -0.356*** 0.326*** (dropped) 0.310*** -0.520*** (dropped) -0.496*** 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.097) (0.107) (0.057) (0.054) 
Ri 0.63 0.05 0.63 0.46 0.01 0.45 0.60 0.05 0.60 
F statistics 152.76*** 1.53 27.63*** 0.24 259.41 *** 1.97* 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 1.99*** 3.06*** 2.74*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 11.21 *** 32.99*** 27.86*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 5.31 12.55** 8.91 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 115.63*** 108.66*** 124.08*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 7.81 *** 6.32*** 7.93*** 
Notes: Results from panel data regressions. All variables are transformed using the rank transformation.*, **and*** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors (to account for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) are in parentheses. 
overall results support the random-effects specification against the fixed-effects 
specification.20 Accordingly, in the following discussion, we limit our discussion to 
the results of the random-effects specification. 
Because the data are pooled, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation may 
influence the OLS results. For the panel data analysis, a likelihood ratio test and the 
Wooldridge test identified heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, respectively.21 
Therefore, following Wooldridge (2002, 2003a), Arellano (1987, 2003) and Bertrand 
et al. (2004), cluster-robust variance and covariance estimators are used to resolve 
these issues. 22' 23 
The random-effects specification indicates that when total return risk is used 
as the dependent variable, SDROA and LLRGL show significant positive relations. 
When non-systematic risk is used as the dependent variable, LLRGL and GLTA 
exhibit significant positive relations. Surprisingly, when systematic risk is the 
dependent variable, none of the coefficients are significant, although all have the 
expected sign. 
2° For the systematic risk model, the Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effects specification is 
superior to the random-effects specification. However, we do not consider this result for the following 
reasons. First, the fixed-effects specification removes the country dummy variables. Second, the two 
specifications produce the same results with regard to the accounting variables. 
21 The details of these tests are provided at: http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/panel.html 
22 Using the cluster command in Stata 9.0, we can obtain cluster-robust variance and covariance 
estimator for panel data regressions (fixed-effects and random-effects) and pooled OLS. This estimator 
is called "a fully robust estimator" (Wooldridge, 2003a). See also StataCorp. (2005, p.293). In this 
study, clustering is assumed by banks. 
23 Some researchers use Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) or Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSE) to handle the two problems. We do not adopt these approaches because Greene (2003) 
indicates that they are more appropriate for data where the number of cross-sectional units is relatively 
small and the number of time periods is relatively large. See also StataCorp. (2005, pp.110 and 342). 
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These findings suggest firm-specific risk is more important in these countries 
than is systematic risk and are consistent with the results of Claessens et al. (2000) 
who indicate that most Asian listed firms are controlled by a single shareholder. This 
would suggest the major shareholder can substantially impact the behaviour of the 
bank and may be more concerned with bank-specific risk than systematic risk. Since 
the systematic risk measure is country-specific, the country dummy variable captures 
this information. 
All country dummy variable coefficients are negative and significant for the 
total return risk and non-systematic risk models. This indicates that the total risk and 
non-systematic risk of Indonesian banks are higher than banks from the other 
countries. However, under the systematic risk model, Thailand and Sri Lanka exhibit 
significantly positive coefficients and the Philippines has a significant and negative 
coefficient. Thus, the systematic risk of Indonesian banks is lower than Thailand and 
Sri Lanka, but higher than the Philippines. 
As shown in Table 2.1, most of the ten countries prohibit or restrict trading in 
securities, insurance, real estate investment, and ownership of non-financial firms. 
However, the restrictions differ across countries. Nevertheless, the panel data 
methodology and country dummy variables· combine to produce high R-squared 
values for the total return risk (63%), systematic risk (45%) and non-systematic risk 
(60%) models. In terms of explanatory power, the results are comparable to Elyasiani 
and Mansur (2005) who use OLS and ridge regression techniques and report an R-
squared of 40%, and McAnally (1996) who uses GLS regressions and reports an R-
squared of 42%. 
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As a comparison, using the fixed-effects specification, only LLRGL shows 
the expected and significant relation with capital market risk measures (i.e., the total 
return risk and non-systematic risk), and none of accounting risk measures shows a 
significant relation with the systematic risk. In addition, all country dummy variables 
are dropped from the models. Using the pooled OLS, three accounting ratios 
(SDROA, LLRGL and GLTA) exhibit a positive and significant relation with capital 
market risk measures (i.e., the total return risk and non-systematic risk). When the 
systematic risk is used as the dependent variable, only LLRGL shows the expected 
significant sign. 
2.4.3 Supplementary Analyses 
To check for robustness, three supplementary analyses are performed. First, to · 
consider general macroeconomic factors, year dummy variables are incorporated into 
the model (not reported in a table). The results are consistent, but all the year dummy 
variables are insignificant. 
The second supplementary analysis is conducted by excluding Indonesian 
banks from the full sample. We exclude Indonesian banks to ensure that our overall 
results are not driven by these banks. Enoch et al. (2001) assert that these banks 
suffered the most from the recent crises, and hence they may have extreme risk 
behaviour compared to other banks from other countries in our sample. We run the 
regressions using the sub-sample of non-Indonesian banks and use Thailand as the 
numeraire country (see Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4 Estimated Coefficients from Regressing Capital Market Risk Measures on Accounting Risk Measures and 
Country Dummy Variables, Years 1998-2003 (Excluding Indonesian banks) 
Total return risk is the annualized standard deviation of the banks' daily stock returns. Systematic risk is the beta of the banks' stock returns. Non-
systematic risk is the annualized standard deviation of residual errors from the market model. SDROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on 
assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. EQTA is the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets. GLTA is the ratio of 
gross-loans-to-total-assets. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. LIQATA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF is the 
coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated over a three-year moving window of annual observations. Thailand is the numeraire 
country and eight country dummy coefficients are used as 
a=l4 L DCOUNTRY and the dummy coefficients range from a7 to a14. 
a=7 
a=14 
CMRM = ll<J + a1 (SDROA) + a2 (EQTA) + a3 (GLTA) + a4 (LLRGL) + a5(LIQATA) + a6 (CVCSTF) + L DCOUNTRY +error. 
a=7 
Dependent variables: Total return risk Systematic risk Non-systematic risk 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: film OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.151 0.373** 0.242** 0.695*** 0.424*** 0.720*** -0.030 0.341 ** 0.101 
(0.114) (0.158) (0.124) (0.111) (0.129) (0.115) (0.136) (0.165) (0.136) 
SDROA + 0.226** 0.142 0.180* -0.013 -0.018 -0.019 0.223** 0.093 0.139 
(0.092) (0.111) (0.095) (0.058) (0.076) (0.063) (0.094) (0.109) (0.095) 
EQTA -0.043 -0.080 -0.062 -0.043 0.009 -0.024 0.013 -0.052 -0.024 
(0.132) (0.192) (0.133) (0.121) (0.128) (0.104) (0.145) (0.217) (0.148) 
GLTA + 0.187* 0.097 0.146 0.054 0.115 0.097 0.228** 0.107 0.159* 
(0.104) (0.118) (0.092) (0.100) (0.110) (0.085) (0.115) (0.115) (0.092) 
LLRGL + 0.224*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.164 0.001 0.062 0.185*** 0.240*** 0.217*** 
(0.081) (0.088) (0.073) (0.119) (0.080) (0.082) (0.067) (0.081) (0.066) 
LIQATA -0.028 -0.117 -0.069 0.042 0.057 0.059 -0.055 -0.101 -0.085 
(0.135) (0.180) (0.130) (0.140) (0.180) (0.137) (0.128) (0.163) (0.115) 
CVCSTF + 0.010 -0.011 -0.001 -0.059 -0.006 -0.026 O.Q78 0.034 -0.051 
(0.054) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.052) (0.042) (0.058) (0.056) (0.051) 
Hong Kong -0.006 (dropped) -0.018 -0.450*** (dropped) -0.501 *** 0.196* (dropped) 0.173* 
(0.093) (0.099) (0.094) (0.089) (0.100) (0.106) 
Malaysia -0.247**.* (dropped) -0.254*** -0.413*** (dropped) -0.445*** -0.107 (dropped) -0.116 
(0.066) (0.069) (0.067) (0.063) (0.070) (0.074) 
Pakistan 0.342*** (dropped) 0.324*** -0.296*** (dropped) -0.322** 0.546*** (dropped) 0.499*** 
(0.106) (0.103) (0.113) (0.132) (0.103) (0.091) 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Dependent variables: Total return risk Systematic risk Non-systematic risk 
Philippines -0.045 (dropped) -0.053 -0.514*** (dropped) -0.521 *** 0.165 (dropped) 0.142 
(0.093) (0.099) (0.099) (0.095) (0.111) (0.113) 
Singapore -0.162** (dropped) -0.168** -0.136 (dropped) -0.150* -0.117 (dropped) -0.141* 
(0.081) (0.084) (0.082) (0.082) (0.087) (0.086) 
South Korea 0.333*** (dropped) 0.309*** -0.204*** (dropped) -0.221 *** 0.462*** (dropped)· 0.430*** 
(0.058) (0.055) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071) (0.068) 
Sri Lanka 0.057 (dropped) 0.033 -0.061 (dropped) -0.112* 0.152** (dropped) 0.120 
(0.073) (0.075) (0.072) (0.068) (0.077) (0.081) 
Taiwan 0.148 (dropped) 0.125 -0.232*** (dropped) -0.308*** 0.255** (dropped) 0.235** 
(0.098) (0.103) (0.085) (0.075) (0.102) (0.111) 
R2 0.49 0.08 0.49 0.54 0.01 0.54 0.44 0.07 0.43 
F statistics 75.07*** 1.71 26.43*** 0.28 51.13*** 2.75*** 
N 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 1.94*** 2.98*** 2.75*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 9.05*** 29.52*** 24.28*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 3.63 5.68 6.42 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 69.06*** 117.65*** 70.87*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 6.51 ** 3.39* 6.45** 
Notes: Results from panel data regressions. All variables are transformed using the rank transformation. *, **and*** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors (to account for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) are in parentheses. 
Using the random-effects as the best specification,24 we find a consistent 
result, particularly for the accounting variables.25 However, the R-squared value of 
the total return risk model decreases from 63% (using the full sample) to 49% 
(excluding Indonesian banks). The R-squared value of the non-systematic risk model 
also decreases from 60% to 43%. In contrast, the R-squared value of the systematic 
risk model increases from 45% to 54%. These findings may indicate that the capital 
market condition in Indonesia is less favourable compared to that of the other 
countries, but the individual bank risk management as proxied by non-systematic 
risk, becomes more important.26 In general, these findings suggest that we basically 
do not need to exclude Indonesian banks from the full sample. 
Finally, we examine exclusively the sub-sample of Indonesian banks (see 
Table 2.5). Since we only have seven banks and the number of regressors is almost 
similar to the number of banks, we employ a simple regression analysis in which we 
take one independent variable and exclude extreme observations in each variable that 
has a highly skewed data distribution. In particular, we delete one observation for 
24 The specification tests (the F test, the LM test and the Hausman test) indicate that the random-effects 
specification is the best model. In addition, based on the likelihood ratio test and the Wooldridge test, 
we find the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. As before, to handle these 
problems, we use cluster-robust variance and covariance estimator. 
25 Some country dummy variables loss their significance. These include Sri Lanka, Philippines and 
Hong Kong under the total return risk model, and Sri Lanka, Philippines and Malaysia under the non-
systematic risk model. However, under the systematic risk model, all country dummy variables are 
negative and significant. 
26 Although the finance literature mostly explores the role of systematic risk (beta), some researchers 
argue that non-systematic risk is more important. See, for example, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) . 
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Table 2.5 Estimated Coefficients from Regressing Capital Market Risk Measures on Accounting Risk Measures and 
Country Dummy Variables, Y~ars 1998-2003 (Indonesian banks) 
Total return risk is the annualized standard deviation of the banks' daily stock returns. Systematic risk is the beta of the banks' stock returns. Non-systematic risk is the 
annualized standard deviation of residual errors from the market model. SDROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year 
moving window of annual observations. EQT A is the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets. GL TA is the ratio of gross-Joans-to-total-assets. LLRGL is the ratio of 
Joan-Joss-reserves-to-gross-Joans. LIQATA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF is the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated 
over a three-year moving window of annual observations. 
Total return risk Systematic risk Non-systematic risk 
Expected a p R' F N a p R' F N a p R' F N 
sign statistic statistic statistic 
SOROA + 98.431*** 1.695 0.24 2.83 38 0.862*** 0.008* 0.08 3.41* 40 94.752*** 1.670 0.24 2.80 38 
(15.622) (1.007) (0.088) (0.004) (15.476) (0.998) 
EQTA 124.622*** -2.056* 0.31 5.15* 38 0.936*** -0.003 O.QJ 0.32 39 120.477*** -1.999* 0.30 4.87* 38 
(11.932) (0.906) (0.071) (0.005) (11.694) (0.906) 
GLTA + 144.425*** -0.696 0.04 0.86 39 0.812*** 0.004 O.Q3 1.03 41 142.939*** -0.760 0.05 1.08 39 
(29.326) (0.749) (0.158) (0.004) (29.680) (0.732) 
LLRGL + 82.054*** 2.330*** 0.38 19.48*** 40 0.874*** 0.004 0.02 0.65 42 79.519*** 2.256*** 0.36 17.21*** 40 
(12.025) (0.528) (0.107) (0.005) (12.407) (0.544) 
LIQATA 110.857*** 0.308 0.QJ 0.63 40 0.962*** -0.001 0.00 0.04 42 104.637*** 0.376 0.02 1.13 40 
(23.624) (0.388) (0.130) (0.003) (21.946) (0.353) 
CVCSTF + 125.954*** -0.164 0.00 0.03 40 0.897*** 0.002 0.00 0.16 42 123.576*** -0.220 0.00 O.o5 40 
(25.190) (0.970) (0.127) (0.004) (24.828) (0.964) 
Notes: Results from the univariate analysis using the pooled OLS estimate. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors are used to account for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the total return risk and the non-
systematic risk models. Robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity are employed in the systematic risk model, particularly when EQTA is used as the 
independent variable. 
GLTA;27 two observations for total return risk, non-systematic and SDROA, 
respectively; and three observations for EQTA.28 We find that the total return risk and 
non-systematic risk models show the expected signs and are significant for EQTA 
and LLRGL, but systematic risk is only significantly positively related to SDROA.29 
2.5 Conclusions 
The relations between accounting and capital market measures of risk are 
examined for a sample of 46 listed banks from 10 countries in Asia during the period 
1998-2003. Using panel data analysis, the random-effects model indicates that the 
standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets (SDROA) and the loan-loss-
reserves-to-gross-loans ratio (LLRGL) are significantly related with total return risk. 
Moreover, LLRGL and the gross-loans-to-total-assets ratio (GLTA) exhibit a 
significant relation with non-systematic risk. However, none of the coefficients are 
significant when systematic risk is used as the dependent variable. 
The results indicate that in these Asian countries, firm-specific risk is more 
important than systematic risk. It appears that concentrated managerial control and 
27 This is the GLTA for Bank Danamon in 1998 (137.30%) as discussed earlier in the descriptive 
statistics section. 
28 Our data for EQTA includes negative ratios. If EQTA has a value less than -50%, we consider this 
as an outlier. 
29 As mentioned in Table 2.5, cluster-robust standard errors are employed to account for both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the total return risk and the non-systematic risk models. Since 
some researchers argue that cluster-robust standard errors are not appropriate when the number of 
observation is small (see, e.g., Bertrand et al., 2004), we repeat the previous regression analyses by 
employing the Newey and West (1987) estimator. Greene (2003) states this estimator requires the 
number of lags to be used should be the smallest integer greater than or equal to T114• In this study T = 
6, therefore, lags = 2. While other results are generally consistent, the expected coefficient on SDROA 
becomes positive and significant for both the total return risk and the non-systematic risk models. 
39 
specific country dummy variables subsume systematic risk. Also, because banks are 
the primary source of financing, other firms in the market index are impacted by the 
behaviour of banks. 
Similar to previous studies, the accounting ratios explain a substantial portion 
of capital market risk. Surprisingly, the results are robust even though significant 
differences exist across the sample countries in banking activities, capital adequacy 
requirements, and deposit insurance protection. Our results can be useful in the 
analysis of bank risk taking across Asian countries. 
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Appendix 2.1 Sample Selection Procedures 
Panel A BankScope and Osiris 
Reduced By 
No. Countries Initial Non- Non- Non- Without In cons is- Insuffi- Total Final Final Final 
Sample Commer- Locally December Finan- tent Data cient Data Reduc- Sample Sample Sample 
from cial Banks Incorpo- Accounting cial for ti on from from 
Bank- rated Year-End Data Balanced Bank- Data-
Scope Banks Panel Scope stream 
& & (see 
Osiris Osiris Panel 
B) 
1 Hong Kong 49 18 2 2 3 7 32 17 7 7 
2 Indonesia* 199 9 9 116 134 65 7 7 
3 Malaysia 45 6 11 1 12 30 15 2 2 
4 Pakistan 24 1 2 16 19 5 5 5 
5 Philiooines 41 1 3 1 21 26 15 6 6 
6 Singapore 26 8 3 1 1 11 24 2 2 2 
7 South Korea 31 1 1 20 22 9 4 4 
8 Sri Lanka 11 7 7 4 4 4 
9 Taiwan 44 1 4 3 14 22 22 2 2 
10 Thailand 17 1 8 9 8 7 7 
Total 487 34 6 22 16 15 232 325 162 46 46 
Notes: *=For Indonesia, the data come from the banks' published financial statements. The 65 Indonesian banks in the final sample from BankScope and Osms 
will be used as the sample banks in Essays 3 and 4 (Chapters 4 and 5). 
.j::.. 
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Panel B Datastream 
No. Countries 
1 Hong Kong 
2 Indonesia 
3 Malaysia 
4 Pakistan 
5 Philippines 
6 Singapore 
7 South Korea 
8 Sri Lanka 
9 Taiwan 
10 Thailand 
Total 
Initial Non- Non-
Sample Commercial December 
from Banks Accounting 
Data- Year-End 
stream 
11 2 
13 
10 6 
7 
9 1 
3 
7 1 
7 1 
2 
9 1 
78 12 
Reduced By 
Inconsistent Insufficient Not Insufficient Total Final 
Data Data for Included in Data in Reduction Sample 
Balanced BankScope BankScope from 
Panel Data-
stream 
2 4 7 
6 6 7 
2 8 2 
2 2 5 
2 3 6 
1 1 2 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
0 2 
1 2 7 
2 1 12 2 3 32 46 
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Appendix 2.2 Sample Banks and their Country of Operations 
Hong Kong 
Countries and 
Bank Names 
1. Wing Lung Bank Ltd 
2. Wing Hang Bank Ltd 
3. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd 
4. International Bank of Asia 
5. ICBC (Asia) Ltd 
6. Hang Seng Bank Ltd 
7. Bank of East Asia Ltd 
Indonesia 
1. Panin 
2.NISP 
3. Lippo 
4. Bil 
5. Permata 
6. Danamon 
7. Niaga 
Malaysia 
1. Southern Bank Bhd 
2. Public Bank Bhd 
Pakistan 
Countries and 
Bank Names 
1. PICIC Commercial Bank Ltd 
2. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd 
3. Metropolitan Bank Ltd 
4. Bank of Punjab 
5. Askari Commercial Bank Ltd 
Philippines 
1. Union Bank of the Philippines 
2. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. 
3. Philippine National Bank 
4. Metropolitan Trust and Bank Company 
5. China Banking Corporation - Chinabank 
6. Bank of the Philippine Islands 
Singapore 
1. United Overseas Bank Ltd - UOB 
2. Oversea-Chinese Banking Co Ltd - OCBC 
South Korea 
1. Pusan Bank 
2. Korea Exchange Bank 
3. HanaBank 
4. Daegu Bank 
Sri Lanka 
1. Seylan Bank 
2. Sampath Bank 
Countries and 
Bank Names 
3. Hatton National Bank Ltd 
4. Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd 
Taiwan 
1. International Bank of Taipei 
2. Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd 
Thailand 
1. Thai Military Bank Pel 
2. Siam Commercial Bank Pel 
3. Krung Thai Bank Pel 
4. Kasikornbank Pel 
5. Bank of Ayudhya Pel 
6. Bank of Asia Pel 
7. Bangkok Bank Pel 
Notes: Market Indices: Hang Seng (Hong Kong); Jakarta Composite (Indonesia); KLSE (Malaysia); Karachi 100 (Pakistan); PSE Composite (Philippines); 
Strait Times- New (Singapore); Seoul Composite (South Korea); All Share (Sri Lanka); Taiwan Weighted (Taiwan); SET (Thailand). 
Appendix 2.3 The Rank Transformation - Method and Example 
For the vector [X1,1, X1,2, ••• ,X1,n] of variable X for year t, we replace each value of X1 
with its corresponding rank (ranging from 1 to n in ascending sequence) divided by 
n+ I. Then, after aggregating the observations, we have pooled data that are 
uniformly distributed between zero and one. 
To illustrate the implementation of rank transformation, we use the raw data of the 
variable SDROA for the year 1998 for 46 banks in our sample as an example. 
Bank Identity Number (ID) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Raw Data 
2.086 
2.891 
4.075 
4.203 
1.870 
3.841 
3.387 
0.196 
0.149 
0.265 
0.239 
0.038 
0.069 
0.611 
0.401 
0.593 
0.651 
3.444 
0.354 
0.329 
0.350 
2.491 
0.320 
0.181 
0.172 
0.141 
0.772 
0.872 
3.239 
1.415 
2.266 
2.824 
0.506 
0.633 
0.659 
0.840 
1.025 
0.437 
0.679 
1.144 
0.449 
34.293 
22.800 
16.664 
71.154 
19.050 
We transform the above raw data, by first rearranging them in ascending rank (from 1 
to 46). We then replace each value of SDROA for each bank with its corresponding 
rank divided by 46+ 1 or 4 7. 
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For example: 
• Bank No.12, its raw datum is 0.038 and its corresponding rank IS 1. The 
transformed datum for this bank is 1 divided by 47 = 0.021. 
• Bank No.13, its raw datum is 0.069 and its corresponding rank Is 2. The 
transformed datum for this bank is 2 divided by 47 = 0.043. 
• Bank No.26, its raw datum is 0.141 and its corresponding rank is 3. The 
transformed datum for this bank is 3 divided by 4 7 = 0.064. 
We repeat the above procedures for the data for the year 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 
2003, respectively. This results in a pooled data (transformed) of SDROA over the 
period 1998-2003. These transformed data are used in the regression analysis. The 
same procedures are applied to other variables. 
Bank Identity Number (ID) 
12 
13 
26 
9 
25 
24 
8 
11 
10 
23 
20 
21 
19 
I5 
38 
41 
33 
16 
14 
34 
17 
35 
39 
.27 
36 
28 
37 
40 
30 
5 
1 
31 
22 
32 
2 
29 
7 
18 
6 
3 
4 
44 
46 
43 
42 
45 
Raw Data 
0.038 
0.069 
0.141 
0.149 
0.172 
0.181 
0.196 
0.239 
0.265 
0.320 
0.329 
0.350 
0.354 
0.401 
0.437 
0.449 
0.506 
0.593 
0.611 
0.633 
0.651 
0.659 
0.679 
0.772 
0.840 
0.872 
1.025 
1.144 
1.415 
1.870 
2.086 
2.266 
2.491 
2.824 
2.891 
3.239 
3.387 
3.444 
3.841 
4.075 
4.203 
16.664 
19.050 
22.800 
34.293 
71.154 
45 
Rank (Ascending) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
I2 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Transformed Data 
0.021 
0.043 
0.064 
0.085 
0.106 
0.128 
0.149 
0.170 
0.191 
0.213 
0.234 
0.255 
0.277 
0.298 
0.319 
0.340 
0.362 
0.383 
0.404 
0.426 
0.447 
0.468 
0.489 
0.511 
0.532 
0.553 
0.574 
0.596 
0.617 
0.638 
0.660 
0.68I 
0.702 
0.723 
0.745 
0.766 
0.787 
0.809 
0.830 
0.85I 
0.872 
0.894 
0.9I5 
0.936 
0.957 
0.979 
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Chapter3 
Bank Moral Hazard and the Disciplining Factors of Risk Taking: 
Evidence from Asian Banks during 1998-2003 
3.1 Introduction 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assert that deposit insurance is useful to prevent 
bank runs, but may encourage excessive risk taking, resulting in an increase in bank 
failure. Based on the principal-agent relation between deposit insurers and insured 
institutions, Sinkey (1989) argues that the primary source of moral hazard in the 
presence of deposit insurance is asymmetric information. The asymmetry exists 
because insured institutions know more about their risk exposure than deposit 
insurers can be expected to know, and some risks may not be under regulatory 
scrutiny. Similarly, Prescott (2001) states that limited liability creates incentives for 
highly leveraged firms to take excessive risk, and these incentives are made worse in 
banking because of deposit insurance. White (2002) indicates that the potential for 
moral hazard by banks is ever-present because their financial structures make them 
prone to the moral hazard problem. In particular, limited liability creates moral 
hazard incentives for bank owners or bank managers to engage in riskier activities, in 
which the bank owners will capture the benefits from the upside outcomes of risky 
ventures, but their losses from the downside outcomes are limited to their equity 
stake. Consequently, insured institutions have opportunities to exploit the insurance 
fund by passing some portions of their risk-taking onto the insurers. Prior research 
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has explored bank moral hazard, including whether risk shifting occurs from banks to 
safety nets.30 
Following the 1997 /1998 banking crises, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
adopted explicit deposit insurance, known as blanket guarantee schemes (BGS). The 
BGS is designed to restore confidence in the national banking system and maintain 
financial stability. The Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan had explicit 
deposit insurance at the time of the crises (see Table 3.1). An important issue is 
whether Asian banks exploit the safety nets, and if there is evidence of bank risk 
shifting. 
The present study examines the moral hazard issue in Asian banks and 
investigates the effectiveness of market, regulatory and bank self discipline (charter 
value) in limiting risk taking. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. 
The study is the first to examine the presence of moral hazard or risk shifting 
behaviour in Asian banks following crises. Second, since the research on bank risk 
shifting requires an estimation of the fair (risk-adjusted) deposit insurance premium, 
the study estimates the fair deposit insurance premium for Asian banks. The focus is 
on the occurrence of bank risk shifting, not the absolute size of the fair premium, or 
the under- or over-pricing of deposit insurance. Third, empirical evidence is 
30 Boyd et al. (1998) indicate two types of moral hazard in banking. The first is moral hazard that 
arises in the relationship between banks and the agents to whom they provide funds, and the second is 
moral hazard problem between banks and the providers of deposit insurance. De Juan (1999) asserts 
that there are several kinds of moral hazard in banking (e.g., bankers', depositors', creditors,' 
borrowers', and supervisors' moral hazard). Deposit insurance, bank restructuring and last resort 
lending may also lead to moral hazard. Gueyie and Lai (2003) examine bank moral hazard in terms of 
the occurrence of bank risk shifting. 
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Table 3.1 Features of the Deposit Insurance Schemes in the Sample Countries 1998-2003 
No. Countries Type of Year 
Insurance Established 
1. Hong Kong Implicit n.a. 
2. Indonesia Explicit (BGS) 1998 
3. Malaysia Explicit (BGS) 1998 
4. Pakistan Implicit n.a. 
5. Philippines Explicit (Limited) 1963 
6. Singapore Implicit n.a. 
7. South Korea Explicit (BGS and Limited)* 1995 
8. Sri Lanka Explicit (Limited) 1987 
9. Taiwan Explicit (Limited) 1985 
10. Thailand Explicit (BGS) 1997 
Notes: * = BGS is adopted during 1998-2000, the rest are limited guarantee. n.a. =not applicable. 
Sources: Baxendale (2005), Schwiering (2003), Laeven (2002), and Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2005) . 
Insurance Premium 
(%of insured deposits) 
n.a. 
0.25 
n.a. 
0.20 
n.a. 
0.10 to 0.30 
0.15 
O.Q15 to 0.02 (risk-based) 
0.20 
provided on the relation between charter value and risk taking in Asia while most 
prior studies have examined the issue from a US perspective. 
Using a panel data methodology with a rank transformation treatment of 
outliers,31 strong evidence of bank risk shifting is found, suggesting the existence of 
moral hazard in Asian banks. Market and regulatory discipline attempt to limit risk 
taking by forcing the banks to adjust their capital in relation to asset risk defined as 
the standard deviation of asset returns. But, market and regulatory discipline is 
insufficient to mitigate banks from exploiting the safety nets. Moreover, it appears 
that charter value is effective in limiting leverage risk, credit risk and liquidity risk, 
but fails to alleviate asset risk. Charter value also fails to reduce bank risk taking 
when the fair deposit insurance premium is used as a proxy for bank risk. In addition, 
implicit guarantees seem to be the main source of bank moral hazard, indicating that 
explicit deposit insurance might have played an important role in enhancing financial 
stability following the recent banking crises. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Bank Risk Shifting Behaviour 
Duan et al. (1992) provide a framework to examine risk shifting behaviour in 
commercial banks. Their framework is based on Merton (1977), the first study that 
shows an analogy between deposit insurance and writing a European put option on 
31 Hovakimian et al. (2003) indicate that in examining the presence of risk-shifting behaviour, the 
focus is on the signs (not the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients). Moreover, Osborne and Lee 
(2001) assert that in investigating the link between charter value and bank risk taking, the focus is the 
direction and the strength of the relation. Therefore, the present study can rely on rank transformation. 
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bank assets. Using the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model, Merton (1977) 
develops a relation between deposit insurance and a European put option on the asset 
value of the banks. In his model, a bank issues a single, homogeneous-term debt. It is 
assumed that the bank's asset value (V) follows a lognormal process with known 
mean and volatility parameters (crv). Moreover, the put option has a maturity equal to 
the auditing period (7) and the striking price equals the maturity values of the debt. It 
is also assumed that deposits equal total bank debt (B) and that both principal and 
interest are insured. The value of deposit insurance premium per dollar of insured 
deposit (!PP) is expressed as follows: 
/PP= N (y + CTv...JT)- (V/B) N(y) (3.1) 
where: 
N = the cumulative standard normal density function 
To use Merton (1977), estimates of the unobserved market value of bank 
assets (V) and their volatility (crv) are needed. Ronn and Verma (1986) suggest using 
two restrictions for the identification of the two variables. The first restriction is 
obtained by viewing the market equity value of the bank, E, which is directly 
observable, as a call option on the bank's assets with a strike price equal to the value 
of the bank's debt. This can be expressed as follows: 
E= VN(x)-BN(x-crv ...JT) (3.2) 
where: 
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The second restriction is the relation between the equity and asset volatility. It is 
stated as follows: 
<JE=[<JvVN(x)]IE (3.3) 
where <JE is the standard deviation of equity returns. 
By simultaneously solving the two restrictions, Ronn and Verma (1986) assert that 
one can find the estimates for V and <Jv. 
Based on Merton (1977), Duan et al. (1992) argue that fixed-rate deposit 
insurance provides banks with an incentive to shift risk to the FDIC, and hence 
expropriate wealth. Specifically, banks can achieve the wealth transfer by increasing 
their overall risk, thus increasing the actuarial value of the deposit insurance. To 
analyse bank risk shifting behaviour, they begin with the approximate change in the 
per dollar deposit insurance premium (AfPP) with respect to changes in asset risk 
(Li<Jv), as follows: 
AfPP ~ 8/PP Li<Jv + 8/PP d{B/V) Li<Jv (3.4) 
o<Jv o(BIV) d<Jv 
Then, they denote 0.1 = {d(BIV)!d<Jv} (3.5) 
Hence, Equation 3.4 can be restated as: 
(3.6) 
where 
flJ = 8IPP + 8/PP 0.1 
o<Jv o(BIV) 
Duan et al. (1992) emphasize that bank risk shifting is taking place when 
fJ1>0. Since Merton (1977) indicates that {8IPP/8<Jv} and {8IPP/8(BIV)} are positive, 
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they indicate that the sign of /h depends on the sign and magnitude of the term a1. 
With this theoretical background, two hypotheses are offered: (1) Hypothesis 1: 
a1 2'.: 0, and (2) Hypothesis 2: /h ::'.:: 0. The rejection of Hypothesis 1 indicates that risk 
shifting is mitigated, but it is not sufficient to conclude that risk shifting is not 
present. The rejection of Hypothesis 2 suggests the presence of risk shifting. Two 
basic equations are developed based on these hypotheses. The first equation shows 
the relation between asset risk (O"v) and leverage risk (BIV). The second equation 
shows the relation between asset risk (O"v) and the fair deposit insurance premium 
(!PP). Since risk shifting is only successful when fJ1>0, the final conclusion about the 
presence of bank risk shifting depends on the second equation. 
To test their hypotheses, Duan et al. (1992) examine a sample of 30 large US 
banks during the period 1976-1986. Using ordinary least squares regressions (OLS), 
they find only one bank that has a significantly positive relation between asset risk 
and leverage risk. This indicates that the bank has been successful in shifting risk, but 
it is not a sufficient condition to make a general conclusion. Then, based on OLS 
regressions on the second relation, they find six banks that show a significantly 
positive relation between asset risk and the fair deposit insurance premium, including 
the one bank that exhibits a positive relation between asset risk and leverage risk in 
the first relation. Therefore, they conclude that, in general, risk-shifting is not 
widespread. 
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) use a sample of 123 US banks over the period 
1985-1994 to examine whether risk shifting incentives exist, and whether capital 
regulation and outside (market) discipline can control risk shifting. They also use an 
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option-based methodology to pnce each bank's actuarial liability to the deposit 
insurers, and run ordinary least square regressions to test the risk shifting hypothesis. 
However, they use a slightly different approach compared to Duan et al. (1992) in 
which all variables (asset risk, leverage risk and the deposit insurance premium) in 
their study are stated in forms of "changes", instead of a "position" at a particular 
time. In testing the two-equation model, Hovakimian and Kane (2000) examine (1) 
the relation between the changes in asset risk and the changes in leverage risk, and (2) 
the relation between the changes in asset risk and the changes in the fair deposit 
insurance premium. In this regard, they offer two hypotheses: (1) Hypothesis I: 
a.1 < 0, and (2) Hypothesis 2: /lJ :'.:: 0. They argue that failing to reject Hypothesis 1 
suggests that risk restraints on leverage (BIV) do, to some extent, discipline efforts to 
increase the volatility of bank returns (av). Although a.1 is negative, risk shifting 
incentives still exist if /h is positive. Their results show that risk shifting incentives 
exist and, at the margin, aggressive banks extract a deposit insurance subsidy. In 
addition, risk-taking incentives prove strongest at troubled banks and at banks with 
high ratios of deposits to total debt. They also find capital regulation does not prevent 
large banks from shifting risk onto the safety nets, but some market and regulatory 
discipline is exerted on bank risk taking. 
Hovakimian et al. (2003) examine how country and safety net characteristics 
affect bank risk shifting. They investigate how well authorities in 56 countries have 
restrained bank risk shifting incentives over the period 1991-1999. They focus on the 
role of market and regulatory discipline in neutralizing risk shifting incentives. They 
do not offer any hypothesis, but indicate that two conditions must be met for market 
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and regulatory pressure to potentially neutralize bank risk shifting incentives: 
(1) capital increases with volatility: a.1 < 0, and (2) guarantee values do not rise with 
volatility: fJ1 ::; 0. Risk shifting incentives are fully neutralized only if /31 is non-
positive. These authors use a panel data methodology to test the relation between 
asset risk and in leverage risk, and the relation between asset risk and the fair deposit 
insurance premium. They find that although significant risk-shifting occurs on 
average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across 
countries. They also find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate 
risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-sensitive, 
coverage limits and coinsurance. 
Using a bank risk shifting hypothesis, Gueyie and Lai (2003) examine the 
effects of the introduction of official deposit insurance in 1967 on bank moral hazard 
in Canada. They employ a sample of the five biggest chartered banks during 1959-
1982. Two sub-hypotheses are tested: 32 (1) Sub-hypothesis 1: a.1 < 0, and (2) Sub-
hypothesis 2: /31 ::; 0. They indicate that bank risk shifting is successful when /31 >0. 
In testing the Sub-hypothesis 1, these researchers use a capital ratio (the ratio of 
market value of bank equity to market value of bank assets) instead of the leverage 
ratio (BIV), and follow Duan et al. (1992) who investigate a relation between asset 
risk and leverage risk. However, to test the Sub-hypothesis 2, they follow 
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) who examine a relation between the changes in asset 
risk and the changes in the fair deposit insurance premium. They find a positive 
32 Their main hypothesis is that after the adoption of the fixed-rate deposit insurance in 1967, Canadian 
chartered banks adopted a risk-shifting behaviour to exploit the deposit insurance system. 
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relation between asset risk and bank capital ratio, indicating that Canadian banks 
adjusted their capitalization as a function of their asset risk. They also find a negative 
relation between the changes in asset risk. and the changes in the fair deposit 
insurance premium, suggesting that risk shifting is not taking place. Overall they 
conclude that they fail to detect the presence of moral hazard in the Canadian banking 
industry after the introduction of deposit insurance. 
Gueyie and Lai (2003) argue that risk shifting behaviour indicates bank moral 
hazard. In the context of Asian banks, moral hazard is a long standing issue. Authors 
such as Krugman (1998) and McKinnon and Pill (1998 and 1999) assert that deposit 
insurance and other implicit guarantees for banks are the major sources of moral 
hazard in Asian banks. They also claim that bank moral hazard is one of the major 
causes of the recent crises in Asia. 
Following the crises, several countries in Asia, particularly those countries 
that experienced the crises, moved to adopt international standards in banking 
supervision and to enhance corporate governance and transparency in banking 
organizations. Lindgren et al. (1999) indicate that, in these countries, maJor 
regulations such as capital requirements, loan classification and loan loss 
provisioning have been updated according to international standards, along with an 
improvement in the institutional environment. Moreover, based on a survey on bank 
corporate governance in four countries in Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, 
and Thailand), Nam and Lum (2005) report that the central banks in these countries 
have given high priority to regulatory changes that encourage disclosure of relevant 
information in the banking industry. An increase in bank financial disclosure would 
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facilitate the use of market discipline in mitigating bank risk taking. These countries 
also adopt a range of bank restructuring policies including recapitalization programs 
to strengthen capital of major banks (Williams and Nguyen, 2005). Since Asian banks 
have improved their transparency and strengthened their capital following the crises, 
the relation between asset risk and leverage risk should be negative. 
However, the above efforts may not be fully effective in reducing moral 
hazard in Asian banks for several reasons. First, moral hazard has a long history in 
Asian banks and may not be easy to eliminate. Second, most bank restructuring 
programs and other policies to improve banking supervision and bank corporate 
·governance come from outside the countries (e.g., the IMF). The crisis countries may 
need some time for learning the new processes. Consequently, the new banking 
policies may not be directly effective in limiting bank moral hazard. Third, following 
the crises, Indonesia, Malaysia, S?uth Korea, and Thailand adopted blanket guarantee 
schemes (BGS). Although the purpose of a BGS is to restore confidence in the 
national banking system and maintain financial stability, like other deposit insurance 
programs, it may encourage moral hazard. Several authors have expressed their 
concerns on moral hazard consequences of the BGS [see, e.g., Fischer (2001), 
McLeod (2003 and 2006), Fane and McLeod (2002), Enoch et al. (2001)]. Therefore, 
we expect that during 1998-2003, bank moral hazard or risk shifting behaviour still 
exists in Asian banks. Hence, the relation between asset risk and the fair deposit 
insurance would be positive. Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: There is risk shifting behaviour in Asian banks during 1998-2003. 
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Sub-hypothesis 1.1.: There is a negative relation between asset risk and leverage 
risk in Asian banks during 1998-2003. 
Sub-hypothesis 1.2: There is a positive relation between asset risk and the fair 
deposit insurance premium in Asian banks during 1998-2003. 
3.2.2 Bank Self Discipline 
In this study, bank self discipline refers to charter value. A number of studies 
have investigated the relation between charter value and bank risk taking. Keeley 
(1990) provides a basic insight for empirical research on this issue. He argues that the 
increased competition since 1950s may have reduced banks' incentives to act 
prudently with regard to risk taking. Using a sample of 85 large bank holding 
companies in the US over the period 1970-1986, he finds that banks with larger 
market-to-book asset ratios (a proxy for charter value) hold more capital relative to 
assets (on a market-value basis) and they have a lower default risk. 
Demsetz et al. (1996) investigate whether franchise value has a disciplinary 
role for bank risk taking. They examine the relation between franchise value (the 
market-to-book asset ratio) and risk taking using a sample of more than 100 US bank 
holding companies (BHCs) over the period 1986-1994. They use panel data 
methodology, and employ a variety of accounting and capital market risk measures. 
As expected, they find an inverse relation between franchise value and all-in risk, and 
between franchise value and systematic and firm-specific risk, respectively. They also 
find that banks with more franchise value hold more capital and have less asset risk 
than banks with less franchise value. Moreover, banks with high franchise value 
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maintain better diversified loan portfolio. They conclude that franchise value has a 
disciplinary role in controlling bank risk taking. 
Galloway et al. (1997) further explore the disciplinary role of charter value. 
They identify two risk-control devices in bank supervision: (1) bank charter value, 
and (2) regulatory supervision. They argue that the two risk-control devices are 
complementary, and therefore, include them in a study on banks' changing incentives 
and opportunities for risk taking using a sample of 86 commercial banks and bank 
holding companies in the US during 1977-1994. They examine a lagged relation 
between charter value and risk taking, and focus on the relation between the bank's 
ex-ante risk taking incentives and ex-post risk taking behaviour. They find no 
statistical difference between the ex-post risk taking behaviour of high and low-
incentives banks during 1977-1982 (the pre-deregulatory and the deregulatory 
regimes).33 However, banks with high risk taking incentives have significantly higher 
ex-post risk taking than banks with low risk-taking incentives during 1983-1989 (the 
post-deregulatory regime). During the re-regulatory regime over 1990-1994, they find 
that banks with high risk taking incentives continued to take on significantly more 
risk than those with low risk-taking incentives. In general, their results suggest a 
negative relation between charter value and bank risk. Also, banks with high charter 
value imposed self-discipline on risk-taking behaviour at all time and banks with high 
risk taking incentives generally assumed more risk when given the opportunity. 
33 A bank is classified as having high (low) risk-taking incentives if its market-to-book equity (a proxy 
for charter value) is less (greater) than 1.0. 
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Osborne and Lee (2001) also use a lagged relation between charter value and 
bank risk taking in a study on the effects of deposit insurance reform on moral hazard 
in US banking. They argue that the reforms legislated with the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 may affect the relations between 
bank risk taking and three variables previously found to play an important role in the 
moral hazard induced by deposit insurance, namely: charter value (market-to-book-
equity ), bank size (total assets), and bank capital (capital-to-asset ratio). They 
examine a sample of 82 banks during 1988-1996 using pooled OLS. A dummy 
interaction variable [1 =after reform (1993-1995), 0 =before reform (1988-1991)] is 
employed to compare the pre- and post-reform effects. When unsystematic risk is 
used as the dependent variable, they do not find any significant coefficients before 
and after reform. However, when systematic risk is used as the dependent variable, 
they find that during the pre-reform period, larger banks and banks with lower charter 
values or capital tend to pursue riskier strategies. After the reform, the relation 
between systematic risk and charter value or asset size are significantly weaker. 
Konishi and Yasuda (2004) examine the relation between franchise value and 
bank risk taking using a sample of panel data 48 regional banks in Japan during 1990-
1999. As expected, they find a significantly negative relation between franchise value 
and two risk measures (total risk and firm-specific risk). But, the relation between 
franchise value and market risk is positive and significant, and a similar result is also 
found on the relation between franchise value and interest rate risk. 
Bank charter value has also been included as a control variable in several 
studies [e.g., Demsetz et al. (1997), Anderson and Fraser (2000), and Gueyie and Lai 
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(2003)]. With the exception of Gueyie and Lai (2003), these studies document a 
significant negative relation between charter value and bank risk taking.34 
Meanwhile, several studies have explored the role of charter value in non-banking 
financial firms. These include Brewer et al. (1996) in the life insurance industry; 
Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) in savings institutions; and Cebenoyan et al. (1999) in 
the thrift industry. In general, they also find a negative and significant relation 
between charter value and risk taking. 
The above reviews show that charter value has a disciplinary role in 
controlling bank risk taking. Several researchers have explained the mechanism that 
makes charter value mitigate excessive risk taking. Demsetz et al. (1997) state that 
charter value works to reduce moral hazard by increasing the cost of financial distress 
and thereby lowering shareholders' desired level of risk. Chan et al. (1992) claim that 
charter value serves as a bankruptcy cost, and assert that moral hazard is less of a 
problem when charter value discourages high-risk strategies. 
Consistent with the results from previous studies, we expect that bank 
franchise value will operate to reduce moral hazard, and thus lower bank risk. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relation between charter value and bank risk 
taking in Asian banks during 1998-2003. 
34 Gueyie and Lai (2003) find that although charter value is negatively associated with market, interest-
rate and asset risks, these relations are not significant. 
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3.3 Data and Method 
3.3.1 Data, Sample and Method 
This chapter uses the same sample of banks as in Chapter 2. As stated earlier, 
the 46 banks in our sample come from 10 countries in Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and 
Thailand) over the period 1998-2003. Accounting and capital market data are 
collected from the same sources as identified in the previous chapter. In addition, the 
macroeconomic data (GDP growth) are obtained from "World Economic Outlook" 
[International Monetary Fund (IMF), April 2004]. 
Following Gueyie and Lai (2003) and Hovakimian et al. (2003) in examining 
bank risk shifting, and Demsetz et al. (1996) in investigating bank self discipline, this 
study also uses a panel data methodology (the fixed-effects and random-effects). For 
comparison purposes, the results based on the pooled OLS are also presented. 
3.3.2 Empirical Models 
Our models are based on pnor research. To test the bank risk shifting 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), following Duan et al. (1992) and Hovakimian et al. 
(2003), we offer two general models: 
LEVRISK = a 0 + a1ARISK + error (3.7) 
IPP = Po+ P1ARISK + error (3.8) 
where LEVRISK is leverage risk, IPP is the fair deposit insurance premium, and 
ARISK is asset risk. Equations 3.7 and 3.8 are used to testSub-hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 
respectively. 
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To test the bank self discipline hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), we propose the 
following model: 
RM= yo+ y1MTBE + Y2SIZE + y3GDPGR +error (3.9) 
where RM is one of the risk measures, MTBE is the market-to-book equity ratio (a 
proxy for bank charter value), SIZE is the bank's total assets, and GDPGR is the 
annual percentage change in gross domestic products (a measure of macroeconomic 
d. . ) 35 con 1t10ns . 
3.3.3 Dependent Variables 
In equations 3.7 and 3.8, LEVRISK and IPP are the dependent variables 
respectively. LEVRISK is leverage risk, measured as the ratio of the face value of 
liabilities to the market value of assets (BIV), whereas IPP is the fair deposit insurance 
premium. We use Merton (1977) to calculate the annual fair (risk-based) deposit 
insurance premium (equation 3.1).36· 37 Because Merton (1977) requires estimates of 
35 Following Keeley (1990), Dernsetz et al. (1996), Anderson and Fraser (2000), and Brewer et al. 
1996), we employ a contemporaneous analysis in this study. 
36 Ronn and Verma (1986) modified Merton (1977) by including a closure rule (p) and dividend 
information [dividend per dollar of value of the assets (<:5) paid n times per period]. However, we do not 
use their approach because closure rules are not relevant in our study. Our sample includes 
recapitalized banks. Bank recapitalization programs may distort closure rules since insolvent banks are 
still allowed to continue their businesses and even be recapitalized. In addition, we do not have 
information on how many times banks in our sample paid dividends per year (n). Laeven (2002) uses 
dividend yield and excludes the "n" from the formula. We prefer to employ Merton (1977) as also 
used by Duan and Yu (1994) and Kaplan-Appio (2002). 
37 Merton (1977) is a single-period put option model. Several authors use a multi-period model [see, 
e.g., Pennacchi (1987a and 1987b), and Cooperstein et al. 0995)]. Hovakimian and Kane (2000) 
indicate that single-period models understate stockholder benefits from deposit insurance more than 
multi-period models do. However, because the main focus of our study is the occurrence of bank risk 
shifting (not the over or under pricing of deposit insurance), using Merton (1977) is appropriate. 
62 
the market value of banks assets (V) and asset risk (av) as an input, following Ronn 
and Verma (1986) we simultaneously solve the two restrictions/equations (equations 
3.2 and 3.3).38 For this purpose, we use the non-linear optimization routine found in 
the R software (version 1.9.0). The data inputs include the year-end book value of 
total liabilities39, the year-end market value of equity (market capitalization), and the 
annualized standard deviation of equity return.40 
In the model for testing the bank self discipline hypothesis (equation 3.9), the 
dependent variable is one of the risk measures. In this study, we use 12 alternative 
risk measures. Three risk measures come from equations 3.7 and 3.8 (LEVRISK, IPP 
and ARISK). Other risk measures consist of three capital market risk measures and 
six accounting risk measures as discussed in Chapter 2. We use both capital market 
and accounting-based risk measures as the dependent variable consistent with prior 
studies such as Demsetz et al. (1996). 
The three capital market risk measures include total return risk, systematic 
risk, and non-systematic risk. Total return risk is defined as the annualized standard 
deviation of the banks' daily stock returns from the market model. Systematic risk is 
38 In addition to Ronn and Verma (1986), one can use Duan (1994 and 2000) or Marcus and Shaked 
(1984) to estimate Vand av. We use Ronn and Verma (1986) for the following reasons. First, previous 
studies on bank risk shifting mostly use their methodology [see, e.g., Duan et al. (1992), and Gueyie 
and Lai (2003)]. Second, Laeven (2002) has indicated that although the methods of Ronn and Verma 
(1986) and Duan (1994 and 2000) produce estimates of deposit insurance premium that differ in size, 
they produce similar rankings. Since our study employs rank transformation in the regressions, we 
consider that the use of Ronn and Verma (1986) is appropriate. 
39 It is assumed that all liabilities (B) are insured and the time until next audit (T) =1. 
4° Following Sato et al. (1990) and Laeven (2002), we compute the annualized standard deviation by 
taking the squared root of the number of annual trading days times the daily standard deviation. The 
average trading days in our study is 261 days. The annualized standard deviation of daily equity return 
is also one of the risk measures in examining bank self discipline in the present study (total return 
risk). 
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the beta of the bank's stock returns, and non-systematic risk is the annualized 
standard deviation of errors from the market model. The six accounting risk measures 
include the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-
year moving window of annual observations (SDROA), the ratio of loan-loss-
reserves-to-gross-loans (LLRGL), the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets (GLTA), the 
ratio of book-value equity-to-total-assets (EQTA), the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-
assets (LIQATA), and the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds 
estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations (CVCSTF). It is 
important to note that SDROA and EQTA is a proxy for bank overall risk and 
leverage risk, respectively. LLRGL and GLTA are a proxy for credit risk, whereas 
LIQ A TA and CVCSTF are a measure of liquidity risk. 
3.3.4 Independent Variables 
ARISK (the standard deviation of asset returns - av) is the only independent 
variable in the two models for testing the bank risk shifting hypothesis. Consistent 
with Sub-hypothesis 1.1, we expect that the estimated coefficient on ARISK in 
equation 3.7 will be negative. Under Sub-hypothesis 1.2, we expect that the estimated 
coefficient on ARISK in equation 3.8 will be positive. 
In the bank self discipline model (equation 3.9), the main independent 
variable is the market-to-book equity ratio (MTBE), which is a proxy for bank charter 
value. There is a large discussion in the literature concerning alternative proxies for 
charter value (see, e.g., Perfect and Wiles, 1994). However, following Galloway et al. 
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(1997), Osborne and Lee (2001), and Cebenoyan et al. (1999), we use MTBE.41 Since 
prior studies suggest that to be an effective deterrent for bank risk taking there should 
be a negative relation between charter value and risk taking, consistent with 
hypothesis 2, we expect that the estimated coefficients on MTBE will be negative. 
However, when EQTA or LIQATA is used as the dependent variable, the estimated 
coefficient on MTBE is expected to be positive. This is because the higher EQTA (or 
LIQATA) the lower leverage risk (or liquidity risk). These expectations basically 
assume that MTBE is exogenous. An alternative hypothesis is that MTBE is 
endogenous, suggesting that for banks with greater asset risk, investors will demand 
compensation in the form of higher market-to-book values. As a result, MTBE should 
have a positive relation with a measure of asset risk such as ARISK or IPP.42 
Following Demsetz et al. (1996), we employ two control variables in the bank 
self discipline model. The first is SIZE (the bank's total assets). The relation between 
bank size and risk taking is generally expected to be negative, since large banks are 
assumed to have a greater capability to diversify their asset risk. However, as 
indicated by Galloway et al. (1997), in the presence of a too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
41 Galloway et al. (1997) provide a discussion on using a market-to-book equity ratio (MTBE) instead 
of a market-to-book asset ratio. Among the important reasons is that MTBE is a simple estimator of 
Tobin's q. In addition, there is evidence from other studies that the correlation between MTBE and the 
market-to-book asset ratio is high and significant. We also find that the Spearman rank correlation 
between MTBE and the market-to-book asset ratio is high and significant (+0.75). 
42 We thank a participant at the 2006 European Financial Management Association (EFMA) 
Conference for suggesting this alternative argument. 
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poHcy, it is possible that the relation is positive.43 Therefore, the relation between 
SIZE and the dependent variable may be positive or negative.44 
The second control variable is GDPGR or the annual percentage change in 
gross domestic products. As suggested by Osborne and Lee (2001), and Gueyie and 
Lai (2003), we include this variable to control the impact of general macroeconomic 
conditions on bank risk taking.45 We argue that the relation between GDPGR and the 
risk measures will be positive or negative. This is because the slowdown in the 
economic growth would make banks riskier due to the increasing rate of non-
performing loans or bad assets. However, when the economic conditions are 
favourable (i.e., there is an increase in the GDP growth) banks would take riskier 
activities in order to maximize the shareholders' wealth. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Fair Deposit Insurance Premiums 
Our calculations for the fair deposit insurance premiums using Merton (1977) 
are presented in Table 3.2. The table shows that during the period 1998-2003, the 
highest mean value of the fair deposit insurance premium is for banks in Indonesia 
(6.52% of liabilities), followed by Thailand (0.32%) and Pakistan (0.16% ). This may 
43 Under a TBTF policy, large banks would prefer to take riskier activities since they believe that they 
will never be closed by the government. 
44 Previous research [Galloway et al. (1997), Dernsetz et al. (1996), and Anderson and Fraser (2000)] 
also document a mixed (positive and negative) relation between bank size and risk taking. 
45 Gueyie and Lai (2003) find a negative and positive (mixed) relation between the growth of gross 
national product (GNP growth) and risk taking. However, Osborne and Lee (2001) do not find any 
significant relation. 
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Table 3.2 Fair Deposit Insurance Premiums in the Sample Countries 1998-2003 
This table presents the mean (average) of the fair deposit insurance premiums for a sample of 46 listed coinmercial banks from 10 countries in Asia. The fair 
deposit insurance premiums are calculated using Merton (1977). 
(Eercentage of liabilities) 
No. Countries 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average 
(1998-2003) 
1. Hong Kong 0.36415 0.10361 0.00724 0.01167 0.00005 0.00061 0.08122 
2. Indonesia 0.82869 29.64023 3.94615 0.81921 0.90877 2.97017 6.51877 
3. Malaysia 0.20662 0.02057 0.00067 0.00048 0.00004 0.00006 0.03807 
4. Pakistan 0.25207 0.18738 0.20310 0.06263 0.11448 0.10888 0.15475 
5. Philippines 0.10844 0.05570 0.09094 0.03597 0.00437 0.00088 0.04938 
°' 6. Singapore 0.05049 0.01503 0.01054 0.00286 0.00004 0.00003 0.01316 -.:i
7. South Korea 0.27304 0.08756 0.05378 0.03069 0.01691 0.03330 0.08255 
8. Sri Lanka 0.00704 0.00034 0.01479 0.02488 0.00320 0.00750 0.00962 
9. Taiwan 0.00291 0.01152 0.03057 0.02261 0.39059 0.21785 0.11268 
10. Thailand 1.65054 0.19336 0.01791 0.01655 0.00353 0.02308 0.31749 
Average 0.37440 3.03153 0.43757 0.10275 0.14420 0.33624 
indicate that Indonesia has not yet recovered from the crisis.46 Other crisis countries 
(Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand) show better progress as their premiums 
decreased considerably after 1998. The lowest premium is for Sri Lanka (0.01 %) and 
Singapore (0.01 %), followed by Malaysia (0.04%) and Philippines (0.05%). The 
premiums for South Korea and Taiwan are 0.08% and 0.11 %, respectively.47 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for the raw variables. In general, we 
find that the variables suffer from the problem of highly skewed data distribution 
and/or the presence of extreme values (outliers). More specifically, among the three 
variables included in equations 3.7 and 3.8 to test Hypothesis 1, only one variable 
(LEVRISK) shows a slightly normal data distribution (skewness value of -1.08). 
Moreover, among the accounting and capital market measures of risk used in 
equation 3.9 to test Hypothesis 2, only two variables (systematic risk and LIQATA) 
46 The high premium for Indonesia in 1999 is mainly caused by two banks (Bank Danamon and Bank 
Niaga). The premium for these banks is 99.07% and 83.62%, respectively. As a comparison, in a study 
on the fair deposit insurance premium for 14 countries (including Indonesia) during 1991-1998, using 
the almost similar method with the present study, Laeven (2002) finds that the maximum value of the 
premium is 4,721.06 basis points or 47 .21 % of total bank liabilities. 
47 The premium for Taiwan appears somewhat high because prior studies generally indicate a lower 
premium [0.01 % according to Laeven (2002) and 0.02% according to Hovakimian et al. (2003)]. 
However, the high premium for Taiwan only occurs during the last two years (2002 and 2003), while 
the premium for 1999-2001 are similar to the findings ofLaeven (2002) and Hovakimian et al. (2003). 
As stated earlier, Laeven (2002) and Hovakimian et al. (2003) use data from before 2000. Our further 
check indicates that the high premium for Taiwan in 2002 and 2003 is caused by the Chang Hwa 
Commercial Bank. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Risk Measures, Charter Value and Other Explanatory Variables 
The table presents summary statistics of the raw variables included in this study. The study uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in IO 
countries in Asia over the six year period 1998-2003 (balanced panel). LEVRISK is leverage risk, measured as the ratio of the face value of liabilities to the 
market value of bank assets. IPP is the fair deposit insurance premium (expressed as a percentage of-liabilities) calculated using Merton (1977). ARISK is 
asset risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset returns. Total return risk is the annualized standard deviation of the banks' daily stock returns. 
Systematic risk is the beta of the banks stock returns. Non-systematic risk is the annualized standard deviation of errors from the market model. SD ROA is the 
standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-
reserves-to-gross-loans. GLTA is the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets. EQTA is the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets. LIQATA is the ratio of liquid-
assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF is the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated in a three-year moving window of annual 
observations. MTBE is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value equity. SIZE is total assets (in USD millions). GDPGR is the annual 
percentage change in gross domestic products. Except for SIZE, all variables are presented as a percentage. There are 276 observations. 
Variables Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
LEVRISK 89.614 91.523 7.508 65.589 99.920 -1.079 
IPP 1.091 0.019 7.909 0.000 99.065 11.083 
ARISK 0.092 0.041 0.370 0.005 5.328 12.087 
Total return risk 65.983 49.702 55.134 14.831 532.805 4.120 
Systematic risk 0.932 0.933 0.411 -0.267 1.981 -0.102 
Non-systematic risk 58.185 40.552 55.606 11.390 529.222 4.175 
SDROA 3.163 0.508 9.407 0.010 71.154 5.109 
LLRGL 7.041 4.648 8.347 0.659 60.353 3.566 
GLTA .56.464 57.925 15.910 9.058 137.302 0.057 
EQTA 6.755 7.975 13.703 -126.596 25.322 -7.049 
LIQATA 27.333 24.366 15.552 5.143 76.379 0.713 
CVCSTF 14.348 10.297 12.345 0.666 66.517 1.557 
MTBE 126.174 103.940 129.373 -435.779 1065.280 2.341 
SIZE 12,137 5,196 15,932 165 68,988 1.857 
GDPGR 2.722 3.700 4.622 -13.100 10.200 -1.693 
exhibit a normal data distribution.48 
The non-normality in the data is also found in all explanatory variables in 
equation 3.9 (MTBE, SIZE and GDPGR).49 These variables have skewness values of 
around 2 (positive or negative). Based on SIZE (total assets in USD millions), the 
smallest bank in our sample is the PICIC Commercial Bank Ltd from Pakistan in 
2000 (165) and the largest bank is the Hana Bank from South Korea in 2003 
(68,988). Meanwhile, the minimum value of GDPGR is attributable to Indonesia in 
1998 (-13.10%), whereas its maximum value of 10.20 is for Hong Kong in 2000 
(10.20%). 
The descriptive statistics also show that negative values exist m some 
variables. A substantial negative value is found in EQTA, MTBE, and GDPGR. The 
negative values in EQT A and MTBE suggest that several banks in our sample faced 
negative capital, whereas the negative values in GDPGR indicate that a country was 
under an economic crisis during a particular year in our study period. 
As in Chapter 2, this chapter uses the rank transformation approach of Kane 
and Meade (1998) to handle the non-normality and extreme observations in our data. 
48 GLTA also shows a normal data distribution (skewness value of 0.06). However, it has a problem of 
outliers, as shown from its extreme maximum value of 137.30%. This value is attributable to Bank 
Danamon (one of the Indonesian banks). In 1998, this bank had large gross loan exposures and loan 
loss reserve (i.e., Rp31.2 trillion and Rp18.8 trillion, respectively), as compared to Rp22.7 trillion in 
total assets. 
49 MTBE (charter value) has a mean (median) of 126.17% (103.94%). This variable is expressed in 
percentage. Other studies express in a fraction. Since in this study we adopt rank transformation, we 
argue that this will not affect the overall results. 
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3.4.3 Regression Results 
3.4.3.1 Bank Risk Shifting Hypothesis 
Table 3.4 presents the results for the bank risk shifting hypothesis. Two 
models (the LEVRISK and IPP models) are used to test this hypothesis. The F test · 
and the LM test suggest that panel data regressions are better than the pooled OLS. In 
addition, the Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effects specification is preferred 
over the random- effects. Thus, we use the fixed-effects approach to explain bank risk 
shifting behaviour in the present study. The other results are presented for 
comparison, but are not discussed. 
Moreover, since our data are pooled, it is possible that heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation influence the results. As in Chapter 2, we use the likelihood ratio test 
and the Wooldridge test to determine the presence of panel-level heteroskedasticity 
panel-level autocorrelation, respectively. Based on these tests, we find that the 
LEVRISK model has a heteroskedasticity problem, whereas the IPP models has both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Thus, we use heteroskedasticity-
robust variance and covariance estimator for the LEVRISK model, and cluster-robust 
variance and covariance estimator for the IPP model. 
As expected, in the LEVRISK model we find the estimated coefficient on 
ARISK is significant and negative. The R-squared value of this model is 45%. This 
result provides support for Sub-hypothesis 1.1. This finding suggests that market and 
regulatory discipline has worked to limit risk taking by forcing Asian banks to adjust 
their leverage (capitalization level) in relation to their asset risk. Our result may 
indicate that the governments' policies to enhance bank governance and transparency 
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Table 3.4 Bank Risk Shifting Hypothesis - Regression Results 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia for the six year period 
1998-2003 (balanced panel) based on the rank transformation. The dependent variable is one of the following: (1) LEVRISK (leverage risk, measured as the 
ratio of the face value of liabilities to the market value of bank assets), or (2) IPP (the fair deposit insurance premium, expressed as a percentage of liabilities, 
calculated using Merton, 1977). The independent variable is ARISK (asset risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset returns). Fixed-effects model 
(FEM) and. random-effects model (REM) are estimated using the within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the LEVRISK model, and cluster-robust standard errors are 
reported for the IPP model. 
Dependent variables: LEVRISK IPP 
---
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variable: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.897*** 0.785*** 0.819*** 0.332*** 0.194*** 0.216*** 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.034) (0.048) 
ARISK -0.794*** -0.569*** -0.638*** 0.336*** 0.612*** 0.567*** 
(0.036) (0.051) (0.044) (0.094) (0.068) (0.051) 
Rz 0.63 0.45 0.63 0.11 0.39 0.11 
F statistics 488.60*** 126.13*** 12.83*** 80.70*** 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 8.09*** 15.81 *** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 157.00*** 310.14*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 17.71 *** 9.44*** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• . Likelihood ratio test 142.97*** 97.84*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 1.40 3.99** 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
and to strengthen bank capital (i.e., recapitalization programs and update capital 
regulation according to international standards) are successful in getting Asian banks 
to adjust their leverage. Although this finding implies that risk shifting is mitigated, 
the final conclusion on risk shifting depends on the results of the IPP model. 
In the IPP model, consistent with Sub-hypothesis 1.2, we find the estimated 
coefficient on ARISK is significant and positive, with an R-squared value of 39%. 
This result suggests that bank risk shifting behaviour or moral hazard exists in Asian 
banks. In other words, Asian banks do exploit the safety nets by increasing asset risk 
and transfer some portions of their risk to the safety nets. 
Taken together, the results of the first and second models reveal that the 
current efforts to improve bank capital and banking practices are not sufficient in 
reducing moral hazard in Asian banks.5° Consequently, bank moral hazard still exists, 
and this may indicate that the banking sectors in this region remain risky. 
In a supplementary analysis, we also use the approach of Hovakimian and 
Kane (2000) in testing bank risk shifting. In this regard, we examine the relation 
between the changes in asset risk (~ARISK) and the changes in leverage risk 
(~LEVRISK), and the relation between the changes in asset risk (~ARISK) and the 
changes in the fair deposit insurance premium (MPP). A qualitatively similar result is 
found. In addition, because the Merton (1977) model that is used to estimate the fair 
deposit insurance premium (equation 3.1) is inherently non-linear, consistent with 
Gueyie and Lai (2003), a regression model that includes the square of the changes in 
50 Similar results are found using the random-effects or the pooled OLS in both the LEVRISK and IPP 
models. 
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asset risk (~ARISK2) as one of the independent variables is also conducted (see Table 
3.5).51 Basically, the model can be stated as follows: 
MPP =Po+ P1 ~ARISK+ P2~ARISK2 +error (3.10) 
Since all variables have a non-normal data distribution, each variable is 
transformed using a rank transformation. We find that the coefficient of the changes 
in asset risk (~ARISK) remains positive and significant, suggesting that Asian banks 
conduct moral hazard by· shifting their risk to the deposit insurance systems. Overall, 
the results are the same as the original findings, i.e., the current efforts to improve 
bank capital and banking practices may not be sufficient to reduce moral hazard in 
Asian banks. 52 
We also investigate the role of explicit deposit insurance as compared to 
implicit guarantee in encouraging bank moral hazard. Hovakimian et al. (2003) 
suggest that in countries that have not introduced explicit deposit insurance, insurance 
still exists in an implicit form. As shown in Table 3.1, seven out of the 10 countries in 
our sample adopt explicit deposit insurance (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka Taiwan and Thailand). Moreover, three countries (Hong Kong, 
Pakistan and Singapore) do not have explicit deposit insurance, and hence provide 
implicit guarantees for their banks. 
51 The first set of the regressions in Table 3.5 show the results of using Hovakimian and Kane (2000) 
approach [the relation between the changes in asset risk ('1ARISK) and the changes in the fair deposit 
insurance premium (AfPP)]. The second set of the regressions show the results of the non-linear 
relation. 
52 We also apply the natural logarithm transformation to IPP and ARISK instead of the rank 
transformation (we do not apply the natural logarithm transformation to LEVRISK as its data 
distribution is close to normal). Again, we find a consistent result. 
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Table 3.5 Bank Risk Shifting Hypothesis -Regression Results (Supplementary Analysis) 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia for the six year period 
1998-2003 based on the rank transformation. The dependent variable is MPP or the changes in the fair deposit insurance premium, expressed as a percentage 
of liabilities, calculated using Merton (1977). The independent variables are ~ARISK or the changes in asset risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset 
returns, and the square of the changes in asset risk (~ARISK2). Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are estimated using the within 
regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
reported for the MPP model in the first column. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the MPP model in the second column. 
Dependent variables: 6.IPP 6. IPP 
---
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 0.118*** 0.142*** 0.121 *** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) 
6.ARlSK 0.722*** 0.731*** 0.724*** 0.719*** 0.732*** 0.721 *** 
(0.046) (0.055) (0.046) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) 
6.AR1SK2 0.045 .. (J.015 O.o38 
(0.045) (0.053) (0.045) 
Ri 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.52 
F statistics 245.80*** 179.70*** 152.20*** 141.37*** 
N 230 230 230 230 230 230 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 1.27 1.24 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 1.01 0.60 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.33 6.29** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 76.67*** 75.95*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 2.94* 2.67 
Note: *, ** and ***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
To examine the impact of explicit deposit insurance, we modify equations 3.7 
and 3.8, by introducing a dummy variable representing the countries that adopt 
explicit deposit insurance, DEXDI, and an interaction variable with the asset risk, 
ARISK*DEXDI (see Table 3.6). Consistent with the previous discussion, the 
estimated coefficient on ARISK*DEXDI is expected to be negative under the 
LEVRISK model. Moreover, consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2003) the estimated 
coefficient on ARISK*DEXDI is expected to be positive under the IPP model. 
Using the fixed-effects approach as the preferred specification, we find that 
the estimated coefficient on ARISK*DEXDI under the LEVRISK model is negative 
and significant, indicating that the seven countries that adopt explicit deposit 
insurance are successful in limiting asset risk by increasing their capital. However, 
inconsistent with expectations, the estimated coefficient on ARISK*DEXDI under 
the IPP model shows a significantly negative sign, suggesting that bank risk shifting 
or moral hazard does not exist in the countries that implement explicit deposit 
insurance. To check the robustness of this result, separate regressions are performed 
with a dummy variable for: (1) the countries that are new in adopting deposit 
insurance (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand), (2) the countries that adopt blanket 
guarantee scheme (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand during 1998-2003, and South 
Korea during 1998-2000), and (3) the countries that had pre-existing deposit 
insurance (Philippine, Sri Lanka, South Korea and Taiwan). Consistent with the 
previous findings, the results suggest that bank risk shifting does not exist in 
each regression (not reported). However, th'ese findings are inconsistent with 
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Table 3.6 Bank Risk Shifting Hypothesis and the Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance - Regression Results 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia for the six year period 
1998-2003 (balanced panel) based on the rank transformation. The dependent variable is one of the following: (1) LEVRISK (leverage risk, measured as the 
ratio of the face value of liabilities to the market value of bank assets), or (2) IPP (the fair deposit insurance premium, expressed as a percentage of liabilities, 
calculated using Merton, 1977). The independent variables include ARISK, DEXDI and ARISK*DEXDI. ARISK is asset risk, measured as the standard 
deviation of asset returns. DEXDI is a dummy variable to indicate countries that have explicit deposit insurance (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand). ARIS*DEXDI is a dummy interaction variable. Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are 
estimated using the within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the LEVRISK model, and cluster-robust standard errors are reported for the IPP model. 
Dependent variables: LEVRISK IPP 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.840*** 0.771 *** 0.669*** 0.265*** 0.181 *** -0.003 
(0.036) (0.022) (0.043) (0.083) (0.032) (0.080) 
ARISK -0.781 *** -0.328*** -0.454*** 0.237 0.844*** 0.749*** 
(0.067) (0.059) (0.062) (0.181) (0.120) (0.096) 
DEXDI 0.076* (dropped) 0.198*** 0.096 (dropped) 0.301 *** 
(0.040) (0.052) (0.095) (0.095) 
ARISK*DEXDI -0.007 -0.314*** -0.234*** 0.144 -0.303** -0.236** 
(0.079) (0.084) (0.081) (0.203) (0.141) (0.110) 
R2 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.19 0.40 0.17 
F statistics 187.77*** 74.35*** 7.96*** 51.55*** 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 8.16*** 14.39*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM)· 147.11 *** 274.39*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 26.77*** 16.81 *** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 148.29*** 126.99*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 1.29 3.92** 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
Hovakimian et al. (2003), who report explicit deposit insurance encourages bank risk 
shifting. Accordingly, our results suggest that the main source of bank moral hazard 
is the implicit guarantee, whereas explicit guarantees might have promoted financial 
stability following the recent crises. 
3.4.3.2 Bank Self Discipline Hypothesis 
Table 3.7 reports the regression results for the bank self discipline hypothesis. 
The specification tests (the F test, the LM test, and the Hausman test) indicate that the 
fixed-effects approach is the best specification for all 12 models (the LEVRISK, IPP, 
ARISK, total return risk, systematic risk, non-systematic risk, SDROA, LLRGL, 
GLTA, EQTA, LIQATA and CVCSTF models).53 The likelihood ratio test for panel-
level heteroskedasticity indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity problems in all 
models, except for the IPP and total return risk models. Moreover, the Wooldridge 
test for panel-level autocorrelation suggests the presence of autocorrelation problems 
in all models. Therefore, we use cluster-robust standard errors to handle these issues. 
Using the fixed-effects approach, we find that when LEVRISK, GLTA, or 
LIQATA is used as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficient on the charter 
value variable (MTBE) shows the expected significant sign. This suggests that banks 
with high charter value tend to have less leverage risk (LEVRISK), less credit risk 
53 In some regressions, we find that the difference of the variance and covariance matrices is not 
positive definite or model fitted on our data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman 
test. Therefore, as mentioned in Chapter 1, we provide the results from an augmented regression test. 
The test is conducted in Stata 9.0 using the code provided by Vince Wiggins from StataCorp. (see 
http://www.stata.com/ statalist/archive/2005-08/ms g007 60.htrnl and http://www.stata.com/statalist/ 
archive/2005-08/msg00837.html). The results suggest that the fixed-effects specification is preferred 
over the random-effects specification. 
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Table 3. 7 Bank Self Discipline Hypothesis - Regression Results 
Panel A 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia for the six year period 
1998-2003 (balanced panel) based on the rank transformation. The dependent variable is one of the following: (1) LEVRISK (leverage risk, measured as the 
ratio of the face value of liabilities to the market value of bank assets), (2) IPP (the fair deposit insurance premium, expressed as a percentage of liabilities, 
calculated using Merton, 1977), or (3) ARISK (asset risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset returns). The independent variables include MTBE, 
SIZE, and GDPGR. MTBE is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value equity. SIZE is total assets. GDPGR is the annual percentage change 
in gross domestic products. Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are estimated using the within regression estimator and Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables: LEVRISK IPP 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects 
Constant 0.737*** 0.719*** 0.732*** 0.648*** 0.703*** 
(0.057) (0.152) (0.057) (0.074) (0.201) 
MTBE -0.692*** -0.500*** --0.539*** -0.057 0.162*** 
(0.061) (0.029) (0.024) (0.087) (0.060) 
SIZE 0.097 0.074 0.068 --0.175 -0.505 
(0.092) (0.308) (0.097) (0.115) (0.397) 
GDPGR 0.137*** -0.013 .0.007 -0.072 --0.071 
(0.033) (0.027) (0.024) (0.067) (0.053) 
Rz 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.05 0.04 
F statistics 51.75*** 116.40*** 2.03 3.53** 
N 276 276 276 276 276 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 13.53*** 9.25*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 250.32*** 208.45*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 92.66*** t 20.38*** 
• Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 30.58*** 6.74* 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 168.74*** 52.97 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 10.80*** 7.77*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
matrices is not positive definite 
ARISK 
Random Pooled Fixed Random 
Effects OLS Effects Effects 
0.598*** 0.362*** 0.550** 0.350*** 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.231) (0.068) 
0.112** 0.613*** 0.508*** 0.543*** 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.048) (0.039) 
--0.251 ** -0.176** --0.586 --0.188** 
(0.122) (0.085) (0.471) (0.093) 
--0.064 --0.182*** -0.025 --0.062 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.045) (Q.039) 
0.03 0.37 0.31 0.36 
65.24*** 42.35*** 
276 276 276 276 
7 .53*** 
146.49*** 
8.37** t 
42.76*** 
122.48*** 
11.34*** 
t indicates the difference of the variance and covariance 
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PanelB 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia for the six year period 
1998-2003 (balanced panel) based on the rank transformation. The dependent variable is one of the following: (1) GLTA (the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-
assets), (2) LIQ AT A (the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets), or (3) EQTA (the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets). The independent variables include 
MTBE, SIZE, and GDPGR. MTBE is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value equity. SIZE is total assets. GDPGR is the annual percentage 
change in gross domestic products. Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are estimated using the within regression estimator and 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS). estimator, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables: GLTA LIQATA EQTA 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects· OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.369*** 0.629*** 0.442*** 0.535*** 0.330 0.481 *** 0.534*** 0.666*** 0.541 *** 
(0.073) (0.244) (0.075) (0.091) (0.214) (0.091) (0.087) (0.137) (0.084) 
MTBE -0.131 -0.144* -0.153** 0.221 ** 0.135* 0.159** 0.130 0.094 0.090 
(0.104) (0.086) (0.074) (0.093) (0.079) (0.070) (0.096) (0.067) (0.061) 
SIZE 0.350*** -0.065 0.302*** -0.299** 0.069 -0.238* -0.102 -0.449* -0.194* 
(0.104) (0.479) (0.111) (0.122) (0.398) (0.127) (0.125) (0.242) (0.115) 
GDPGR 0.050 -0.054 -0.038 0.007 0.152*** 0.132*** -0.107** O.o28 0.025 
(0.048) (0.040) (0.036) (0.058) (0.051) (0.047) (0.049) (0.028) (0.025) 
R' 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.05 o.oi 
F statistics 4.36*** 1.24 3.24** 3.36** 2.44* 2.96** 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 11.49*** 13.18*** 25.96*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 263.38*** 283.82*** 420.61 *** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) -7.66 § -1.18 § 1.75 t 
• Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 8.63** 13.09*** 11.59*** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 103.52*** 130.68*** 103.10*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 49.97*** 69.62*** 16.60*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates the difference of the variance and covariance 
matrices is not positive definite. § indicates that model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. 
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Panel C 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia for the six year period 
1998-2003 (balanced panel) based on the rank transformation. The dependent variable is one of the following: 1) total return risk (the annualized standard 
deviation of the banks' daily stock returns), (2) systematic risk (the beta of the banks stock returns), or (3) non-systematic risk (the annualized standard 
deviation of errors from the market model). The independent variables include MTBE, SIZE, and GDPGR. MTBE is the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value equity. SIZE is total assets. GDPGR is the annual percentage change in gross domestic products. Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-
effects model (REM) are estimated using the within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Cluster-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables: Total return risk Systematic risk Non-systematic risk 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.680*** 0.776*** 0.641 *** 0.379*** 0.504*** 0.414*** 0.778*** 0.670*** 0.694*** 
(0.071) (0.158) (0.067) (0.088) (0.184) (0.080) (0.065) (0.139) (0.061) 
MTBE -0.189*** 0.053 0.008 0.008 0.068 0.049 -0.220*** 0.040 -0.006 
(0.087) (0.055) (0.051) (0.095) (0.080) (0.066) (0.085) (0.051) (0.048) 
SIZE -0.125 -0.537* -0.230* 0.199* -0.012 0.170 -0.255** -0.307 -0.309*** 
(0.119) (0.303) (0.123) (0.117) (0.374) (0.118) (0.118) (0.271) (0.114) 
GDPGR -0.052 -0.077 -0.068 0.040 -0.071 -0.054 -0.091 -0.083* -0.081 * 
(0.069) (0.049) (0.045) (0.057) (0.047) (0.042) (0.066) (0.048) (0.044) 
R' 0.07 O.Q3 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.12 
F statistics 4.27*** 1.88 1.13 0.92 10.90*** 1.63 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 12.48*** 9.49*** 11.17*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 266.42*** 223.94*** 234.01 *** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 8.33** t 136.57*** 10.19** t 
• Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 7.59* 6.92* 10.48** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 54.62 96.99*** 99.01 *** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 7.46*** 5.58** 10.28*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates the difference of the variance and covariance 
matrices is not positive definite. 
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Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 46 listed commercial banks in 10 countries in Asia for the six year period 
1998-2003 (balanced panel) based on the rank transformation. The dependent variable is one of the following: (1) SDROA (the standard deviation of the 
before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations), (2) LLRGL (the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans), or 
(3) CVCSTF (the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations). The 
independent variables include MTBE, SIZE, and GDPGR. MTBE is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value equity. SIZE is total assets. 
GDPGR is the annual percentage change in gross domestic products. Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are estimated using the 
within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables: SD ROA LLRGL CVCSTF 
---
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.487*** 0.990*** 0.556*** 0.519*** l.069*** 0.651 *** 0.763*** -0.574*** 0.708*** 
(0.075) (0.194) (0.065) (0.088) (0.147) (0.075) (0.055) (0.161) (0.049) 
MTBE -0.045 0.007 -0.024 0.003 -0.047 -0.065 --0.046 -0.047 --0.007 
(0.090) (0.049) (0.043) (0.085) (0.046) (0.042) (0.082) (0.073) (0.067) 
SIZE 0.153 -0.887** -0.002 -0.032 -1.110*** -0.266* -0.421 *** 2.229*** --0.343*** 
(0.103) (0.399) (0.123) (0.122) (0.298) (0.143) (0.079) (0.327) (0.085) 
GDPGR --0.093 -0.111 ** -0.096** --0.010 0.021 0.032 --0.067 --0.039 --0.075 
(0.061) (0.047) (0.044) (0.062) (0.036) (0.035) (0.067) (0.055) (0.063) 
R1 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.20 
F statistics l.65 3.56** 0.03 8.22*** 14.01 *** 15.57*** 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 10.94*** 18.49*** 4.32*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 248.10*** 351.49*** 21.23*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 11.31 *** t 28.00*** t 64.58*** t 
• Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 11.23*** 17.58*** 61.41*** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 96.57*** 113.69*** 100.58*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 4.08** 23.78*** 65.57*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates the difference of the variance and covariance 
matrices is not positive definite. 
(GLTA), and less liquidity risk (LIQATA). However, the finding that banks with 
high charter value tend to have less leverage risk is not evident when EQT A is used 
as a proxy for leverage risk. 
Further, when ARISK or IPP is used as the dependent variable, in contrast to 
our expectations, the estimated coefficient on MTBE shows a positive sign. This 
suggests that bank charter value fails to mitigate asset risk, and is not effective in 
limiting bank risk taking when the fair deposit insurance premium (IPP) is used as a 
proxy for bank risk. However, this positive relation is consistent with the alternative 
argument that investors demand compensation in the form of higher market-to-book 
values for banks with greater asset risk. 
In addition, when total return risk, systematic risk, non-systematic risk, or 
SDROA is used as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficient on MTBE does 
not show a significant sign. This indicates that charter value does not significantly 
affect bank total return risk, systematic risk, non-systematic risk, and overall risk. 
It can be noted that when LLRGL or CVCSTF is used as the dependent 
variable, MTBE shows a negative but not significant sign. Since LLRGL and 
CVCSTF are a proxy for credit risk and liquidity risk respectively, the negative signs 
of MTBE provide a support for our findings that banks with high charter value tend 
to have less credit risk and liquidity risk. 54 
54 Using pooled OLS, we find that the estimated coefficient on MTBE demonstrates the expected 
significant sign, particularly when LEVRISK, LIQATA, total return risk, or non-systematic risk is 
used as the dependent variable: However, since the pooled OLS does not consider bank specific 
characteristics, its results may be biased. In addition, using the random-effects, we find that the results 
are almost similar to those of the fixed-effects. 
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Furthermore, the relation between the control variable SIZE and the risk 
measures is mixed. When total return risk, SDROA, LLRGL, or EQTA is used as the 
dependent variable, the relation is negative and significant.55 However, when 
CVCSTF is used as the dependent variable, the relation is positive and significant. 
Meanwhile, the relation between GDPGR and the risk measures is negative and 
significant, particularly when non-systematic risk or SDROA is used as the dependent 
variable.56 This indicates that the macroeconomic factor strongly affects risk taking 
by Asian banks following the crises. Our results generally suggest that unfavourable 
macroeconomic conditions lead to a greater bank risk taking. 
In general, our empirical evidence provides partial support for our hypothesis 
that there is a negative relation between charter value and bank risk taking by Asian 
banks during 1998-2003. Our findings suggest that charter value can only limit 
certain types of bank risk (leverage, credit and liquidity risks), and not asset risk and 
total bank risk.57 Therefore, consistent with the results of our study on the bank risk 
shifting, it is not surprising that moral hazard still exists in Asian banks. 
55 A negative and significant relation between SIZE and EQTA suggests a positive and significant 
relation between SIZE and leverage risk. 
56 When LIQ AT A is used as the dependent variable, the relation is positive and significant. This 
indicates a negative and significant relation between GDPGR and liquidity risk. 
57 A supplementary analysis has also been conducted to check the robustness of these findings. Here, 
to avoid a simultaneously problem in a contemporaneous relation, all independent variables are lagged 
one year (t-1). The regression results appear to be less significant compared to the previous findings 
probably because the lagged independent variable approach have reduced the number of observations. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
We have examined the presence of bank moral hazard and the effectiveness of 
market, regulatory and bank self discipline (charter value) in mitigating risk taking 
using a sample of 46 commercial banks from 10 countries in Asia during the period 
1998-2003. Using a panel data methodology and rank transformation treatment of 
outliers, we find strong evidence of bank risk shifting. This suggests that moral 
hazard exists in Asian banks. Although market and regulatory discipline have 
attempted to limit risk taking by forcing the banks to adjust their leverage (capital) in 
relation to asset risk, it is still insufficient to mitigate banks from exploiting the safety 
nets. Moreover, we find that charter value is effective in limiting leverage risk, credit 
risk and liquidity risk, but fails to alleviate asset risk. Charter value also fails to 
reduce bank risk taking when the fair deposit insurance premium is used as a proxy 
for bank risk. In addition, we do not find a significant relation between charter value 
and capital market measures of risk. However, it appears that the main source of bank 
moral hazard is the implicit guarantees from the governments. 
Our results are consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2003). In a study of 56 
countries, including the countries in our sample during 1991-1999, they find that 
significant bank risk-shifting occurs on average. Like ours, a negative relation 
between asset risk and leverage risk is also evident in their study. Nevertheless, 
inconsistent with Hovakimian et al. (2003), we do not find that explicit deposit 
insurance encourages bank moral hazard, indicating that it might have played an 
important role in enhancing financial stability following the recent crises in this 
region. 
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Although our study offers a new finding that charter value can limit credit risk 
and liquidity risk, our results only partially support prior studies such as Demsetz et 
al. (1996) who find that charter value can mitigate total return, systematic, non-
systematic, asset, and leverage risks in a sample of US banks during 1986-1994. 
However, our results are comparable to Gueyie and Lai (2003). In a study using a 
sample of Canadian banks over the period 1959-1982, they do not find a significantly 
negative relation between bank charter value and capital market risk measures. 
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Chapter 4 
Blanket Guarantee, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking: 
Evidence from Indonesian Banks during 1995-2003 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the present study is to examine the impact of regulatory 
changes on bank risk taking in Indonesia during the period 1995-2003. Indonesia 
provides a unique setting because following the 1997/1998 banking crisis, banks in 
this country experienced two major regulatory changes. The first is the introduction 
of the Blanket Guarantee Scheme (BGS), akin to deposit insurance, in 1998, and the 
second is the changes in capital regulation. In 1998, Bank Indonesia (the Central 
Bank) reduced the minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) requirement from 8% to 
4%, then back to 8% in 2001. Although the crisis hit several countries in Asia, only 
Indonesia introduced BGS and reduced the capital requirement. Therefore, it is 
interesting to investigate whether these regulatory changes have a significant effect 
on bank risk taking in Indonesia. Moreover, since the debt market is in its infancy in 
this country and banks provide most of firms' finance, we need to examine the impact 
these regulatory changes have on selected control groups. 
The role of deposit insurance has been largely discussed in the existing 
literature. However, it remams unclear whether deposit insurance enhances the 
financial stability, or alternatively, encourages banks to take a greater amount of risk. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assert that deposit insurance is useful in preventing bank 
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runs, but they also indicate its side effect which is encouraging excessive risk taking 
by banks. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000 and 2002) argue that whether or not 
deposit insurance is the best policy to prevent depositor runs, it is a source of moral 
hazard. Moreover, empirical studies on the impact of deposit insurance show a mixed 
and inconsistent result (e.g., positive and negative relation between deposit insurance 
and bank risk taking). By examining the impact of the BGS, our study will provide a 
new insight on the actual relation between deposit insurance and bank risk taking. 
Capital regulation is one of the most important aspects of bank regulation 
(Santos, 2001).58 Bank regulators around the world have spent a lot of effort to find 
the best framework for this regulation. In 1988, for the first time in history, through 
the introduction of the Basle Accord, an international convergence of bank capital 
regulation was established. Indonesia has also adopted this standard since 1992. 
However, when the capital requirement was reduced in 1998, some researchers argue 
that, given the industry was under distress and protected by a blanket guarantee, it 
may not be an appropriate policy because it can encourage moral hazard or excessive 
risk taking.59 However, none has examined whether a lower capital requirement 
during 1998-2000 encouraged bank risk taking. By examining this issue, the present 
study will provide a significant contribution to the existing literature. 
58 Berger et al. (1995) indicate two major motivations of capital regulation in banking. First, capital 
requirements are a means to limit the risk exposure of the government and the taxpayer due to the 
existence of deposit insurance. Second, capital requirements protect the economy from negative 
externalities caused by bank failures, especially systemic risk. 
59 For example, Fane and McLeod (2002) assert that the government should increase instead of 
lowering the minimum capital standard. 
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The present study also contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
First, our study is the first that examines the impact of the BGS on bank risk taking, 
at least in the Indonesian context.60 Previous studies in developed countries such as 
the US and Canada generally investigate the effects of a traditional form of deposit 
insurance (e.g., a limited guarantee instead of a full guarantee like the BGS). Second, 
our study is the first that examines the impact of the changes in capital regulation on 
risk taking of Indonesian banks over the period 1995-2003. Yudistira (2003) 
investigates the effects of capital regulation in Indonesian banks, but he focuses on its 
macroeconomic impacts during the period 1997-1999. Finally, we provide empirical 
evidence on the presence of moral hazard in Indonesian banks following the 
introduction of the BGS and when a lower capital requirement was implemented. 
This is also an important contribution since no prior research has examined this issue. 
Using a panel data methodology and a control group approach, we find that 
the introduction of the BGS encourages insured banks to take higher leverage risk, 
and a lower capital requirement increases leverage risk and liquidity risk. Moreover, 
using the bank risk shifting framework of Duan et al. (1992), we find that bank moral 
hazard exists after the adoption of the BGS, and the extent of moral hazard is stronger 
under a lower capital requirement. In addition, we also document the important 
impact of government intervention and poor economic conditions on the selected risk 
variables. 
60 To the best of our knowledge, only one study concerning the impact of full deposit insurance on 
bank risk taking is available in the existing literature [e.g., Onder and Ozyildirim (2003)]. They 
examine a sample of Turkish banks during the period 1988-2000. 
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4.2 Institutional Background and Regulatory Environment 
Based on the Banking Law (the Act No.7 of 1992 as amended by the Act 
No.10 of 1998), the Indonesian banking system consists of commercial banks and 
rural banks. Both commercial banks and rural banks conduct general banking 
activities. However, unlike commercial banks, rural banks do not provide payment 
services since by law they do not have access to the payment system. Legal 
incorporation of commercial banks and rural banks may take the form of Limited 
Liability Company, Regional Government Enterprise, and Cooperative. Commercial 
banks continuously dominate the banking industry, as they hold 99% of total assets of 
the industry. 
Traditionally, commercial banks in Indonesia are classified into private 
national banks, joint venture banks, state-owned banks, regional development banks, 
and foreign banks (branch offices).61 The number of commercial banks is presented in 
Table 4.1. For the purpose of the present study, in this table we include the listing 
status in the capital market (e.g., the Jakarta Stock Exchange) as an indicator of 
ownership. Although the number of listed banks in the private national bank category 
comprises at least 19 banks, only seven banks are continuously listed in the capital 
market during our study period. Some other banks were merged or closed, and others 
just entered the capital market. 
The table also shows that the number of commercial banks significantly 
declined following the 1997/1998 banking crisis. The crisis started when the rupiah 
61 Private national banks and joint venture banks can be classified into one category, which is private 
banks. As described later, our study uses a sample of private banks. 
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Table 4.1 Number of Commercial Banks in Indonesia 1995-2003 
Banks 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1. Private national banks 165 163 144 130 92 81 80 76 76 
a. Listed 19 20 28 24 19 19 20 22 22 
b. Unlisted 146 143 116 106 73 62 60 54 54 
2. Joint venture banks 31 31 34 34 29 29 24 23 20 
a. Listed 3 3 3 3 I I I I I 
b. Unlisted 28 28 31 31 28 28 23 22 19 
3. State-owned banks 7 7 7 8 5 5 5 5 5 
a. Listed - I I I I I I I I 
b. Unlisted 7 6 6 7 4 4 4 4 4 
4. Regional development banks 27 27 27 27 27 26 26 26 26 
5. Foreign banks (branch offices) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 
Total 240 238 222 209 163 151 145 141 138 
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, various issues. Institute for Economic and Financial Research, The Indonesian Capital Markets Directory, various 
issues. 
suffered from a sudden pressure in July 1997 (see Enoch et al., 2001, and Khambata, 
2001). The crisis was caused by the contagion effects from other countries in Asia 
(particularly Thailand)62 and weaknesses in the fundamentals of the Indonesian 
economy. Nasution (1998) indicates that the weaknesses include overinvestment in 
.non-traded sectors and manufacturing industries that required high levels of 
protection, and a weak financial system. The crisis was aggravated further by the 
political uncertainty that revolved around the departure of Suharto as President of the 
country. 
In response to the decline in the rupiah, on 14 August 1997, Bank Indonesia 
abandoned the exchange rate intervention band and moved to a floating exchange rate 
system. However, reaction was contrary to expectations: the rupiah weakened further 
and the banking sector started to experience distress. The closure of 16 insolvent 
banks in the absence of explicit deposit insurance in November 1997 did not improve 
the situation, and even encouraged bank runs.63 Investors continued to lose 
confidence in the Indonesian banking sector, from interbank money markets to bank 
depositors and creditors. In January 1998, foreign banks refused to accept letters of 
credit from Indonesian banks (Khambata, 2001). 
62 Sharma (2001, p.90) describes the contagion as follows: "On July 2, 1997 the Bank of Thailand 
abandoned the baht's peg to its traditional basket, and the baht immediately depreciated sharply against 
the US dollar. Pressure then quickly intensified against the Philippine peso and the Malaysian ringgit -
each of which received only limited support from their central bank. On July 8, the rupiah came under 
pressure." 
63 At the time, the government only protected depositors up to RplO million (around USD3,000 at the 
prevailing rate). Although the immediate response to the banking closure was positive for the rupiah 
exchange rate, within a few weeks, the positive sentiment disappeared entirely. By mid-December 
1997, 154 banks, representing half of the total assets of the banking system, had, to varying degrees, 
faced some erosion of their deposit base (Enoch et al., 2001). · 
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In late-January 1998, faced with a deeply depreciated currency, with 
protracted bank runs, and the threat of imminent hyperinflation and financial 
meltdown, the Indonesian government articulated their strategy. The strategy 
included, among others, the provision of a blanket guarantee for domestic banks to 
restore confidence in the national banking system, and the creation of the Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), for a limited period, with a range of 
responsibilities to address the banking crisis.64 
The introduction of a blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) and the establishment 
of IBRA are the key elements of bank restructuring in Indonesia. The IMF, the World 
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank provided support and supervision for the 
banking system. As part of these efforts, at least 68 banks were closed, 17 banks 
were merged, and 11 private national banks were restructured by recapitalization or 
by government take-over. 
Indonesia did not have an explicit deposit insurance scheme until the 
government officially announced the adoption of the BGS on 26 January 1998. The 
guarantee applies to all commercial banks in Indonesia, except for the branch-offices 
of foreign banks.65 IBRA is responsible for administering the BGS. Under the BGS, 
64 Fane and McLeod (2002) document three main roles of IBRA. The first is to oversee the 
restructuring or liquidation of weak banks so as to limit the fiscal costs of the government's blanket 
guarantee. The second, as a large state-owned banking conglomerate, it had responsibility for the 
troubled private banks that the government took over but did not close down. The third is as an asset 
management company, including managing of the very low quality (category 5) loans that the 
government stripped from all banks that were recapitalized. 
65 Kusumaningtuti (1998) reports that although joint venture banks were eligible to join the BGS, in 
fact, none of these banks chose to participate. 
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the government guarantees all bank liabilities, including off-balance sheet items.66 
Each bank that participates in the BGS has to pay a fixed-rate premium which is 
0.25% of deposits per year.67 Also, on 12 November 1998, Bank Indonesia modified 
the minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) by temporarily reducing it from 8% of 
risk-weighted assets (RWA) to 4%. Later, all commercial banks were required to 
have a minimum CAR of 8% by the end of 2001. 
4.3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk Taking 
Blanket guarantee is akin to deposit insurance. Despite the usefulness of 
deposit insurance in preventing bank runs or enhancing the financial stability, it is 
generally claimed that deposit insurance may introduce a moral hazard problem. For 
example, Demsetz et al. (1997) and Prescott (1999) state that deposit insurance 
shields depositors from the consequences of bank risk taking. As a result, depositors' 
incentives to monitor and constrain bank risk taking are severely limited. This lack of 
monitoring creates incentives for banks to take on excessive amounts of risk or shift 
some portions of their risk to the deposit insurance agency. 
An option-pricing framework can be used to analyse the presence of the moral 
hazard problem associated with deposit insurance. As stated earlier, Merton (1977) is 
66 The BGS is not applicable to loan capital, subordinated capital, unproved/illegal liabilities, liabilities 
to bank's related parties, and derivative transactions (except for currency swaps). 
67 In September 2005, Indonesia replaced the BGS with a limited guarantee. Since then a new deposit 
insurance agency ["Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan (LPS)"] has been established. The current official 
premium is 0.10% of deposits. See also McLeod (2006). 
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the first that shows an analogy between deposit insurance and writing a European put 
option on bank assets. Based on his work, the incentives for risk taking created by 
deposit insurance can be explained. His theoretical model suggests that insured banks 
tend to hold more leverage and/or asset risks than they would in the absence of 
insurance. In addition, if the price (premium) of deposit insurance does not reflect the 
actual level of bank risk, then banks have an incentive to assume more risk. 
A number of studies have examined empirically the impact of deposit 
insurance on bank risk taking. Wheelock (1992) uses individual bank data from 
Kansas to examine the contribution of deposit insurance to bank failures during 
1920s. The balance sheets of a random sample of 259 banks m 1920 are used to 
compare the riskiness of insured and uninsured banks. Wheelock argues that if moral 
hazard characterized the Kansas deposit insurance system, then those banks with 
insured deposits would have engaged in riskier activities than non-insured banks. 
Several accounting risk measures are used, and a simple test is conducted to 
determine whether the average ratios of insured banks differed from those of 
uninsured banks. It is found that the surplus/loans and capital/assets ratios of insured 
banks are significantly less than those of non-insured banks. Moreover, the 
bonds/assets and deposits/assets ratios of insured banks are significantly higher for 
insured banks. These results imply that moral hazard characterized the Kansas deposit 
insurance system. 
Grossman (1992) compares risk-taking of insured and uninsured thrifts 
operating under strict and less-strict regulatory regime during the 1930s in the US. He 
focuses on the behaviour of insured and uninsured thrifts over the period 1934-1940 
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m the principal cities of Wisconsin and Illinois: Milwaukee and Chicago.68 The 
foreclosures-to-asset ratio 1s used as a proxy for thrift risk taking. His analysis 
includes a model that relates thrift risk taking with the length of time an institution 
was insured. It is found that, after having been insured for approximately five years, 
an insured thrift's risk taking surpasses that of its uninsured counterpart. This finding 
suggests that moral hazard emerges gradually. 
Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1994) employ individual bank data from Kansas 
for the years of 1920, 1922, 1924 and 1926 to examine the effects of deposit 
insurance on bank behaviour. They find that the capital/asset ratio of insured banks is 
significantly less than that of uninsured banks in all years. However, they argue that a 
simple comparison of the capital/asset ratios of insured and uninsured banks may not 
indicate whether deposit insurance encourages insured banks to hold less capital. 
Therefore, they model bank risk as a function of various firm-specific variables, 
including whether a bank is a member of the deposit insurance system (insured versus 
uninsured banks). Using the capital/asset ratio as the dependent variable in a test for 
moral hazard, they find a negative and significant sign in the coefficient on the 
deposit insurance variable. Thus, they conclude that deposit insurance encourages 
banks to take greater risks. 
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) use a sample of banks operating in Kansas 
during the period 1910-1928 to examine the causes of bank failures. Specifically, 
they employ balance sheet information, measures of technical efficiency, and deposit 
68 Thrifts in Wisconsin face strict regulations, whereas those in Illinois face less-strict regulations. 
Thrifts in Wisconsin, by law, are strictly local. In contrast, out-of-state thrifts are allowed to operate 
branches within Illinois. 
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insurance system membership status to explain failure and survival of individual 
banks. Their results indicate that weakly capitalized banks, banks with few reserves, 
and banks relying heavily on short-term borrowed funds ex ante, have ·a higher 
probability of failure than their counterparts. Moreover, consistent with the 
hypothesis that deposit insurance encourages banks to hold higher risk portfolios, 
they find that insured banks have a higher probability of failure than uninsured banks. 
Alston et al. (1994) employ state level data series to examine the causes of 
rural bank failures during the 1920s in the US. By focusing on rural banks, they 
observe the impacts of agricultural distress and government policies on the class of 
banks accounting for 80% of the failures in the decade. They find that failure rates are 
higher in states with deposit insurance systems, and deposit insurance worsens the 
impact of agricultural distress on bank failures. 
Hooks and Robinson (2002) examine the role of moral hazard in deposit 
insurance in Texas state-chartered banks during the period 1919-1926 by employing 
uninsured banks (nationally chartered banks in Texas) as a control group. They find 
that the existence of deposit insurance increase the banks' likelihood of failure. Also, 
declines in capitalization at insured state banks are followed by an increase in loan 
concentrations. Based on these findings, they conclude moral-hazard effects at work 
under deposit insurance. 
Thies and Gerlowski (1989) review the history of failure of state-sponsored 
deposit insurance in the US by focusing on two waves of experiments: (1) during the 
early 19th century, starting with New York State's safety fund, and (2) during the 
early 20th century, starting with Oklahoma's guarantee fund. According to them, the 
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history of deposit insurance has been disastrous, and moral hazard is a basic problem 
under deposit insurance. They also claim that "state-sponsored deposit insurance 
funds have all exhibited the same moral hazard problem that is evident at the federal 
level today" (p.678). 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiqche (2000 and 2002) argue that regardless of 
whether or not deposit insurance is the best policy to prevent depositor runs, it is a 
source of moral hazard. In particular, as the banks' ability to attract deposits no 
longer reflects the risk of their asset portfolio, they are encouraged to finance high-
risk, high return-projects. Thus, deposit insurance may lead to more bank failures and 
systemic banking crises may become more frequent. To determine the impact of 
deposit insurance on banking system stability, they examine panel data for 61 
countries during the period 1980 and 1997. They find that explicit deposit insurance 
tends to increase the likelihood of banking crises. Further, the adverse impact of 
deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to 
depositors is extensive, the scheme is funded, and it is run by the government rather 
than by the private sector. 
The preceding research suggests that deposit insurance encourages insured 
banks to take excessive risk or moral hazard. However, several studies show opposite 
results. For example, Gueyie and Lai (2003) examine the effects of the introduction 
of official deposit insurance in 1967 on bank moral hazard in Canada. They use a 
sample of the five biggest chartered banks during the period 1959 to 1982. In the 
pooled cross-section time series regressions, two dummy variables are used to 
indicate the introduction of deposit insurance: IDI (l=after 1967, and O=before 1967), 
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and D75 (l=after 1975, and O=before 1975).69 They find that total risk, market risk 
and asset risk increase, and the capital ratio decreases following the introduction of 
deposit insurance. However, based on the bank risk shifting framework of Duan et al. 
(1992), they find that Canadian banks do n.ot exploit the safety net, indicating that 
moral hazard does not exist after the adoption of deposit insurance. 
Karels and McClatchey (1999) examine the relation between deposit 
insurance (introduced in 1971) and risk taking behaviour within the US credit union 
industry over the period 1971-1990. To assess the moral hazard consequences of 
deposit insurance, they use both time series and cross sectional tests. Accounting risk 
measures are used and classified into three groups: (1) capital adequacy, (2) loan 
delinquency, and (3) liquidity. Time series tests using industry financial ratios for 
federal and state credit unions do not support the increased risk taking hypothesis. 
Moreover, cross-sectional tests results employing Iowa state-chartered credit union 
data suggest that insured credit unions are better capitalized and more liquid than 
their uninsured counterparts. Therefore, they conclude that there is no evidence that 
the introduction of deposit insurance increases the risk taking behaviour of credit 
unions. 
The existing literature mostly discusses the traditional form of deposit 
insurance (i.e., a limited guarantee). However, there is one study that explores a full 
or blanket guarantee. Onder and Ozyildirim (2003) examine the impact of full deposit 
insurance on the risk behaviour of Turkish banks during the period 1988-2000. Their 
69 Two dummy variables are used because they divide their sample period into three sub-periods of 8 
years, namely: PRE-DI (1959-1966), POST-Dll (1967-1974), and POST-DI2 (1975-1982). 
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results indicate that the riskiness of banks increases with deposit insurance. Under the 
full guarantee, large banks are more prudent in terms of risk taking than small banks. 
They claim that moral hazard intensifies and market discipline weakens with this type 
of guarantee. 
Overall, the literature shows that due to the moral hazard associated with 
deposit insurance, insured banks take higher risk than uninsured banks. In addition, 
there is evidence that relation between blanket guarantee and bank risk taking is 
significantly positive. 
4.3.2 Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking 
A number of studies have examined the relation between capital regulation 
and bank risk taking. However, the results are generally inconsistent. For example, 
one strand of the theoretical literature argues that more stringent bank capital 
regulation causes a utility-maximizing bank owner-manager to increase asset risk,70 
and hence increase the risk of bank failure [see, e.g., Kahane (1977), Koehn and 
Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), and Gennotte and Pyle (1991)]. 
Meanwhile, the second strand of literature [e.g., Furlong and Keeley (1989) and 
Keeley and Furlong (1990)] suggests that for a value-maximizing bank, incentives to 
increase asset risk decline as its capital increases.71 
70 Rochet (1992) describes that if banks behave as portfolio managers, they can be called "utility 
maximizing banks". However, if banks have an objective to maximize the market value of their future 
profits, they can be called "value maximizing banks". 
71 Keeley and Furlong (1990) state that analysis on value maximizing banks can be traced back to the 
works of Sharpe (1978), Kareken and Wallace (1978), and Dothan and Williams (1980). Consistent 
with Merton (1977), these authors suggest that when deposit insurance underprices risk, banks seeking 
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The above discussions indicate that the relation between bank capital and risk 
taking can be positive or negative. However, using empirical data from the US 
banking industry during 1984-1993, Calem and Rob (1999) find a U-shaped relation 
between capital and risk taking, indicating that as a bank's capital increases it first 
takes less risk, then more risk. They also find that a severely undercapitalized bank 
tends to take on maximal risk, suggesting that moral hazard is a serious problem for 
banks close to insolvency. These authors claim that a minimum capital standard -
whether flat or risk-based - can, in principle, curtail the risk-shifting benefits of 
deposit insurance and the associated moral hazard. 
Similar to Calem and Rob (1999), Blum (1999) uses a dynamic framework to 
study the impact of capital adequacy requirements on bank risk taking. Blum shows 
that capital adequacy rules may increase a bank's riskiness. Blum argues that the key 
insight behind the result is that under binding capital requirements, an additional unit 
of equity tomorrow is more valuable for banks. Hence, if raising equity is excessively 
costly, the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to increase risk today. 
Furlong (1988) examines empirically the change in asset risk, default risk and 
the liability of the deposit insurance system for large bank holding companies (BHCs) 
in the 1980s. A sample of 98 large and publicly traded BHCs during the period 1981-
1986 is examined. In general, the results do not support the view that increases in 
regulatory capital standard lead banks to increase asset risk. 
to maximize the value of their shareholders' equity will attempt to maximize the value of the insurance 
subsidy by increasing asset risk and/or leverage risk. 
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Shrieves and Dahl (1992) investigate a sample of nearly 1,800 FDIC-insured 
independent and holding company affiliated commercial banks with assets in excess 
of $100 million as of December 1984, and which are in existence between December 
1983 and December 1987. Using a two-stage simultaneous equation framework, they 
find a positive association between changes in risk and capital.72 However, they argue 
that the positive relation is not strictly the result of regulatory influence, but rather 
reflects the view that risk taking tends to be constrained by bank owners' and/or 
managers' private incentives. They also find that target capital levels and rates of 
adjustment of capital are higher for banks presumed to be under regulatory pressure 
due to low capital levels, suggesting that capital regulation is effective for banks with 
relatively low capital levels. 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) examine the impact of the risk-based capital 
standard on bank capital and portfolio risk during the first year the risk-based 
standards (Basle Accord 1988) were in effect in the US. They modify the work of 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) by applying a three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique to 
recognize the relation between bank capital, portfolio risk, and the risk-based capital 
standard. Using a sample of 2,570 FDIC-insured commercial banks with assets 
greater than $100 million based on call report data from 1990 and 1991, they find that 
the risk-based capital standards are effective in increasing capital ratios and reducing 
portfolio risk in commercial banks. This result confirms the effectiveness of the risk-
based capital regulation. 
72 This means increases in capital ratios lead to increasing levels of asset risk, and increases in asset 
risk lead banks to increase their capital ratios. 
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Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) examine the effectiveness of regulatory reform 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) passed by 
the US Congress in 1991. FDICIA requires bank regulators establish capital ratio 
zones that mandate prompt corrective action (PCA) and early intervention in troubled 
banks. There are five capital categories under PCA: (1) well-capitalized, (2) 
adequately capitalized, (3) undercapitalized, (4) significantly undercapitalized, and 
(5) critically undercapitalized. To explore the possible impact of PCA on bank capital 
ratios and risk, these authors employ a three-stage least squares over the period after 
the passage of FDICIA but before the implementation of PCA (1992) and the first 
four years after the PCA standards became effective (1993-1996). Using a sample of 
1,685 FDIC-insured commercial banks with assets of $100 million or more, they find 
that the FDICIA is effective, in that subsequent to its passage, the sample banks 
increase their capital ratios without offsetting increases in credit risk. 
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) investigate the effectiveness of capital 
regulation at a sample of 123 US commercial banks over the period 1985-1994. They 
focus on regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control bank risk shifting. 
They adopt and extend the framework of Duan et al. (1992) in examining bank risk 
shifting. Specifically, bank risk shifting is investigated by testing the relation between 
the changes in asset risk and the changes in the leverage risk, and the changes in asset 
risk and the changes in the fair deposit insurance premium. By testing the relation 
between the changes in asset risk and the changes in the leverage risk, they can 
observe whether regulatory capital can discipline risk taking. Moreover, by 
examining the relation between the changes in asset risk and the changes in the fair 
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deposit insurance premium, they can assess whether bank risk shifting exists. In this 
regard, a positive and significant relation indicates that bank risk shifting exists. They 
find that capital regulation did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the 
safety net. Moreover, bank risk shifting incentives exists, and at the margin, 
aggressive banks could extract a deposit insurance subsidy. 
Several studies examine the data from non-US countries. Ediz et al. (1998) 
explore the impact of bank capital regulation on the capital ratio choices of UK 
banks. They use confidential bank supervisory data including detailed information 
about the balance sheet and profit and loss of all British banks during the period 
1989-1995. They find that capital requirements affect bank behaviour over and above 
the influence of the bank's own internally generated capital targets. In addition, banks 
seem to achieve adjustment in their capital ratios, mainly by boosting their capital 
rather than through systematic substitution away from assets that attract high-risk 
weights. 
Rime (2001) examines whether and how Swiss banks react to constraints 
placed by the regulator on their capital. He also uses a simultaneous equation model 
to analyze adjustments in capital and risk when banks approach the minimum 
regulatory capital level. A three-stage least squares procedure is used to examine a 
sample of 154 banks during the period 1989-1995. He finds that banks that are close 
to the minimum regulatory capital requirements tend to increase their ratio of capital 
to risk-weighted assets, suggesting that regulatory pressure has the desired impact on 
banks' behaviour. Although regulatory pressure induces banks to increase their 
capital, Rime argues that it does not affect the level ofrisk taking. 
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Bichsel and Blum (2004) also examine Swiss banks. They use monthly data 
for a sample of 19 publicly traded banks during the period 1990-2002, and find a 
positive correlation between changes in capital and risk. In spite of the positive 
relation between risk and capital, a significant relation between the likelihood of 
failure of a bank and its capital ratio is not found. 
Barrios and Blanco (2003) examine the effectiveness of capital adequacy 
regulation in Spanish commercial banks. The~ develop two models to explain the 
behaviour of banks when they choose their capital to assets ratios, namely market 
model, and regulatory model. These authors estimate both models using unbalanced 
panel data of 76 banks from 1985 to 1991. They find a higher adjustment speed to the 
desired capital ratio in the market model than in the regulatory one. In addition, the 
calculated average probability of belonging to the market model is higher than that of 
belonging to the regulatory model. Their results suggest that the pressure of market 
forces is the main determinant of banks' capital requirements in Spanish banks. 
A number of studies have also explored whether the adoption of the risk-
based capital requirements (the 1988 Basle Accord) leads to credit crunch, defined as 
"a significant reduction in the supply of bank loans available to commercial 
borrowers" (Bergers and Udell, 1994, p.586).73 In general, these studies consider 
73 For US banks, see Bemanke and Lown (1991), Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), Berger and Udell 
(1994), Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995), Wall and Peterson (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1995a and 
1995b), Furfine (2000), and Jackson et al. (1999). For Japanese banks, see Horiuchi and Shimizu 
(1998), Woo (2003), Ito and Sasaki (2002), and Honda (2002). For Indonesian banks, see Yudistira 
(2003) and Agung et al. (2001). See also Chiuri et al. (2001). They examine credit crunch in 15 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, 
Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, India, Poland, and Slovenia). 
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credit crunch as a side effect of the capital standard.74 
Overall, the literature does not show a conclusive result on the relation 
between capital regulation and bank risk taking. Both theoretical and empirical 
studies do not achieve a consensus on whether a more stringent capital regulation 
discourages bank risk taking. However, capital regulation is argued to have a side 
effect on bank behaviour, including discouraging banks to supply loans to customers 
(credit crunch). 
4.4 Hypotheses 
4.4.1 Blanket Guarantee Hypothesis 
Having reviewed the institutional background and the existing literature, we 
argue that the introduction of the BGS encourages insured banks in Indonesia to take 
a greater risk. There are several reasons for this. First, the coverage of the BGS is 
very broad compared to the usual deposit insurance scheme. The traditional deposit 
insurance is mostly a limited guarantee, however, the BGS is a full guarantee. In 
addition, the BGS is also considered as a bailout of the banking system by the 
government [see, e.g., Kozo (2004) and Rosengard (2004)]. Under a full guarantee 
and bailout policy, banks may prefer to take excessive risk or moral hazard since they 
do not need to be responsible for the losses, but enjoy the gain if their riskier 
activities lead to greater profits. 
74 We do not provide a detailed review on these studies because, as stated by Chiuri et al. (2001) and 
Yudistira (2003), they are better classified as the research on the macroeconomic impact of bank 
capital regulation. 
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Second, the BOS uses a fixed-rate premium (0.25% of deposits). As discussed 
earlier, Merton (1977) indicates that when the price (premium) of deposit insurance 
does not reflect the actual level of bank risk, such as in the case of a fixed-rate 
premium system, banks have an incentive to assume more risk. Also, several studies 
such as Kareken (1983) and White (1989) suggest that a fixed-premium encourage 
banks to take riskier activities. 
Third, evidence from Turkish banks during 1988-2000 (Onder and 
Ozyildirim, 2003) suggests that full guarantee leads to bank moral hazard. Therefore, 
we expect that the riskiness of insured banks in Indonesia increases following the 
adoption of the BOS. This then leads to the following hypothesis: 
H 1: Risk taking of insured banks increases following the introduction of the BGS. 
4.4.2 Capital Regulation Hypothesis 
As stated earlier, in 1998 Bank Indonesia reduced the minimum CAR from 
8% to 4%, but in 2001 it was raised back to 8%. Unlike the BOS, which only affects 
insured banks, the changes in capital regulation impact all banks. 
Yudistira (2003) examines the impact of bank capital requirements m 
Indonesia using monthly panel data of all the banks that exist during 1997-1999. His 
study is more on the macroeconomic impact of capital regulation, and uses the credit 
crunch hypothesis as the theoretical background.75 Using fixed-effects panel data 
75 As stated earlier, the presence of credit crunch behaviour in Indonesian banks post the crisis has also 
been examined by Agung et al. (2001). These authors use aggregate data and indiyidual banks (panel) 
data during 1994-2000, and a qualitative analysis based on surveys on banks and companies. They find 
the existence of credit crunch following the recent crisis. However, they do not consider the change in 
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regressions, he finds regulatory capital is associated with the changes in Indonesian 
banks' behaviour. In particular, bank loans decrease but with less than before the 
Central Bank reduced the minimum CAR from 8% to 4% in 1998. He claims that his 
findings are consistent with an argument that banks choose to shrink their balance 
sheet activities during the capital shock. 
Following Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990), we 
argue that a more stringent capital regulation reduces bank asset portfolio risk. Hence, 
a lower capital requirement during 1998-2000 would encourage banks to take greater 
risk. Our expectation is based on the moral hazard hypothesis. In particular, as banks 
only need to maintain a lower capital requirement during 1998-2000, they may 
increase risk in order to maximize shareholders' value. Thus, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Banks take a greater risk under the minimum CAR regulation of 4% (during the 
sub-period 1998-2000) as compared to under the minimum CAR regulation of 
8% (during the sub-periods 1995-1997 and 2001-2003). 
4.5 Data and Method 
4.5.1 Data, Sample and Method 
. We manually collect the data for the present study. The financial data come 
from the banks' condensed published financial statements. Data for 1995-2000 were 
compiled by Bank Indonesia in a series of books entitled "Direktori Perbankan 
capital regulation in 1998 as the main factor. In contrast, Yudistira (2003) includes this regulatory 
change in his study, and finds the presence of credit crunch behaviour in Indonesian banks. 
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Indonesia [The Indonesian Banking Directory]" (1996-2001 Editions), so we use 
these books in our study. The remaining data are obtained from Infobank, a banking 
magazine in Jakarta.76 The data for the Rupiah/USD exchange rate come from the 
Annual Report of Bank Indonesia, various issues. 
To be included in our sample, we apply the following criteria. First, the bank 
is a commercial bank with limited liability legal structure. Since rural banks are not 
commercial banks and regional banks do not have a limited liability legal structure, 
we exclude these banks from our sample. We need to focus on banks with a limited 
liability legal structure to ensure that our study is comparable to the existing studies 
that generally discuss the risk taking of limited liability banks. Second, the bank is 
locally incorporated in Indonesia. This is to ensure that the changes in risk taking 
reflecting the bank as a whole. Third, the bank is not permanently owned by the state 
or regional government during our study period. We do not include state banks and 
regional banks because they are generally owned 100% by the government (in the 
state or regional levels).77 By excluding state owned banks from our sample, we can 
also avoid the possibility that bank risk taking is distorted by the government social 
objectives (if any). Finally, we require that the bank is completely listed or not listed 
on the Jakarta Stock Exchange during the full period 1995-2003.78 We apply this 
76 They provide a copy of the banks' condensed published financial statements, upon request. 
77 Two state banks were listed in the capital market in several years during our study period. We do not 
include these banks in our sample because they were not listed in the capital market for the full period 
of our study. 
78 As in Chapters 2 and 3, because certain risk measures (i.e., SDROA and CVCSTF) are calculated 
using a three-year moving window of annual observations, we require that their input data are 
available from 1993 to 2003. 
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restriction because we use a balanced panel in our study and we also want to partition 
our sample into listed and unlisted banks. 
By applying the above criteria, we exclude all rural banks, all state-owned 
banks, all regional banks and all foreign banks (branch offices) from our sample. 
Therefore, we only focus on private national banks and joint venture banks. In the 
first step, we have a balanced panel of 66 banks, consisting of 52 private national 
banks and 14 joint venture banks. Then, we partition our sample based on two 
dimensions. The first is based on the listed status in the capital market (i.e., listed and 
unlisted banks). The second is based on the insurance status under the BGS (i.e., 
insured and uninsured banks). Since all joint venture banks do not join the BGS, we 
classify these banks as uninsured banks and all private national banks as insured 
banks. Moreover, based on the classifications of listed and unlisted banks, and 
insured and uninsured banks, we construct four sub-samples: Listed and Insured 
banks (7 banks), Listed and Uninsured banks (1), Unlisted and Insured banks (45), 
and Unlisted and Uninsured banks (13). The sub-sample of Listed and Uninsured 
banks is dropped because it only has one bank. As a result, our final sample consists 
of a balanced panel of 65 banks (see Appendix 4.1).79 
Similar to the previous chapters, we use a panel data methodology. Prior 
studies such as Gueyie and Lai (2003) and Ediz et al. (1998) also employ this 
79 When LLRGL is used as the dependent variable, we do not have a balanced panel. This is because in 
2003 total loans of a joint venture bank (Bank Credit Lyonnais Indonesia) is zero. As a result, the 
LLRGL ratio of this bank for 2003 is undefined. In 2004, the bank was closed. 
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methodology. The results from a pooled OLS are also provided for comparison 
purposes. 
Before implementing a panel data analysis, we use a non-parametric test. In 
particular, the z-test for difference of medians (the Wilcoxon rank sum test) is used to 
examine the impact of the regulatory changes on bank risk taking in Indonesian 
banks.so For comparison purposes, we provide the results from the two independent 
sample t-test for difference of means. 
4.5.2 Control Groups 
To ensure that our results are affected by the regulatory changes and not by 
other factors during the study period, we apply a control group approach.s 1 In 
particular, following Hooks and Robinson (2002), we use uninsured banks (from the 
sub-sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks) as a control group in examining the 
impact of deposit insurance (BGS) on bank risk taking. As stated earlier, the sub-
sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks consists of joint-venture banks. These banks 
did not join the BGS, and therefore, they can be used as the control group in 
examining the impact of the BGS. Meanwhile, insured banks include all banks from 
the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks, and Unlisted and Insured Banks. 
80 Initially, the Wilcoxon rank sign test is used. However, because the number of observations before 
and after the regulatory changes is not exactly similar, we do not adopt this test. Previous studies such 
as Gueyie and Lai (2003) also use the z-test for difference of medians. 
81 This approach is taken because it is possible that other industries/firms may have experienced an 
increase or decrease in riskiness during the observed time frame that has nothing to do with the 
regulatory changes. We thank Tom Smith for making this suggestion. 
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Moreover, following Akhigbe and Whyte (2001),82 we use non-banking 
financial firms as a control group in examining the impact of the changes in capital 
regulation on bank risk taking. Because of the data availability problem, we employ 
non-banking financial firms that are continuously listed on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange during the study period as a control group. A sample of 18 balanced panels 
of these firms is used for this purpose (see Appendix 4.2). Their financial data are 
obtained from the Indonesian Capital Markets Directory (Institute for Economic and 
Financial Research, Jakarta), 1996 to 2004 Editions. 
4.5.3 Dependent Variables 
Because very few banks in Indonesia are continuously listed in the capital 
market (seven out of 65 banks in our sample), the present study uses accounting-
based measures of risk as the dependent variables. Specifically, we use the same 
accounting risk measures to the previous chapters, namely: SDROA, EQTA, GLTA, 
LLRGL, LIQATA and CVCSTF. SDROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax 
return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations, 
a proxy for overall risk. EQTA is the ratio of book-value equity-to-total-assets, a 
proxy for leverage risk. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. 
82 Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) examine the impact of the FDICIA of 1991 on bank stock returns and 
risk. One of the main features of the FDICIA is a system of capital-based regulations based on prompt 
corrective actions (PCA). These authors use two control samples: (1) finance companies, and (2) real 
estate investment trusts (REITS). They argue that both finance companies and REITS represent the 
best pool of firms for constructing control sample in their study. This is because finance companies are 
in the same line of business as banks on the asset side of their balance sheet, but are not subject to the 
provision of FDICIA since they do not hold deposits. Moreover, REITS would be subject to the same 
real estate problems as banks but would not be subject to the provision of FDICIA. In our study, non-
banking financial firms are akin to firms that very close to banks, but are not subject to the bank capital 
regulations. Therefore, we consider them as an appropriate control group. 
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OLTA is the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets. LLROL and OLTA are alternative 
proxies for credit risk. LIQATA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF 
is the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated in a three-
year moving window of annual observations. LIQATA and CVCSTF are a measure 
of liquidity risk. 
However, in examining the impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking, 
we only focus on four risk measures: SDROA, EQTA, OLTA, and LIQATA. We can 
not apply LLROL and CVCSTF to non-banking financial firms (the control group) 
because their business activities are not exactly similar to banking firms. Moreover, 
in applying OLTA and LIQATA to the control group, we assume that several items in 
a balance sheet of non-banking financial firms are similar to banks. In particular, to 
obtain OLTA, we classify all receivables and long-term investments of these firms as 
loans. Then, to obtain LIQATA, we classify all cash, deposits in banks and securities 
as liquid assets. 
4.5.4 Independent Variables 
In this study, the main independent variables are the BOS and the changes in 
capital regulation. Following Oueyie and Lai (2003), we use a time dummy variable 
("BOS") to indicate the implementation of BOS during the sub-period 1998-2003 
(1 = 1998-2003, 0 =otherwise). We expect that the estimated coefficient on BOS will 
be positive (negative) when SDROA, LLROL, OLTA, or CVCSTF (EQTA or 
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LIQATA) is used as the dependent variable.83 For the control groups (uninsured 
banks), we expect that the estimated coefficient on BGS will be insignificant or 
negative under the SDROA, LLRGL, GLTA, and CVCSTF models (positive under 
the EQTA and LIQATA models). 
With regard to the changes in capital regulation, we focus on a lower capital 
requirement (the minimum CAR of 4%) during the sub-period 1998-2000. Therefore, 
we introduce a time dummy variable ("CAR4") for this purpose (1 = 1998-2000, 
0 = otherwise).84 We expect that the estimated coefficient on CAR4 will be positive 
(negative) when SDROA or GLTA (EQTA or LIQATA) is used as the dependent 
variable. For the control group (non-bank financial firms), we expect that the 
estimated coefficient on CAR4 will be insignificant or negative under the SDROA, 
and GLTA models (positive under the EQTA and LIQATA models). 
Similar to Chapter 3, we also use two control variables. The first is bank size 
(the bank's total assets). As in the previous chapter, the relation between bank size 
and risk taking is expected to be mixed (positive or negative). Moreover, Kwon et al. 
(1997) and Crosby (2004) suggest that exchange rate movements reflect 
macroeconomic conditions. Because Indonesia experienced a banking crisis 
originating from a currency crisis, the annual average of the rupiah/USD exchange 
rate, EXCHRT, is used as the second control variable. The relation between 
83 A negative sign on BGS is expected when EQT A or LIQAT A is used as the dependent variable. 
This is because the higher these ratios the lower is bank risk. 
84 Technically, based on the capital regulation regime we divide the study period into three sub-
periods: 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003. Except for the second sub-period, a minimum CAR of 
8% was applied. Therefore, using CAR4 (a lower capital requirement during 1998-2000) as a proxy for 
the changes in capital regulation is reasonable. 
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EXCHRT and the risk measures can be positive or negative. An increase in the 
exchange rate would reflect deterioration in the Indonesian economy and, therefore, 
banks would become more risky due to the increasing rate of non-performing loans or 
bad assets. However, a decrease in EXCHRT would indicate an improvement in the 
country's economy as its local currency becomes stronger. As general economic 
conditions improve, banks could make riskier loans in order to increase their 
shareholders' wealth. 85 
4.5.5 Empirical Models 
For each hypothesis, we offer a general model. To test the Blanket Guarantee 
Hypothesis, we propose the following model: 
(4.1) 
where RM is one of the risk measures (SDROA, LLRGL, GLTA, EQTA, LIQATA, 
or CVCSTF), and BGS is the time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of 
BGS. Two control variables are included in this model: LNTA (the natural logarithm 
of total assets), a proxy for bank size, and EXCHRT (the annual average Rupiah/USD 
exchange rate) - a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Equation 4.1 is 
tested using insured banks and uninsured bank (control group). 
To test the Capital Regulation Hypothesis, we propose the following model: 
(4.2) 
85 The effects of EXCHRT on bank risk taking may also be influenced by the quality of bank risk 
management. This factor is controlled by employing panel data methods that take into account the 
unobserved bank specific characteristics such as the quality of bank risk management. 
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where RM is the one of the risk measures and CAR4 is the time dummy variable to 
indicate the implementation of a lower capital requirement (the minimum CAR of 
4%) during the period 1998-2000. Again, the two control variables (SIZE and 
EXCHRT) are included in this model. Equation 4.2 is tested using the full sample of 
banks and non-banking financial firms (control group). 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Non-Parametric Tests 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the raw variables in the present 
study. The statistics include insured banks and their control group (uninsured banks), 
and the full sample of banks and their control group (non-banking financial firms). 
In general, the descriptive statistics show that our data are highly skewed, 
with a little exception. To handle the issue of highly skewed data distribution, we 
transform all variables (except for EQTA and EXCHRT) using the natural logarithm 
transformation before their use in the regression analyses.86 A rank transformation 
procedure, as in previous chapters, is not adopted because it is not suitable with our 
model and data.87 Specifically, our model includes a control variable that has the 
same value across banks for each year (i.e., EXCHRT). In addition, one of the sub-
samples of banks (i.e., the Listed and Insured Banks) does not have many 
86 For EQT A we use an elimination of outlier approach. As in Chapter 2 for the sub-sample of 
Indonesian banks, if EQTA has a value less than -50%, we consider this an outlier. We do not use the 
natural logarithm transformation approach because it leads to a greater value of skewness (even after 
reflexing the raw data as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983). 
87 Cheng et al. (1992) assert that any decision to use transformations should consider data constraints, 
the particular research design, and available theoretical alternatives. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Risk Measures and Explanatory Variables 
This study uses annual observations of 65 private commercial banks and 18 non-banking financial firms in Indonesia over the nine year period 1995-2003. 
SDROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. LLRGL is the ratio of 
loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. LIQATA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. TA is total assets (in Rp,billion), a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the 
annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Except for TA and EXCHRT, all variables are 
presented as a percentage. 
Panel A: Insured Banks (N=52, 468 observations) 
Variables Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
SD ROA 3.746 0.804 8.453 0.006 71.154 4.536 
EQTA 13.080 12.283 14.488 -126.596 75.820 -3.608 
GLTA 52.071 54.650 21.666 2.664 137.302 -0.191 
LLRGL 7.170 2.805 10.207 0.175 61.447 2.713 
LIQATA 17.289 8.056 18.914 0.935 77.339 1.561 
CVCSTF 26.576 24.404 15.877 1.776 105.329 1.212 
TA 3,125.488 265.870 8,173.467 9.748 62,168.058 3.802 
EXCHRT 7.088 8.438 2.993 2.253 10.255 -0.656 
Panel B: U · d Banks - Control G (N=13. 117 ob f t for LLRGL 116 ob ions, excep1 f 
Variables Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
SDROA 15.719 1.456 55.132 0.053 347.166 5.316 
EQTA 11.368 13.317 17.978 -78.979 99.014 -1.398 
GLTA 80.619 76.502 38.332 0.000 355.731 3.759 
LLRGL 15.262 8.380 18.270 0.536 100.000 2.326 
LIQATA 11.935 5.158 17.300 0.667 100.360 3.418 
CVCSTF 36.983 32.560 25.632 3.277 170.858 1.751 
TA 1,799.161 1,243.580 1,517.559 17.540 6,692.149 1.663 
EXCHRT 7.088 8.438 3.003 2.253 10.255 -0.654 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
Panel C: All Banks (N=65, 585 observations) 
Variables Mean 
SD ROA 6.140 
EQTA 12.738 
GLTA ·57.780 
LIQATA 16.218 
TA 2,860.223 
EXCHRT 7.088 
Panel D: Non-Bankin!! F" . IF' Control G 
Variables Mean 
SD ROA 11.666 
EQTA 33.234 
GLTA 57.240 
LIQATA 20.463 
TA 1,457.234 
EXCHRT 7.088 
Median 
0.953 
12.365 
58.723 
7.492 
388.340 
8.438 
(N=18. 162 ob t' 
Median 
3.340 
36.215 
58.430 
12.263 
190.730 
8.438 
Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
26.151 0.006 347.166 10.973 
15.249 -126.596 99.014 -2.956 
28.246 0.000 355.731 2.499 
18.711 0.667 100.360 1.847 
7,359.413 9.748 62,168.058 4.271 
2.993 2.253 10.255 -0.656 
Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
19.952 0.235 104.024 2.768 
42.471 -199.291 99.558 -1.578 
29.190 1.587 98.958 -0.149 
20.922 O.Q35 79.449 0.757 
4,531.278 20.081 36,355.742 5.309 
2.999 2.253 10.255 -0.654 
observations as it only has seven banks. Accordingly, the use of the rank 
transformation would limit the variability of the variables included in this study. 
A non-parametric test is then used to examine the impact of the regulatory 
changes on bank risk taking in Indonesian banks. As stated earlier, we use the z-test 
for difference of medians (the Wilcoxon rank sum test) for this purpose. Moreover, 
for a comparative purpose, we also provide the results from the two independent 
sample t-test for difference of means. 
With regard to the impact of the introduction of the BGS (see Table 4.3), we 
find that the median of SDROA is significantly higher in post-BGS than in pre-BGS. 
However, because both insured banks and uninsured banks (control group) show the 
same behaviour, we do not consider that the adoption of the BGS increases overall 
risk (SDROA). 
The impact of the BGS on credit risk is somewhat mixed. When credit risk is 
proxied by LLRGL, its median is significantly higher in post-BGS than in pre-BGS, 
and this applies for both insured banks and uninsured banks. Therefore, we do not 
argue that the BGS leads to an increase in credit risk. In contrast, when credit risk is 
proxied by GLTA, its median for insured banks is significantly lower in post-BGS 
than in pre-BGS, whereas for uninsured banks there is no significant difference 
between pre- and post-BGS. The latter suggests that the BGS reduces credit risk. 
The two measures of liquidity risk (LIQA TA and CVCSTF) show a consistent 
result. The medians of LIQATA (CVCSTF) are significantly higher (lower) in post-
BGS than those in pre-BGS, indicating that liquidity risk decreases following the 
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Table 4.3 The Impact of the Blanket Guarantee Scheme on Bank Risk Taking - Non Parametric Tests 
The results from a non parametric test based on annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003. The banks consist of 52 
insured banks and 13 uninsured banks (control group). The test includes the z-test for difference of medians (the Wilcoxon rank sum test). The results from the two independent 
sample t-test for difference of means are also presented for comparison purposes. SDROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year 
moving window of annual observations. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. GLTA is the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets. EQTA is the ratio of book-value-
equity-to-total-assets. LIQATA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF is the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated in a three-year 
moving window of annual observations. · 
Variables Pre-BGS Post-BGS 
(1995-1997) (1998-2003) 
SDROA 
Insured Banks 
Mean 0.516 5.360 
Median 0.356 1.668 
N 156 312 
Uninsured Banks (Control Group) 
Mean 0.720 23.219 
Median 0.643 3.056 
N 39 78 
LLRGL 
Insured Banks 
Mean 1.794 9.858 
Median 1.737 5.322 
N 156 312 
Uninsured Banks (Control Group) 
Mean 2.536 21.708 
Median 2.673 15.979 
N 39 77 
GLTA 
Insured Banks 
Mean 65.985 45.114 
Median 68.949 46.161 
N 156 312 
Uninsured Banks (Control Group) 
Mean 78.181 81.837 
Median 79.835 74.082 
N 39 78 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
Median Difference Test 
(Pre- and Post-BGS) 
-10.312*** 
-7.213*** 
-12.242*** 
-8.562*** 
10.463*** 
1.451 
Mean Difference Test 
(Pre-and Post-BGS) 
-6.064*** 
-2.112*** 
-8.674*** 
-6.130*** 
11.018*** 
-0.485 
Table 4.3 (continued) 
Variables Pre-BGS Post-BGS Median Difference Test Mean Difference Test 
(1995-1997) (1998-2003) (Pre- and Post-BGS) (Pre- and Post-BGS) 
EQTA 
Insured Banks 
Mean 16.399 11.421 3.547*** 
Median 13.702 11.306 4.343*** 
N 156 312 
Uninsured Banks (Control Group) 
Mean 12.651 10.726 -0.544 
Median 12.774 13.496 -0.835 
N 39 78 
LIQATA 
Insured Banks 
Mean 5.463 23.202 -10.654*** 
Median 4.540 13.616 -13.338*** 
N 156 312 
>-' 
Uninsured Banks (Control Group) 
N Mean 3.188 16.308 -4.125*** 
>-' Median 3.147 7.882 -7.551 *** 
N 39 78 
CVCSTF 
Insured Banks 
Mean 30.041 24.843 3.376*** 
Median 27.401 21.721 3.512*** 
N 156 312 
Uninsured Banks (Control Group) 
Mean 41.315 34.817 1.296 
Median 37.860 29.089 2.064** 
N 39 78 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
adoption of BOS. However, because both insured and uninsured banks show the same 
risk behaviour, we do not conclude that the BOS alleviates liquidity risk. 
The most important result is shown by the proxy for leverage risk (EQTA). 
For insured banks, the median of this variable is significantly lower in post-BOS than 
in pre-BOS. In contrast, for uninsured banks its median is higher (but not significant) 
in post-BOS. These results suggest that the introduction of BOS encourages insured 
banks to increase leverage risk, or indicate the presence of the moral hazard problem 
associated with deposit insurance. As discussed earlier, Merton (1977) asserts that 
insured banks tend to hold more leverage and/or asset risks than they would in the 
absence of insurance. We find that the impact on leverage risk is more evident than 
the impact on asset risk. The results from the mean difference tests are generally 
consistent with those of the median difference tests. 
To examine the impact of the changes in capital regulation, we perform the 
same approach to the three sub-periods: 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003 (see 
Table 4.4). Our focus is the second sub-period: when a lower capital requirement is 
applied. Unlike the impact of the BOS, now we only examine four risk measures 
(SDROA, OLTA, EQTA and LIQATA) using a sample of all banks and non-banking 
financial firms (control group). 
By comparing the medians of the risk measures during the sub-periods 1995-
1997 and 1998-2000, we find that two risk measures (OLTA and EQTA) exhibit a 
significantly different behaviour between the sample of banks and the control group. 
The results suggest that the lower capital requirement tends to reduce credit risk 
(OLTA) but it increases leverage risk (EQTA) in banks. 
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Table 4.4 The Impact of the Changes in Capital Regulation on Bank Risk Taking - Non Parametric Tests 
The results from a non parametric test based on annual observations of 65 private commercial banks and lS non-banking financial firms (control group) in Indonesia over the nine 
year period 1995-2003. The test includes the z-test for difference of medians (the Wilcoxon rank sum test). The results from the two independent sample t-test for difference of 
means are also presented for comparison purposes. SDROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual 
observations. GLTA is the ratio of gross-loans-fo-total-assets. EQT A is the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets. LI QA TA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. 
Variables CARS% CAR4% CARS% Median Difference Test Mean Difference Test 
(Sub-period 1) (Sub-period 2) (Sub-period 3) (Sub-periods (Sub-periods (Sub-periods (Sub-periods 
1995-1997 199S-2000 2001-2003 1and2) 2 and 3) 1and2) 2 and 3) 
SDROA 
All Banks 
Mean 0.557 10.205 7.659 -S.4S9*** 0.793 
Median 0.415 3.3S4 1.166 -13.557*** 7.061 *** 
N 195 195 195 
Non-Banking Financial Finns (Control Group) 
Mean 2.390 lS.422 14.1S4 -4.206*** 0.955 
Median 1.670 5.322 4.3S4 -5.423*** 0.519 
N 54 54 54 
GLTA 
All Banks 
Mean 6S.424 49.S91 55.026 7.360*** -1.601 
Median 71.353 46.735 55.S51 9.450*** -3.159*** 
N 195 195 195 
Non-Banking Financial Finns (Control Group) 
Mean 54.21S 49.54S 67.955 O.SlS -3.614*** 
Median 34.594 43.0S6 71.555 0.627 -3.269*** 
N 54 54 54 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% ahd 1 % level, respectively. 
Table 4.4 (continued) 
Variables CARS% CAR4% CARS% Median Difference Test Mean Difference Test 
(Sub-period l) (Sub-period 2) (Sub-period 3) (Sub-periods (Sub-periods (Sub-periods (Sub-periods 
1995-1997 199S-2000 2001-2003 land 2) 2 and 3) l and 2) 2 and 3) 
EQTA 
All Banks 
Mean 15.649 S.199 14.364 4.446*** -3.564*** 
Median 13.590 11.194 12.310 4.035*** -2.149** 
N 195 195 195 
Non-Banking Financial Firms (Control Group) 
Mean 39.403 23.450 36.S4S l.S34* -1.457 
Median 34.594 31.620 40.419 0.934 -O.S97 
N 54 54 54 
LIQATA 
All Banks 
Mean 5.00S 9.219 34.42S -5.636*** -15.306*** 
Median 3.SS7 6.977 30.06S -9.357*** -14.3S6*** 
N 195 195 195 
Non-Banking Financial Firms (Control Group) 
Mean 19.679 27.163 14.551 -1.793* 3.271 *** 
....... Median 12.143 26.6Sl 4.940 -1.653* 2.716*** N N 54 54 54 .j:::.. 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
Moreover, the comparisons between the medians of the risk measures during 
the sub-periods 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 indicate that three risk measures (SDROA, 
EQTA, and LIQATA) show a significantly different behaviour between the sample of 
banks and the control group. The results suggest that the lower capital requirement 
leads to an increase in overall risk (SDROA), leverage risk (EQTA) and liquidity risk 
(LIQATA) in banks. 
Taken together, the above non-parametric tests indicate that the most 
consistent finding is only with regard to the positive impact of the lower capital 
requirement on leverage risk. The results from the mean difference tests are less 
consistent with those of median difference tests. 
4.6.2 Regression Results 
4.6.2.1 The Impact of the Blanket Guarantee Scheme on Bank Risk Taking 
We run several regressions to examine the impact of the Blanket Guarantee 
Scheme (BGS) on bank risk taking in Indonesia during the period 1995-2003.88 
Although six accounting measures of risk are used as the dependent variables, we 
only report in a table the most consistent result with our hypothesis. 
The pooled OLS and panel data regressions (including both the fixed-effects 
and random effects models) are employed to test the Blanket Guarantee Hypothesis. 
A series of specification tests (e.g., the F test, and the LM test) indicate that panel 
data regressions are preferred over the pooled OLS. We continue with the Hausman 
88 As in the previous chapters, most statistical estimations in this chapter are conducted in Stata 9.0. 
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test to select the more appropriate specification between the fixed-effects and the 
random-effects. Because in some regressions the difference of the variance and 
covariance matrices is not positive definite or model fitted on our data fails to meet 
the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test, we use an augmented regression 
test. Based on this approach, for insured banks the best specification is the fixed-
effects under the LNSDROA, LNLLRGL and LNLIQATA models, and the random-
effects under other models. For uninsured banks (the control group), the best 
specification is the fixed-effects under the LNGLTA, EQTA and LNLIQATA model, 
and the random-effects under other models. The following discussions are based on 
the best specification for each model. 89 
Further, a likelihood ratio test for panel-level heteroskedasticity and the 
Wooldridge test for panel-level autocorrelation indicate that heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problems exist. As in the previous chapters, we use cluster-robust 
variance and covariance estimator (and hence standard errors) to handle these issues. 
When LNSDROA, LNLLRGL, or LNGLTA is used as the dependent variable 
(not reported in a table), we find that the estimated coefficient on the BGS shows a 
similar sign both for insured banks and uninsured banks. The relation between the 
BGS and LNSDROA and LNLLRGL is positive and significant, whereas the relation 
between the BGS and LNGLTA is negative and significant. Although the relation 
between the BGS and LNSDROA and LNLLRGL is consistent with our expectation, 
because the control group also yields the same result, we do not claim that the BGS 
encourages banks to take a greater amount of overall risk (LNSDROA) and credit risk 
89 In fact, the results from the fixed-effects or the random-effects are similar. 
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(LNLLRGL). The similar behaviour between insured and uninsured banks with 
regard to overall risk and credit risk may suggest that the regulatory change is not the 
major cause of the changes in bank risk taking. Perhaps, the general economic 
conditions play a more important role in this regard. 
Similarly, since the control group also produces the same results, the negative 
and significant relation between the BGS and LNGLTA does not mean that the BGS 
discourages banks to take credit risk. It appears that the relation between the BGS and 
credit risk is inconsistent under the two models of credit risk (the LNLLRGL and 
LNGLTA models). 
Meanwhile, when EQTA is used as the dependent variable (see Table 4.5), we 
find that the estimated coefficient on the BGS is negative and significant for insured 
banks, and insignificant for uninsured banks. This result provides strong evidence 
that the BGS encourages insured banks to take a higher leverage risk, which is 
consistent with our expectation, and may suggest the presence of the moral hazard 
problem associated with deposit insurance. This finding is also consistent with the 
result from the non-parametric test as discussed earlier. 
With regard to liquidity risk (LNLIQATA and LNCVCSTF - not reported in 
a table), the introduction of the BGS also has a different effect on insured and 
uninsured banks. The BGS does not have a significant effect on liquidity risk of 
insured banks, but it significantly reduces liquidity risk of uninsured banks. However, 
because the relation between the BGS and liquidity risk in insured banks is 
insignificant, we do not argue that the BGS affects liquidity risk. 
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Table 4.5 The Impact of the Blanket Guarantee Scheme on Bank Risk Taking - Regression Results 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 
(unbalanced panel). The dependent variable is EQTA (the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets), a proxy for leverage risk. The independent variables include 
BGS, LNTA and EXCHRT. BGS is the time duffimy variable to indicate the implementation of the Blanket Guarantee Scheme during 1998-2003 (hence 1 = 
1998-2003; 0 = otherwise). LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled 
in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are estimated using the within 
regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Insured Banks Uninsured Banks (Control Grou~) 
Dependent variable: EQTA 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 52.297*** 52.113*** 52.231 *** 88.906 163.514** 101.274* 
(7.552) (18.278) (8.908) (53.958) (60.089) (56.403) 
BGS -3.413 -3.494 -3.480* 4.046 3.217 3.857 
(2.082) (2.345) (2.111) (3.604) (3.960) (3.646) 
LNTA -2.910*** -2.898* -2.908*** -5.540 -11.119** -6.469 
(0.531) (1.473) (0.654) (4.154) (4.506) (4.330) 
EXCHRT 0.204 0.216 0.214 -0.103 0.525 0.012 
(0.331) (0.355) (0.332) (0.934) (0.773) (0.919) 
Rz 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.13 
F statistics 15.41 *** 7.66*** 6.41*** 7.88*** 
N 465 465 465 115 115 115 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 7.79*** 2.60*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 343.81 *** 2A9 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.00 13.16*** t 
• Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 0.00 13.77*** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 366.33*** 112.38*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 12.75*** 12.22*** 
Notes: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates the difference of the variance and covariance matrices 
is not positive definite. 
The impact of the BOS on the two types of insured banks (Listed and Insured 
Banks versus Unlisted and Insured Banks) also merits discussion (not reported in a 
table). We find that when each of the three main risk measures (LNSDROA, 
LNLLROL and LNOLTA) is used as the dependent variable, the estimated 
coefficient on the BOS in the two sub-samples shows the same sign and is significant. 
Only under the EQTA or LNLIQATA models are the results for the two sub-samples 
different.90 Specifically, the relation between the BOS and EQTA is negative and 
significant in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks, but it is insignificant in 
the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks. This suggests that the source of a 
positive and significant relation between the introduction of the BOS and leverage 
risk, as stated earlier, is the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks. Moreover, the 
relation between the BOS and LNLIQATA is positive and significant in the sub-
sample of Listed and Insured Banks, but it is negative and significant in the sub-
sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks. The positive relation between the BOS and 
LNLIQA TA in the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks is attributable to the fact 
that five of the seven banks in this sub-sample joined the government recapitalization 
program that improved their capital and liquidity positions. Since not all banks are 
allowed to participate in the recapitalization program, these findings provide 
important evidence on the impact of selective government intervention. 
The relation between the control variable for bank size (LNTA) and bank risk 
taking is generally negative and significant, except for when EQTA is used as the 
90 When LNCVCSTF is used as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficient on the BGS is 
insignificant for both sub-samples. 
129 
dependent variable. In the latter case, large banks tend to hold higher leverage risk, 
evidence which is consistent with the TBTF policy. Further, the relation between the 
general macroeconomic variable (EXCHRT) and bank risk measures is mixed. The 
relation is mostly positive and significant for uninsured banks, but it is sometimes 
insignificant or even negative for insured banks. This suggests that since insured 
banks are protected by the BGS, their risk taking becomes less affected by general 
macroeconomic conditions. 
4.6.2.2 The Impact of the Changes in Capital Regulation on Bank Risk Taking 
We examine the impact of the changes in capital regulation on bank risk 
taking using the pooled OLS and panel data regressions. For this purpose, non-
banking financial firms are used as a control group. Since business activities of the 
control group is not exactly similar to banking firms, only four models (the 
LNSDROA, LNGLTA, EQTA and LNLIQATA models) are investigated.91 
However, we only report in a table the most consistent result with our hypothesis. 
Based on the best specification for the sample banks and the non-banking 
financial firms, 92 we .find that the estimated coefficient on CAR4 shows a positive 
91 Again, for EQTA we use an elimination outlier approach to handle the non-normality. This applies 
for banks and the control group. 
92 The specification tests (the F test and the LM test) indicate that panel data regressions is preferred 
over the pooled OLS. As before, we use the Hausman test to determine the best specification between 
the fixed-effects and random-effects. Moreover, whenever the Hausman test indicates that the 
difference of variance and covariance matrices is not positive definite, we perform an augmented 
regression test. For the sample banks, we find that the best specification under the LNSDROA and 
EQTA models is the fixed-effects, whereas under the LNGLTA and LNLIQATA models, is the 
random-effects. For the control group, the best specification is the fixed-effects (under the LNSDROA 
and LNGLTA models), or the random-effects (under the EQTA and LNLIQATA models). 
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sign and is significant under the LNSDROA model, and negative and significant 
under the LNG LT A model (not reported in a table). Because these results are similar 
for banks and the control group, we do not assert that the lower capital requirement 
regime encourages banks to take higher overall risk (LNSDROA), or to reduce their 
credit risk (LNGLT A). These results may suggest that the general macro economic 
conditions play a more important role in bank risk taking than the regulatory change. 
Similar to the impact of BGS, we consider three possible explanations for the 
negative relation between CAR4 and LNGLTA. First, the presence of credit crunch 
behaviour as argued by Yudistira (2003) and Agung et al. (2001). Second, the transfer 
of bad loans from recapitalized banks to IBRA. Wijaya (2003) documents that the 
amounts of bad loans transferred to IBRA were Rp.289 trillion, or equivalent to 
36.6% of total assets of commercial banks in December 1999. Finally, the deep crisis 
would make it difficult to find attractive investment projects for banks (insured and 
uninsured) and non-banking financial firms. 
When EQTA or LNLIQATA is used as the dependent variable (see Table 
4.6), we observe that the lower capital requirement has a different impact for banks 
and non-banking financial firms. In particular, the lower capital requirement leads 
to an increase in leverage risk (EQTA) for banks, but it does not have a significant 
impact on leverage risk of non-banking financial firms. In addition, the lower capital 
requirement encourages banks to increase liquidity risk (LNLIQATA), but non-
banking financial firms show an opposite behaviour. These results indicate that the 
lower capital requirement encourages all sample banks to increase leverage risk 
131 
........ 
VJ 
N 
Table 4.6 The Impact of the Changes in Capital Regulation on Bank Risk Taking - Regression Results 
Panel A 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 private commercial banks and 18 non-banking financial firms in Indonesia 
over the nine year period 1995-2003 (unbalanced panel). The dependent variable is EQTA (the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets), a proxy for leverage 
risk. The independent variables include CAR4, LNT A and EXCHRT. CAR4 is the time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) regulation of 4% during 1998-2000 (hence 1 = 1998-2000; 0 =otherwise). LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank 
size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed-effects model (FEM) 
and random-effects model (REM) are estimated using the within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors (to handle heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) are used for banks, and robust standard errors 
(to handle heteroskedasticity) are used for non-banking financial firms. 
Banks Non-Banking Financial Firms (Control Groue) 
Dependent variable: EQTA 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 53.890*** 102.607*** 65.234*** 156.312*** 116.870*** 126.798*** 
(7.504) (34.052) (13.638) (15.608) (28.796) (22.957) 
CAR4 -4.447*** -5.378*** -4.661 *** -1.875 -3.029 -2.912 
(1.249) (1.538) (l.301) (6.137) (3.459) (3.766) 
LNTA -2.995*** -6.908** ·-3.906*** -9.089*** -5.900*** -6.736*** 
(0.565) (2.749) (l.094) (0.131) (2.202) (1.682) 
EXCHRT 0.089 0.524 0.192 --0.350 --0.396 -0.382 
(0.192) (0.393) (0.244) (0.773) (0.566) (0.529) 
R1 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.07 0.21 
F statistics 14.65*** 7.20*** 22.10*** 2.64** 
N 580 580 580 155 155 155 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 5.86*** 13.27*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 235.98*** 201.43*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 21.10*** t 0.75 
• Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 21.15*** 0.72 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 439.41 *** 111.19*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 12.25*** 1.44 
Notes: *, **and ***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates the difference of the variance and covariance matrices 
is not positive definite. 
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Panel B 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 private commercial banks and 18 non-banking financial firms in Indonesia 
over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is LNLIQATA, the natural logarithm of LIQATA (the ratio of liquid-assets-to-
total-assets), a proxy for liquidity risk. The independent variables include CAR4, LNTA and EXCHRT. CAR4 is the time dummy variable to indicate the 
implementation of the minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) regulation of 4% during 1998-2000 (hence 1 = 1998-2000; 0 =otherwise). LNT A is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate RpfUSD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic 
conditions. Except for CAR4 and EXCHRT, all variables are transformed using the natural logarithm transformation. Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-
effects model (REM) are estimated using the within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
Banks 
Dependent variable 
Independent Pooled Fixed 
variables: OLS Effects 
Constant 0.350 1.030 
(0.404) (l.649) 
CAR4 -1.064*** -1.078*** 
(0.078) (0.091) 
LNTA 0.026 -0.028 
(0.031) (0.133) 
EXCHRT 0.269*** 0.275*** 
(0.013) (0.022) 
R1 0.58 0.66 
F statistics 154.51 *** 146.51 *** 
N 585 585 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 3.51*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 107.28*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.91 
• Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 0.91 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 91.94*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 53.92*** 
Random 
Effects 
0.450 
(0.509) 
-1.066*** 
(0.079) 
O.Q18 
(0.040) 
0.270*** 
(0.014) 
0.58 
585 
LNLIQATA 
Note: *, ** and ***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
Non-Banking Financial Firms (Control Group) 
Pooled 
OLS 
2.068 
(2.634) 
0.752*** 
(0.231) 
0.007 
(0.208) 
-0.061 
(0.057) 
0.03 
4.35*** 
162 
Fixed 
Effects 
3.383* 
(l.922) 
0.756*** 
(0.236) 
-0.098 
(0.155) 
-0.060 
(0.060) 
0.08 
3.45*** 
162 
12.42*** 
194.35*** 
0.21 
0.21 
79.57*** 
28.63*** 
Random 
Effects 
2.987* 
(l.803) 
0.755*** 
(0.225) 
-0.066 
(0.138) 
-0.061 
(0.057) 
0.03 
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and liquidity risk. These findings are consistent with our expectations and may 
indicate that moral hazard exists when regulator reduces bank capital requirement. 
Obviously, the results of this panel data analysis are better than those of the non-
parametric tests which only show that the lower capital requirement increases 
leverage risk. 
Looking more closely at each sub-sample of the sample banks (Listed and 
Insured Banks, Unlisted and Insured Banks, and Unlisted and Uninsured Banks - not 
reported in a table), we find that when LNSDROA is used as the dependent variable 
the impact of the lower capital requirement is similar across the sub-samples, which 
is positive and significant. When LNGLTA i~ used as the dependent variable, the 
impact of CAR4 is negative and significant in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured 
Banks, but it is positive and significant in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Uninsured 
Banks. The results in the full sample seem to be driven by the sub-sample of Unlisted 
and Insured Banks. Moreover, when EQT A is used as the dependent variable, the 
impact of the lower capital requirement is negative and significant on all sub-samples, 
except for the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks. The same pattern is also 
found under the LNLIQATA model. These suggest that the source of a positive 
relation between the lower capital requirement and leverage risk and liquidity risk is 
the sub-samples of Unlisted and Insured Banks and Unlisted and Uninsured Banks. 
The fact that sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks does not experience an increase 
in leverage risk and liquidity risk during the lower capital requirement regime may be 
because at the time the majority of banks in this sub-sample participated in the 
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government bank recapitalization program. As stated earlier, this program improves 
bank capital (and hence reduces leverage risk) and liquidity positions. 
The relation between size (LNTA) and bank risk taking is mostly negative, 
except for under the EQTA model. In the latter, size tends to have positive relation 
with leverage risk. Moreover, the link between general economic conditions 
(EXCHRT) on bank risk taking is only significant when LNSDROA or LNOLTA is 
used as the dependent variable.93 However, the relation between EXCHRT and these 
risk measures is mixed (positive and negative). 
4.6.3 Supplementary Analyses 
Our results indicate that the BOS encourages insured banks to take a higher 
leverage risk, and the lower capital requirement increases bank leverage risk and 
liquidity risk. To check the robustness of these findings we also run several 
regressions using a dummy variable approach (not reported in a table). In particular, 
when examining the impact of the BOS, we combine all insured and insured banks 
(control group), and use a dummy variable to indicate the insured banks (1= insured 
banks; 0 = otherwise). This dummy variable is then interacted with the BOS variable, 
and the dummy interaction variable then becomes the focus of our observations in 
investigating the effect of the regulatory change. A similar approach is also applied 
for the lower capital requirement variable (CAR4). Here, banks and non-banking 
financial firms (control group) are combined and a dummy variable is introduced to 
93 Under the LNLIQATA model, the relation is also significant, but it only applies for banks (not for 
non-banking financial firms). 
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indicate a banking firm (1 = banks; 0 = otherwise). Then a dummy interaction 
variable between banks and the regulatory variable is included as one of the 
independent variables. The results are consistent with our previous findings. 
The next supplementary analysis is conducted by introducing a dummy 
interaction variable of BOS*CAR4 into our model. To avoid the perfect collinearity 
between BOS and CAR4, we do not include BOS and CAR4 in the right side of the 
equation. Basically, the model can be stated as follows: 
LN(RM) = ~o+ ~1BOS*CAR4 + ~2LNTA + ~3EXCHRT +error (4.3) 
Since CAR4 is an important element of the dummy interaction variable, the 
full sample of banks is investigated, and the non-banking financial firms are used as 
the control group. Four models (i.e., the LNSDROA, LNOLTA, EQTA and 
LNLIQATA models) are examined, but not reported in a table. We find that the 
regulatory changes, as proxied by the dummy interaction variable, increase bank 
leverage risk and liquidity risk. This result is consistent with our previous finding on 
the impact of the changes in capital regulation. Therefore, we may argue that the 
results of this analysis are largely influenced by the changes in capital regulation. 
We also perform a supplementary analysis to examine whether moral hazard 
exists when the BOS or the lower capital requirement is implemented.94 For this 
purpose, as in Chapter 3, we use the bank risk shifting framework of Duan et al. 
(1992). This framework includes an examination on the relation between asset risk 
94 Several authors have discussed the moral hazard consequences of the Blanket Guarantee Scheme 
(BGS) and/or the lower capital requirement in Indonesia. See for example McLeod (2003 and 2006), 
Fane and McLeod (2002) and Enoch et al. (2001). However, none has used the bank risk shifting 
framework ofDuan et al. (1992) to examine this issue. 
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and leverage risk, and the relation between asset risk and the fair deposit insurance 
premium.95 The positive and significant relation between asset risk and the fair 
deposit insurance premium indicates that bank risk shifting exists. Gueyie and Lai 
(2003) argue that the presence of risk shifting is an indication of bank moral hazard. 
Because the Duan et al. (1992) framework is only applicable for capital 
market listed banks, we focus on seven banks in the sub-sample of Listed and Insured 
Banks. Then, we use Merton (1977) to calculate the fair deposit insurance premium, 
and Ronn and Verma (1986) to estimate the market value of assets and asset risk (the 
standard deviation of asset returns or the implicit volatility of market value of 
assets). 96 Moreover, we run several regressions to examine the relation between asset 
risk (LNARISK) _and leverage risk (LEVRISK), and the relation between asset risk 
(LNARISK) and the fair deposit insurance premium (LNIPP) - see Table 4.7. 
In particular, to account for the impact of the BGS, separate regressions are 
conducted for the sub-periods pre-BGS (1995-1997) and post-BGS (1998-2003). 
Moreover, to account for the impact of the lower capital requirement, separate 
regressions are performed for the sub-periods 1995-1997, 1998-2000 and 2001-2003. 
95 As in Chapter 3, asset risk refers to the standard deviation of asset returns or the implicit volatility of 
market value of assets, whereas leverage risk is the ratio of the face value of liabilities to total market 
value of assets. Duan et al. (1992) describe that one needs to examine the two relations because based 
on Merton (1977) the sign of the estimated coefficient on asset risk in the second relation depends on 
the sign and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on asset risk in the first relation. The first 
relation can be used to assess whether banks have attempted to mitigate asset risk by strengthening 
capital (by reducing leverage risk). The second relation can be used to reach a final conclusion on the 
presence of bank risk shifting. 
96 See Appendix 4.3 for the fair deposit insurance premiums and Appendix 4.4 for asset risk and 
leverage risk of the seven listed banks. 
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Table 4. 7 Bank Moral Hazard and the Regulatory Changes - Supplementary Analysis 
Panel A 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of seven listed commercial banks in Indonesia during the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced 
panel). The dependent variable is LEVRISK, a proxy for leverage risk, measured as the ratio of the face value of liabilities to the market value of bank assets. The independent 
variable is LNARISK or the natural logarithm of ARISK (asset risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset returns). Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model 
(REM) are estimated using the within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors 
(to handle heteroskedasticity) are used in the regressions for the sub-periods of 1998-2003 and 2001-2003. 
1995-1997 1998-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003 
Dependent variable: LEVRISK 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.589*** 0.563••• 0.589**• 74.228*** 73.156•*• 74.15! ••• 72.846*** 72.759*** 72.846••• 80.303••• 79.08! ••• 80.303*** 
(0.043) (0.059) (0.043) (1.718) (1.611) (l.751) (l.663) (1.900) (1.663) (3.836) (7.983) (3.836) 
LNARISK 
-0.101 ••• -0.110••• -0.101 *** -6.407••• -6.907*•• -6.444*** -7.086*** -7.132*•• -7.086*** -3.943*** -4.448 -3.943*** 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.548) (0.566) (0.552) (0.702) (0.826) (0.702) (1.215) (3.220) (1.215) 
R' 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.29 0.15 0.29 
F statistics 51.12*** 32.55*** 136.74••• 148.98••• 101.80••• 74.5! ••• 10.53••• 1.91 
N 21 21 21 42 42 42 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Specijicatwn tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 0.33 1.28 0.53 0.78 
. LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 2.15 0.00 0.87 0.23 
. Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.42 2.22 0.01 0.04 
. Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 0.77 2.01 0.02 0.04 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
. Likelihood ratio test 0.79 16.93*** 7.25 20.57••• 
Autocorrelation test: 
. Wooldridge test 1.94 0.34 3.57 0.04 
Note: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
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PanelB 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of seven listed commercial banks in Indonesia during the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced 
panel). The dependent variable is LNIPP, the natural logarithm of IPP (the fair deposit insurance premium, estimated using Merton, 1977). The independent variable is LNARISK 
or the natural logarithm of ARISK (asset risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset returns). Fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are estimated 
using the within regression estimator and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors (to handle 
heteroskedasticity) are used in the regressions for the sub-periods of 1995-1997, 1998-2003 and 2001-2003'. Cluster-robust standard errors (to.handle autocorrelation) are used in 
the regressions for the sub-period of 1998-2000. 
1995-1997 1998-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003 
Dependent variable: LNIPP 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant -1.613 -4.244 -1.613 2.990*** 2.593*** 2.797*** 2.827*** 2.688*** 2.747*** 4.182*** 3.069*** 3.913*** 
(2.044) (3.070) (2.044) (0.218) (0.216) (0.204) (0.105) (0.139) (0.141) (0.522) (1.233) (0.662) 
LNARISK 0.615 -0.253 0.615 1.416*** 1.231*** 1.326*** 1.142*** 1.068*** 1.100••• 2.053*** 1.592*** 1.941 *** 
(0.746) (l.006) (0.746) (0.122) (0.103) (0.110) (0.070) (0.074) (0.061) (0.204) (0.502) (0.234) 
R' 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.75 0.47 0.75 
F statistics 0.68 0.06 135.53*** 142.20*** 267.08*** 207.21 *** 101.22••• 10.06*** 
N 21 21 21 42 42 42 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 0.35 3.56*** 3.22** 2.12 
. LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 2.40 4.76** 2.60 0.72 
. Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 1.02 28.18*** -10.05 § 0.98 
. Augmented regression test (FEM vs REM) 1.95 5.27** 2.67* 0.98 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 16.26*** 15.41 *** 9.83 14.86** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 0.06 0.18 10.32** 0.16 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. § indicates model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of 
the Hausman test. 
Using the best specification,97 we do not find that bank risk shifting exists 
during the sub-period 1995-1997. However, there is evidence that the relation 
between asset risk and deposit insurance premium is positive and significant 
following the introduction of the BGS (1998-2003). The relation is also positive and 
significant during the sub-periods 1998-2000 and 2001-2003. We also find that the R-
squared value of the regression for the sub- period 1998-2000 is higher than the sub-
period 2001-2003 (94% versus 75%). Taken together, these results indicate that moral 
hazard exists following the introduction of the BGS, and the extent of moral hazard is 
stronger under the lower capital requirement regime.98 Overall, these supplementary 
analyses provide evidence that is consistent with our previous findings. 99 
4. 7 Conclusions 
We have examined the relation between the two major regulatory changes 
following the 199711998 banking crisis (the introduction of the BGS and the changes 
in capital regulation) on bank risk taking in Indonesia over the period 1995-2003. We 
97 Under the LEVRISK model, the best specification is the pooled OLS for all sub-periods. Under the 
LNIPP model, the best specification is the pooled OLS (for the sub-periods of 1995-1997 and 2001-
2003), and the fixed~effects for other sub-periods. 
98 The results from the LEVRISK model suggest that the banks have attempted to mitigate asset risk by 
strengthening their capital, with a stronger effort during the sub-period of 1998-2000, when the bank 
recapitalization program was implemented in 1999 and 2000. However, the banks' capitalization levels 
are still insufficient to combat bank risk shifting or moral hazard. 
99 As shown in Table 4.5, for the sub-period of 1998-2000 under the LNIPP model, we use cluster-
robust variance and covariance estimator to handle panel-level autocorrelation problems. However, 
because this estimator is based on underlying assumptions that the number of cross-sectional units is 
large, whereas this number in the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks is only small (seven), we 
repeat the previous analysis by employing the Newey and West (1987) estimator. Greene (2003) 
indicates this estimator requires the number of lags to be used should be the smallest integer greater 
than or equal to T 114• In this study T = 3, thus, lags= 2. Using the Newey-West estimator in Limdep 
8.0, we find a consistent result. 
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find that the BOS encourages insured banks to take a higher leverage risk, whereas 
the lower capital requirement increases bank leverage risk and liquidity risk. Because 
these findings are consistent with the expectation from the moral hazard hypothesis, 
we conducted a supplementary analysis to confirm the presence of bank moral hazard 
due to the BOS and the lower capital requirement. Using the Duan et al. (1992) 
framework, we find a strong confirmation of this prediction. 
Our results provide strong support for previous studies such as Wheelock 
(1992), Grossman (1992), Alston et al. (1994), Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1994), 
and Hooks and Robinson (2002), which find a positive relation between deposit 
insurance and bank risk taking or the presence of bank moral hazard. However, our 
results are inconsistent with Gueyie and Lai (2003) and Karels and McClatchey 
(1999), who do not document excessive risk taking or moral hazard following the 
introduction of deposit insurance. 
Moreover, we do not find support for Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero 
(1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Gennote and Pyle (1991) who claim that 
higher capital requirements may induce banks to increase their asset portfolio risk. 
Our results seem to be consistent with Furlong and Keeley (1989), Keeley and 
Furlong (1990) and Jacques and Nigro (1997) who argue that capital standards are 
effective in reducing bank portfolio risk (and hence the lower capital requirement 
regime can encourage bank risk taking). 
Finally, we also document the impact of government intervention and poor 
economic conditions on the selected risk variables. In particular, the implementation 
of the selective recapitalisation program may lead to idiosyncratic results, and this is 
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more obvious in the Listed and Insured Banks, a sub-sample that mostly consists of 
recapitalised banks. Moreover, the fact that the control group seems to behave similar 
to the banks when certain types of accounting ratios are used as the dependent 
variable, may suggest the presence of contagion effect and generally poor economic 
conditions impacting firms. Therefore, government intervention and poor economic 
conditions may provide an important explanation on bank risk taking. 
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Appendix 4.1 Sample Banks 
No. Bank Remarks 
Names 
1. BankPanin Listed and Insured 
2. BankNISP idem 
3. BankLiooo idem 
4. Bank Bii idem 
5. Bank Permata idem 
6. Bank Danamon idem 
7. BankNiaga idem 
8. Bank Bukopin Unlisted and Insured 
9. Bank Antar Daerah idem 
10. BankDipo idem 
11. Bank Ekonomi Raharia idem 
12. BankHagaku idem 
13. Bank Halim idem 
14. Bank Indomonex idem 
15. Bank Maspion idem 
16. Bank Sri Partha idem 
17. Bank Tugu idem 
18. Bank Bumi Arta idem 
19. Bank Persyarikatan idem 
20. Bank Ina Perdana idem 
21. BankLiman idem 
22. Bank Metro Express idem 
23. Bank Royal idem 
24. Bank Windu Kencana idem 
25. Bank Yudha Bakti idem 
26. Bank Alfindo Sejahtera idem 
27. Bank Akita idem 
28. Bank Mestika Dharma idem 
29. Bank Bintang Manun!!!!al idem 
30. Bank Swaguna idem 
31. Bank Shinta Indonesia idem 
32. Bank Prima Master idem 
33. Bank Jasa Jakarta idem 
34. Bank Artha Graha idem 
35. Bank IFI idem 
36. Bank Bisnis idem 
37. Bank BHS 1906 idem 
38. Bank Anglomas idem 
39. Bank Kesejahteraan Ekonomi idem 
40. Bank Purba Danarta idem 
41. Bank Harmoni idem 
42. Bank Ganesha idem 
43. BankUIB idem 
44. Bank Mitra Niaga idem 
45. Bank Hagakita idem 
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Appendix 4.1 (continued) 
No. Bank Remarks 
Names 
46. BankHarfa Unlisted and Insured 
47. Bank Artos idem 
48. Bank Multi Arta Sentosa idem 
49. Bank Index Selindo idem 
50. BankMayora idem 
51. Bank Centratama Nasional idem 
52. Bank Fama idem 
53. Bank ANZ Panin Unlisted and Uninsured 
54. Rabobank International Indonesia idem 
55. Bank Resona Perdania idem 
56. Bank Sumitomo Mitsui Indonesia idem 
57. Bank Korea Exchange Danamon idem 
58. Bank DBS Indonesia idem 
59. Bank UOB Indonesia idem 
60. Bank BNP Paribas Lippo Indonesia idem 
61. Bank Mizuho Indonesia idem 
62. Bank UFJ Indonesia idem 
63. Bank Finconesia idem 
64. Bank Multicor idem 
65. Bank Credit Lyonnais Indonesia idem 
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Appendix 4.2 Sample Non-Banking Financial Firms 
No. Firm 
Names 
1 Global Financindo 
2 Bina Danatama Finance 
3 BFI Indonesia 
4 Clipan Finance 
5 Equity Development Investment 
6 Indocitra Finance 
7 Pacific Utama Finance 
8 Sinar Mas Multiartha 
9 Liooo Securities 
10 Asuransi Bintang 
11 Asuransi Davin Mitra 
12 Asuransi AHAP 
13 Asuransi Ramayana 
14 Asuransi Bina Dharma Arta 
15 Maskapai Reasuransi Indonesia 
16 Panin Insurance 
17 Panin Life 
18 Pool Advista 
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Appendix 4.3 Fair Deposit Insurance Premiums of Listed Banks in Indonesia 1995-2003 
This appendix presents the fair deposit insurance premiums for the seven listed banks in Indonesia during 1995-2003. The fair deposit insurance premiums are 
calculated using Merton (1977). 
f liabilities) 
No Banks 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Panin 0.00191 0.01082 0.22949 1.39965 5.29034 0.15536 0.08317 0.46156 0.04628 
2 NISP 0.20799 0.02279 0.06216 0.55009 0.82370 0.20966 0.01782 0.01062 0.05906 
3 Lippo 0.06407 0.07574 0.09061 1.02588 3.05539 0.27093 0.12678 0.45803 0.15920 
4 Bil 0.02640 0.04537 0.24811 0.52683 13.98813 2.49380 2.53354 1.49174 0.99502 
5 Permata 0.10719 0.00093 0.06445 0.41676 1.63879 14.64374 0.68069 1.65442 7.57936 
6 Danamon 0.00098 0.02934 0.23381 0.47035 83.62042 6.63972 1.32140 0.18336 9.21652 
7 Niaga 0.01966 0.00092 0.13288 1.41125 99.06480 3.20981 0.97104 2.10168 2.73577 
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Appendix 4.4 Asset Risk and Leverage Risk of Listed Banks in Indonesia 1995-2003 
This appendix presents asset risk and leverage risk for the seven listed banks in Indonesia during 1995-2003. Asset risk is the standard deviation of asset returns. 
Leverage risk is the ratio of the face value of liabilities to the market value of bank assets. 
No Banks 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Panin 0.042 0.048 0.061 0.097 0.422 0.047 0.033 0.131 0.107 
(0.884) (0.889) (0.918) (0.934) (0.693) (0.933) (0.949) (0.825) (0.784) 
2 NISP 0.071 0.062 0.043 0.065 0.142 0.047 0.020 0.022 0.052 
(0.897) (0.865) (0.926) (0.937) (0.840) (0.939) (0.962) (0.952) (0.906) 
3 Lippo 0.067 0.094 0.029 0.097 0.280 0.054 0.028 0.047 0.047 
(0.876) (0.825) (0.959) (0.918) (0.772) (0.934) (0.965) (0.957) (0.934) 
4 Bii 0.080 0.111 0.043 0.031 0.559 0.154 0.129 0.099 0.139 
(0.828) (0.775) (0.951) (0.982) (0.796) (0.904) (0.934) (0;934) (0.857) 
5 Permata 0.081 0.037 0.020 0.030 0.071 0.612 0.088 0.170 0.348 
(0.861) (0.891) (0.971) (0.979) (0.971) (0.759) (0.910) (0.850) (0.844) 
6 Danamon 0.033 0.054 0.029 0.020 2.979 0.476 0.138 0.105 0.233 
(0.905) (0.890) (0.971) (0.992) (0.686) (0.678) (0.876) (0.831) (0.999) 
7 Niaga 0.039 0.046 0.027 0.049 5.328 0.291 0.161 0.157 0.174 
(0.919) (0.864) (0.966) (0.988) (0.679) (0.765) (0.822) (0.886) (0.888) 
Note: The first row is asset risk, and the second row (in parentheses) is leverage risk. 
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Chapter 5 
Risk Taking, Ownership Structure and Regulatory Changes: 
Evidence from Indonesian Banks during 1995-2003 
5.1 Introduction 
Several studies have examined the relation between ownership structure and 
bank risk taking, and the results are mixed. For example, Saunders et al. (1990) and 
Anderson and Fraser (2000) find a positive relation between managerial ownership 
and bank risk-taking, particularly during periods of deregulation, whereas Chen et al. 
(1998) document a negative relation. These conflicting results are partially explained 
by the interest rate environment existing during the different time periods, and the 
different banks in their samples. 
The present study extends the existing literature by examining the relation 
between ownership structure and bank risk taking in Indonesia during a period of 
high interest rates, volatile exchange rates and changing regulatory settings over 
1995-2003. Like many Asian countries, few Indonesian financial institutions are 
publicly traded and most have high ownership concentration. In Indonesia, ownership 
is extremely concentrated as most banks have only two owners. Prior studies that 
examine the relation between ownership and bank risk taking have not investigated 
this issue in a setting with such pronounced ownership concentration. The intense 
/ 
ownership concentration coupled with the economic and regulatory conditions during 
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our sample period allow an investigation of how owners behave in a setting that has 
more pronounced moral hazard opportunities. 
The existing literature generally examines bank ownership and risk taking in a 
non-crisis setting. However, during the last decade, many Asian countries 
experienced a financial crisis, resulting in bank restructuring programs that continue 
today. The efficacy of ownership concentration and bank risk taking models during 
both normal and crisis periods requires consideration because both highly 
concentrated ownership and government intervention affect banks' risk taking 
behaviour. Therefore, this study includes the period when Indonesian banks 
experienced the 1997/1998 crisis, followed by an intensive bank restructuring 
program and regulatory changes. Because of the crisis, the Blanket Guarantee 
S.cheme (BGS), a form of deposit insurance, was introduced in 1998, but did not 
include all banks, while the changes in capital adequacy regulation in 1998 and 2001 
impacted all banks. 100 More importantly, the government injected capital into some 
banks and temporarily became a significant shareholder. This partial government 
ownership altered ownership concentration and more fully explains the risk-taking 
behaviour of these banks relative to those that did not receive government funding. 
Because most Indonesian banks are not publicly traded, capital market risk 
measures cannot be used for risk assessment. Therefore, the relations between 
accounting measures of risk and ownership concentration are examined. Using a 
sample of 65 Indonesian commercial banks, a significant positive relation is found 
100 As stated earlier, in 1998, Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) reduced the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) requirement from 8% to 4%, then back to 8% in 2001. 
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between ownership concentration and overall risk. However, ownership concentration 
is negatively related to credit risk and liquidity risk. 
The sample is partitioned into Listed and Insured Banks, Unlisted and Insured 
Banks, and Unlisted and Uninsured Banks. This allows a more thorough examination 
of how the listing, insurance status, capital requirement changes and the introduction 
of the BGS impact risk taking behaviour by Indonesian banks. When the BGS was 
introduced and capital requirements were changed, the Unlisted and Insured, and 
Unlisted and Uninsured banks showed much less reaction than the Listed and Insured 
banks. This is consistent with the government implementing regulation to protect the 
banking system by providing assistance to the major participants and by requiring 
more shareholder funds. Ownership concentration alone is insufficient to explain 
bank risk taking behaviour. In Indonesia, because banks are the principal source of 
debt finance, government intervention, selectively applied, dictates the link between 
ownership concentration and risk. Risk-insensitive deposit insurance coupled with the 
"too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) policy motivates banks to have high ownership 
concentration and to minimize the cost of failure. The findings should provide 
insights for other similarly structured banking systems in Asian countries. 
5.2 Literature Review 
Several studies on the relation between ownership structure and bank risk 
taking explore the role of managerial ownership. 101 This is understandable since 
101 These include, for example, Saunders et al. (1990), Chen et al. (199S), Anderson and Fraser (2000), 
Gorton and Rosen (1995), Demsetz et al. (1997), Sullivan and Spong (1998), and Lee (2002). For non-
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managerial ownership has been considered as a solution for agency conflicts between 
managers and owners. The conflicts can be traced back to the idea of the separation 
between ownership and control in large modem corporations as suggested by Berle 
and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Large modem corporations, 
including banks, have long been attributed with an image that they have diffuse 
h. 102 owners 1p. 
Understanding the link between managerial ownership and risk taking is 
particularly important when ownership of the firm is characterized by diffuse 
ownership. However, many studies on corporate ownership around the world suggest 
that diffuse ownership is not always the case. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) 
examine the first level ownership of the 10 largest publicly traded firms in 49 
countries, and find that firms' governance is characterized by highly concentrated 
ownership, particularly in developing economies. Moreover, in a study on the 
ultimate shareholders of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, La Porta et al. 
(1999) find that except in countries with very good shareholder protection (e.g., the 
US), relatively few of the firms are widely held. In addition, Claessens et al. (2000) 
examine the separation of ownership and control in 2,980 publicly traded companies 
(including both financial institutions and non-financial institutions) in nine East Asian 
countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand). They find that more than two-thirds of firms are 
banking financial firms, see for example Knopf and Teall (1996), Cebenoyan et al. (1995 and 1999), 
and Brewer and Saindenberg (1996). See Pagano (2001) for a review on the link between managerial 
ownership and bank risk taking. 
102 Krayenbuehi (1993), for example, notes that for many years large commercial banks have had a 
very diversified ownership with a large number ofrelatively small individual shareholders. 
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controlled by a single shareholder, and separation of management from ownership 
control is rare. They also document that the top management of about 60% of the 
firms that are not widely held is related to the family of the controlling shareholder, 
and there is extensive family control in more than half of East Asian corporations.103 
In the absence of diffuse ownership, ownership concentration in the hands of 
any owner may become a major focus. Claessens and Djankov (1999) used the idea 
of the concentration of ownership in the hands of any owner in examining the relation 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance in the Czech Republic 
over the period 1992-1997. Controlling for some firm-specific variables, they find 
that ownership concentration leads to an increase in short-term labor productivity and 
short term profitability. Moreover, in a study on the relation between ownership 
concentration and performance in Ukraine's privatized enterprises based on the year 
1998 data, Pivovarsky (2003) use the same approach, but he focuses more on non-
state ownership concentration. He finds that ownership concentration is positively 
associated with enterprise performance. 
The presence of concentrated ownership may lead to an ambiguous result. On 
the one hand, it may provide benefits to'the firms as the owners have more power to 
monitor and control management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, and Burkart et al., 
1997). Alternatively, it may lead to misuse the power or moral hazard. In addition, 
the lack of ownership diversification may expose companies unnecessarily to risk 
(Giirsoy and Aydogan, 1998). 
103 For more discussion on corporate governance in East Asia, see Walker and Fox (2002). 
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Pinteris (2002) and Laeven (2002) provide some evidence on the relation 
between ownership concentration and bank risk taking. In a study on the presence of 
agency conflicts within banking institutions in Argentina during the period 1997-
1999, Pinteris (2002) examines the relation between ownership concentration and 
bank performance and risk. He investigates this issue because the Argentine banking 
system is characterized by a highly concentrated structure of ownership. He employs 
the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hischman (HH) index as a measure of 
ownership concentration. He expects that banks with a more concentrated ownership 
structure will be more willing to take higher risk, as measured by the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans. Using a panel data methodology, Pinteris finds that 
banks with a more concentrated ownership structure exhibit a higher loan portfolio 
risk. 
Laeven (2002) exammes deposit insurance and bank risk in 14 countries 
(Argentina, Chile, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, UK and US) over the period 1991-1998. He 
argues that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance may indicate that a bank takes a 
higher risk. He uses the estimated cost of deposit insurance as a risk measure, and 
evaluates the relation between risk taking behaviour of banks and their corporate 
governance structure, including ownership concentration. A dummy variable is 
employed to indicate banks with concentrated and non-concentrated ownership. 
Using ordinary least square regressions, Laeven finds a positive relation between 
ownership concentration and bank risk taking. 
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Based on agency theory, a positive relation between ownership concentration 
and bank risk taking can be explained in terms of moral hazard in the agency 
relationship between debtholders (e.g., depositors in banks) and shareholders 
(perhaps including management). As stated by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), moral 
hazard problems arise when the agent and principal have differing individual 
objectives and the principal can not easily determine whether the agent's reports and 
actions are being taken in pursuit of the principal's goals or are self-interested 
misbehaviour. These authors state that one problem between creditors and 
shareholders is asset substitution or risk shifting. In this regard, they write: "when a 
firm has too much debt compared to its equity, the owners may be too ready to 
undertake risky investments. This is because the owners of shares enjoy virtually all 
the benefits if returns on the risky investments turn out to be high, but the lenders 
suffer a major portion of the losses if the returns turn out to be low" (p.495). This 
may occur in banking firms. 104 As banks are largely financed by borrowing funds, in 
the imperfect monitoring by depositors and regulators, bank owners may undertake 
riskier activities at the expense of depositors. Moreover, when ownership is 
concentrated in a few owners, it is much easier for them to engage in excessive risk 
taking. 
Asset substitution can also be explained using option theory. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that once a debt is in place, the value of the equity is like an 
104 Simpson and Gleason (1999) assert that the incentives for risk-shifting from equity owners to 
depositors exist in banking similar to the agency problems caused by the conflict between owners and 
debt-holders in other companies. 
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option due to the shareholders' limited liability. 105 According to option price theory 
(see e.g., Merton, 1977, and Ronn and Verma, 1986), equity can be viewed as a call 
option on the firm's value with the amount of debts as the strike price, whereas the 
risk-insensitive deposit insurance system can be seen as a put-option-like subsidy to 
shareholders. Since depositors can only monitor shareholders' actions imperfectly, 
shareholders can increase the value of their equity call and put options by increasing 
the risk of underlying assets of the bank and/or leverage risk (Saunders et al., 1990). 
In this regard, increasing asset risk and/or leverage risk essentially transfers wealth 
from depositors to shareholders. 106 
There are two other studies on the relation between ownership concentration 
and risk taking in banking organizations (e.g., Kim and Rhee, 2000, and Kim et al., 
2002). However, these studies follow the way of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in 
examining the relation between risk taking and ownership concentration. In a study 
on the determinants of firm ownership structure in the US during 1976-1980, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that risk taking is exogenous and ownership structure 
is endogenous decision of the firm. 107 In other words, the degree of risk to which a 
firtn is exposed is one factor that determines the ownership structure that the firm will 
105 John et al. (1991) specifically discuss ti)e role of limited liability in banks. They argue that risk 
shifting incentives in banks arise from the existence of limited liability for owners. They further claim 
that the incentives for risk shifting will always exist regardless of risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
premiums are in place. 
106 Chen et al. (1998) and Berkowitz and Qiu (2002), for example, name this idea as the wealth transfer 
argument. 
107 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) employ a sample of 511 firms from major sectors of the US economy, 
including regulated utilities and financial institutions. Using ordinary least squares regressions, they 
find that among the variables that are empirically significant in explaining the variation in ownership 
structure are firm size, instability of profit rate, whether or not the firm is a regulated utility or 
financial institutions, and whether or not the firm is the mass media or sports industry. 
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have. Based on their view, ownership should be treated as the dependent variable, and 
risk taking as the independent variable. 108 
Kim and Rhee (2000) and Kim et al. (2002) examine a sample of Japanese 
commercial banks over the period 1983-1991. They partition the study period into 
three sub-periods: 1983-1985, 1986-1988, and 1989-1991. They find that when the 
Japanese government increased the coverage of deposit insurance and reduced the 
capital requirement during the sub-period 1986-1988, bank risk has a positive effect 
on ownership concentration. They attribute their results to the "substitution 
hypothesis" - that regulatory oversight and shareholders oversight substitute for one 
another. Based on their finding, they claim that bank shareholders will exert 
oversight, but only when the regulatory environment subsidizes risk taking and 
provides flexibility to shareholders. 
Outside the banking industry, there is one study on the relation between 
ownership concentration and risk taking. Gtirsoy and Aydogan (1998) examine the 
impact of ownership structure on performance and risk-taking behaviour of Turkish 
non-financial firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) during the period 
1992-1998. They find that firms with concentrated ownership have higher total risk 
and lower market beta risk than companies with diffuse ownership. They provide the 
108 Much of studies on the relation between ownership structure and bank risk taking do not follow this 
idea. Saunders et al. (1990) and others argue that risk taking is a part of endogenous decision of the 
bank. They claim that the idea of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) may be appropriate for non-bank firms, 
but not for banks. In banks, according to Saunders et al. (1990), financial portfolios are much more 
flexible in the short term than ownership structure. Moreover, transaction costs of stockholders 
changing ownership structures endogenously, such as through the market of corporate control, should 
overweigh the transaction costs of changing the structure of bank portfolios to alter risk - such as 
changing the composition of a bank's deposits, loans, and securities. Therefore, Saunders et al. (1990) 
indicate that, at least in the short term, risk taking can be viewed as an endogenous decision of the 
bank impacted by its ownership structure, other control variables and the regulatory environment. 
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following explanation for their results. First, the presence of large shareholders may 
increase the incentive to take higher risk by those shareholders at the expense of 
creditors, and this leads to a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
firm total risk. Second, because firms with diffuse ownership are usually run by 
professional managers with little or no interest in the firm, in the presence of risk 
averse managers who cannot diversify their human capital, the relation between 
ownership concentration and firm market beta risk is negative. 
Overall, the existing literature shows that ownership concentration is one of 
the important determinants for bank risk taking. Moreover, the relation between 
ownership and bank risk taking can be influenced by the changes in the regulatory 
environment. 
5.3 Hypotheses 
5.3.1 Relation between Ownership Concentration and Bank Risk Taking in 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of the nine countries studied by Claessens et al. (2000) on the 
separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. As stated earlier, they 
find that more than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder, and the 
separation of management from ownership control is rare. Although their study only 
includes publicly traded companies (both financial and non-financial firms) their 
findings provides an important insight on ownership structure of Indonesian banks. 
Without providing more detailed information, Pangestu and Habir (2002) 
indicate that Indonesian banks are characterized by a highly ownership concentration 
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structure. Perhaps this is because for many years this country used a Dutch colonial 
law (the Commercial Code 1847 - Wetboek van Koophandel or Kitab Undang-
Undang Hukum Dagang) that allowed a single owner to establish a company. 
Although a new Company Law (the Act No.I of 1995) has changed this regulation 
and requires at least two owners in establishing a limited liability corporation, many 
Indonesian companies, including banks, still have a high ownership concentration. 
In a developing country with a less developed capital market such as 
Indonesia, monitoring and control from market participants and outside parties 
(including depositors in banks) toward the majority shareholders may be less 
effective. This is partly because capital markets in developing countries are usually 
characterized by less transparent information, resulting in greater information 
asymmetry. 109 Since market participants and outside parties do not receive enough 
information both in quantity and quality, they can not properly monitor and control 
for the risk attitudes of the majority shareholders. This may imply that Indonesian 
banks would easily undertake higher risk if their majority owners want them to do it. 
The problem becomes worse if the majority ownership and management are 
amalgamated in one person. 
Further, Indonesian banks are generally small, closely held and not many are 
listed in the capital market. As noted by DeYoung et al. (2001), closely held banks 
typically face a classic monitoring problem. In particular, market discipline, 
institutional oversight and direct monitoring of these banks are either unavailable or 
109 For a review on the transparency in the capital market in Indonesia, see Wells (1999). 
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ineffective tools for mitigating agency costs. In the absence of appropriate 
monitoring, bank shareholders would prefer to take riskier activities in order to 
increase their wealth at the expense of depositors. 
In addition, Nagar et al. (2002) indicate that a closely held firm is 
characterized by: (1) a small number of shareholders, (2) no ready market for 
corporate stock, and (3) substantial majority shareholders participation in the 
management, direction, and operations of the corporation. Since Indonesian banks are 
very closely held, the presence of a small number of shareholders may result in a 
higher ownership concentration. Accordingly, consistent with the asset substitution 
argument and the findings from previous studies (e.g., Pinteris, 2002, and Laeven, 
2002), it is predicted that the higher ownership concentration, the higher bank risk · 
taking in Indonesia. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H 1: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and bank risk 
taking in Indonesia during the period 1995-2003. 
5.3.2 Effects of Regulatory Changes on the Relation between Ownership 
Concentration and Bank Risk Taking in Indonesia 
As stated earlier, there are two major regulatory changes in the Indonesian 
banking industry over the period 1995-2003. The first is the introduction of the 
Blanket Guarantee Scheme (BGS) in 1998, and the second is the changes in the 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) requirement in 1998 and 2001. Specifically, in 1998 the 
CAR requirement was reduced from 8% to 4%, then back to 8% in 2001. Based on 
159 
the occurrence of these regulatory changes, our study period includes three sub-
periods as follows: 
(1) Sub-period 1 (1995-1997; without the BOS, but with a minimum CAR of 8%), 
(2) Sub-period 2 (1998-2000; with the BOS and a minimum CAR of 4% ), 
(3) Sub-period 3 (2001-2003; with the BOS and a minimum CAR of 8%). 
Previous research has shown that the changes in the regulatory environments 
have an effect on the relation between ownership structure and bank risk taking. For 
example, Saunders et al. (1990) and Anderson and Fraser (2000) find that the relation 
between managerial ownership and bank risk taking is positive during the 
deregulation period. Moreover, using bank risk as the independent variable and 
ownership concentration as the dependent variable, Kim and Rhee (2000) and Kim et 
al. (2002) find that when the Japanese government increased the coverage of deposit 
insurance and reduced the capital requirement in 1986-1988, bank risk has a positive 
effect on ownership concentration. 
In this study, we also argue that the regulatory changes affect the relation 
between ownership concentration and bank risk taking in Indonesia. Before adopting 
the BOS or during the first sub-period (1995-1997), the relation between ownership 
concentration and bank risk taking would be significantly positive as the banking 
industry still under the deregulation policy that was introduced in 1988. After the 
introduction of the BOS in 1998, the relation would be stronger. This is because in 
terms of bank risk taking, due to the moral hazard consequences of the BOS, banks 
may undertake riskier activities after the implementation of the BOS. Moreover, in 
terms of ownership concentration, the sub-periods following the adoption of the BOS 
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are characterized by intensive banking restructuring programs that would increase 
bank ownership concentration. 
One of the most important banking restructuring programs is bank 
recapitalization. Since the 199711998 crisis deteriorated bank capital, many banks 
needed to inject a new capital to meet the minimum capital requirement. Under the 
government's bank recapitalization program, which is designed to lift bank capital to 
meet the minimum capital requirement, the government injected new capital up to 
80% of the funding requirement, whereas the bank's majority shareholders should 
provide the rest. 110 This program would lead to a greater ownership concentration 
since the government became a temporary majority shareholder until the 
divestment. 111 Meanwhile, non-recapitalized banks might also increase their capital, 
but their majority shareholders may be more responsive for this purpose than their 
minority shareholders because when a bank is closed by the government, its majority 
shareholders would experience a greater loss than its minority shareholders. This may 
result in a greater ownership concentration in the hands of the majority owners. 
We further argue that a lower capital requirement during the second sub-
period (1998-2000) would not lessen the stronger relation between ownership 
concentration and bank risk taking following the adoption of the BGS. This is 
because since the beginning banks in this country may have understood that the lower 
capital requirement is only for a temporary purpose. In addition, as a part of its bank 
110 In case the majority shareholders failed to provide the 20% funding required, the bank was taken 
over by the government. See, for example, Abdullah and Santoso (2001) and Batunanggar (2002) for a 
discussion on bank recapitalization program in Indonesia. 
Ill The divestment process began in 2002, and still continuing while this study is being written. 
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restructuring programs, Bank Indonesia also required commercial banks to submit a 
business plan showing the bank's detailed plans to achieve a minimum CAR of 8% in 
2001.112 Therefore, we expect that the relation between ownership concentration and 
bank risk taking is stronger following the regulatory changes (during the sub-periods 
2 and 3). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The relation between ownership concentration and bank risk taking is stronger 
during the sub-periods 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 than the sub-period 
1995-1997. 
5.4 Data and Method 
5.4.1 Data, Sample and Method 
The present study uses the same sample of banks as the previous chapter. The 
sample includes 52 private national banks and 13 joint venture banks and the data are 
partitioned into three mutually exclusive groups based on listing and deposit 
insurance status. The three partitions are Listed and Insured Banks (7), Unlisted and 
Insured Banks (45), and Unlisted and Uninsured Banks (13). The final sample 
consists of a balanced panel of 65 banks over the nine-year period. 113 
The same data sources described in Chapter 4 are used to obtain ownership 
and financial data of the sample banks. Bank ownership and financial data are from 
the banks' condensed published financial statements. Data for 1995-2000 were 
112 The viability of the business plan is also one of the requirements for including a bank in the 
government's bank recapitalization program. See, for example, Batunanggar (2002). 
113 As mentioned earlier, when the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans (LLRGL) is used as the 
dependent variable, we do not have a balanced panel. 
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compiled by Bank Indonesia in a series of books entitled "Direktori Perbankan 
Indonesia [The Indonesian Banking Directory]" (1996-2001 Editions). The 
remaining banking data are obtained from Infobank, while the exchange rate data is 
from various issues of the Annual Report of Bank Indonesia. 
Similar to previous chapters, this chapter also uses panel data methods that 
consist of two models: fixed-effects, and random-effects. In addition, results based on 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) are also presented to allow comparison with the 
1 d . 114 pane ata regress10ns. 
5.4.2 Dependent and Independent Variables 
Saunders et al. (1990), Chen et al. (1998) and Anderson and Fraser (2000) use 
capital market based measures of risk as the dependent variable. However, because 
few banks in Indonesia are listed (seven out of 65 banks), this study employs 
accounting-based measures of risk. We use the same accounting risk measures as in 
previous chapters: SDROA, EQTA, GLTA, LLRGL, LIQATA and CVCSTF. 
SDROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a 
three-year moving window of annual observations, a proxy for overall risk. EQTA is 
the ratio of book-value equity-to-total-assets, a proxy for leverage risk. LLRGL is the 
114 Initially, similar to the previous chapters, in this chapter we want to use Stata 9.0 for all 
estimations, and apply the cluster-robust standard error when there is evidence of panel-level 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. However, because the cluster-robust estimator requires a large 
number of cross-section units and one of our sub-samples (the sub-sample of Listed and Insured 
Banks) only has seven banks, we use Limdep 8.0, which has the Newey and West (1987) estimator to 
handle heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems in the pooled OLS and fixed-effects models. 
Please note that Limdep 8.0 estimates the fixed-effects model using the Least Squares with Group 
Dummy Variables (LSDV) method, and does not produce the R-squared values for the random-effects 
model. 
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ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. GLTA is the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-
assets. LLRGL and GLT A are a proxy for credit risk. LIQAT A is the ratio of liquid-
assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF is the coefficient of variation of customer and short-
term funds estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. 
LIQATA and CVCSTF are a measure of liquidity risk. 
The independent variable, ownership concentration (OC), is measured as the 
percentage of equity owned by the single largest shareholder. While Kim and Rhee 
(2000) and Kim et al. (2002) use the top five shareholders, only the largest 
shareholder is used here because many Indonesian banks have only two owners. 
The existing literature suggests two approaches for examining the impact of 
the regulatory changes on the relation between ownership concentration and bank risk 
taking. Knopf and Teall (1996), Kim and Rhee (2000) and Kim et al. (2002) conduct 
sub-period analyses and compare the results for each sub-period. Alternatively, 
following Wooldridge (2003b), Kim and Rhee (2000) and Kim et al. (2002) this 
study uses two time-period dummy variables and interacts these variables with 
ownership concentration to assess the impact of the change in government policy. In 
this approach, the coefficient of interest is associated with the interaction terms. The 
sub-period 1995-1997 is used as the base period, and two time-period dummy 
variables, "SUBP2" and "SUBP3'', refer to the sub-periods 1998-2000 and 2001-
2003, respectively. 115 Moreover, several dummy interaction variables are included by 
multiplying the independent variables by the two time-period dummy variables. If 
115 Using the sub-period 1995-1997 as the base category allows a comparison of the relation between 
ownership concentration and bank risk taking before and after adoption of the BGS. 
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increased concentration is related to greater risk-taking, a positive relation is expected 
between ownership concentration, LNOC, and the risk measures and also for 
SUBP2*LNOC and SUBP3*LNOC. 116 
As in Chapter 4, the present study also uses two control variables: (1) bank 
size and (2) macroeconomic conditions. For bank size, we use the natural logarithm 
of total assets (LNT A), whereas for the macroeconomic conditions, we use the annual 
average of the rupiah/USD exchange rate (EXCHRT). Again, the relation between 
each control variable and the risk measure is expected to be mixed (positive or 
negative). 
5.4.3 Empirical Models 
The following model is used to examine the relation between ownership 
concentration and bank risk taking in Indonesia: 
LN(RM) = ao+ a 1LNOC+ a2LNTA + a3 EXCHRT +error (5.1) 
where LN(RM) is the natural logarithm of the risk measures, RM, and LNOC is the 
natural logarithm of ownership concentration, OC. The natural logarithm of total 
assets, LNT A, a measure of bank's size, and the annual average Rupiah/USD 
exchange rate, EXCHRT, a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions, are used as 
control variables. 
116 When EQTA or LNLIQATA is used as the dependent variable, a negative sign in the estimated 
coefficient on LNOC should be interpreted as a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
bank risk taking, and vise versa. In addition, a negative sign is expected in the estimated coefficients 
on the two dummy interaction variables. 
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Moreover, to examine the impact of the regulatory changes on the relation 
between ownership concentration and bank risk taking, the following model is 
used: 117 
LN(RM) =Po+ P1LNOC+ P2LNTA + P3 EXCHRT + p4SUBP2+ P5SUBP3 
+ P6SUBP2*LNOC + P7SUBP3*LNOC + P8SUBP2*LNTA 
+ p9SUBP3*LNTA + P10SUBP2*EXCHRT 
+ P11SUBP3*EXCHRT +error (5.2) 
In this model, the focus is on the estimated coefficients of SUBP2*LNOC and 
SUBP3*LNOC. 
S.S. Results 
S.S.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics of the raw variables used in the 
present study. In addition to the statistics for the full sample, the table also shows the 
statistics for three sub-samples in the present study: (1) Listed and Insured Banks, (2) 
Unlisted and Insured Banks, and (3) Unlisted and Uninsured Banks. 
In the full sample, SDROA has a mean (median) of 6.14% (0.95%). 
Moreover, EQTA has a mean (median) of 12.74% (12.37%). At a glance, this may 
suggest that the capital ratios of Indonesian banks during 1995-2003 are above 8%. 
However, its minimum value of -126.60% indicates that several banks experienced a 
negative capital during several years in our study period, most likely due to the crisis. 
117 This dummy interaction variable approach follows Kim and Rhee (2000) and Kim et al. (2002). 
They use SUBPl and SUBP3 as the dummy variables. Their base category is SUBP2, when a lower 
capital requirement was present for Japanese banks during 1986-1988. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Risk Measures, Ownership Concentration and Other Explanatory Variables 
This study uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003. SDROA is the standard deviation of the 
before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. 
LIQATA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-.total-assets. OC is the ownership concentration, defined as the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder. 
TA is total assets (in Rp,billion), a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general 
macroeconomic conditions. Except for TA and EXCHRT, all variables are presented as a percentage. 
Panel A: Full S le (N=65. 585 ob for LLRGL 584 
Variables Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
SD ROA 6.140 0.953 26.151 0.006 347.166 10.973 
EQTA 12.738 12.365 15.249 -126.596 99.014 -2.956 
GLTA 57.780 58.723 28.246 0.000 355.731 2.499 
LLRGL 8.778 3.153 12.639 0.175 100.000 2.991 
LIQATA 16.218 7.492 18.711 0.667 100.360 1.847 
CVCSTF 28.657 25.803 18.693 1.776 170.585 1.813 
oc 62.073 60.000 25.489 10.000 100.000 -0.069 
TA 2,860.223 388.335 7,359.413 9.748 62,168.058 4.271 
EXCHRT 7.088 8.438 2.993 2.253 10.255 -0.656 
Panel B: Listed and Insured Banks (N=7, 63 observations) 
Variables Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
SD ROA 10.218 0.812 17.902 0.043 71.154 2.052 
EQTA 0.516 7.917 26.806 -126.596 25.322 -3.496 
GLTA 52.098 53.699 24.997 9.058 137.302 0.454 
LLRGL 12.316 7.515 14.764 1.114 60.353 1.726 
LIQATA 24.286 13.149 23.647 2.014 76.379 0.782 
CVCSTF 25.879 24.781 14.885 1.776 66.517 0.405 
oc 50.498 48.000 25.379 10.000 99.360 0.659 
TA 19,061.294 15,940.612 13,680.424 875.313 62,168.058 1.028 
EXCHRT 7.088 8.438 3.014 2.253 10.255 -0.651 
-0\ 00 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Panel C: Unlisted and Insured Banks (N=45, 405 observations) 
Variables Mean Median 
SD ROA 2.739 0.797 
EQTA 15.035 12.975 
GLTA 52.067 54.748 
LLRGL 6.370 2.732 
LIQATA 16.201 7.824 
CVCSTF 26.684 24.073 
oc 58.078 51.200 
TA 646.585 212.201 
EXCHRT 7.088 8.438 
Panel D: Unlisted and U · d Banks (N=l3.117 ob 
Variables Mean Median 
SD ROA 15.719 1.456 
EQTA 11.368 13.317 
GLTA 80.619 76.502 
LLRGL 15.262 8.380 
LIQATA 11.935 5.158 
CVCSTF 36.983 32.560 
oc 82.135 85.000 
TA 1,799.161 1,243.577 
EXCHRT 7.088 8.438 
Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
5.086 0.006 33.928 3.362 
10.194 -19.196 75.820 1.415 
21.136 2.664 104.441 -0.353 
9.071 0.175 61.447 2.877 
17.857 0.935 77.339 1.722 
16.040 2.174 105.329 1.306 
25.093 13.300 100.000 0.192 
1,655.396 9.748 17,557.864 6.024 
2.994 2.253 10.255 -0.656 
t for LLRGL 116 ob f 
Standard Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Deviation 
55.132 0.053 347.166 5.316 
17.978 -78.979 99.014 -1.398 
38.332 0.000 355.731 3.759 
18.270 0.536 100.000 2.326 
17.300 0.667 100.360 3.418 
25.632 3.277 170.858 1.751 
14.108 40.000 99.000 -1.043 
1,517.558 17.540 6,692.149 1.663 
3.003 2.253 10.255 -0.654 
LLRGL and GLTA have a mean (median) of 8.78% (3.15%) and 57.78% 
(58.72%) respectively. The minimum value of GLTA is zero, and this is somewhat 
odd given providing loans are the main business of banks. A further check indicates 
that this is because in 2003 the total loans of a joint venture bank (Bank Credit 
Lyonnais Indonesia) are zero. LIQATA and CVCSTF have a mean (median) of_ 
16.22% (7.49%) and 28.66% (25.80%) respectively. 
As indicated by their skewness values, all risk measures in the full sample 
have a very highly skewed data distribution. The highest skewness value is in 
SDROA (more than 10), and the lowest is in CVCSTF (1.81). In the sub-samples, all 
risk measures also have a highly skewed data distribution, except for GLTA, 
LIQATA and CVCSTF in the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks, and GLTA in 
the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks. 
Among the explanatory variables, in the full sample only OC and EXCHRT 
show a relatively normal data distribution. The mean (median) of these variables are 
62.30% (60.00%) and 7.09 (8.44), respectively. Meanwhile, TA (total assets) has a 
highly skewed data distribution, as reflected by its skewness values of more than 4. 
The mean (median) of TA is Rp.2,860 billion (Rp.388 billion), respectively. This 
variable has a minimum value of Rp.10 billion (Bank Swaguna in 1999) and a 
maximum value of Rp.62,168 billion (Bank Danamon in 2000). In the sub-samples, 
the descriptive statistics of these variables show the similar pattern to those of in the 
full sample. 
In term of ownership concentration (OC), the sub-sample of Listed and 
Insured Banks shows the lowest OC with a mean (median) of 52.62% (50.99% ). 
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However, the mean and median in the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks are 
not much different from those in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks 
(58.08% and 51.20%, respectively). This may indicate that the proportion of equity of 
Indonesian banks that listed in the capital market is small. 118 The highest mean and 
median of OC is in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks (82.14% and 
85.00%, respectively). This makes sense since this sub-sample consists of joint 
venture banks, where the establishment of these banks is based on a scheme that 
foreign investors provide 85% of the capital and local investors provide the rest. 119 
Because of the importance of the ownership concentration variable, year-by-
year concentration is shown in Table 5.2 (Panel A).120 Listed and Insured Banks 
exhibited the greatest increase in ownership concentration over time. The Unlisted 
and Uninsured Banks show the least change because they were originally highly 
concentrated. In addition, government intervention on six large banks as reflected by 
government ownership is shown in Table 5.2 (Panel B). 
In general, the descriptive statistics show that, with little exception, our data 
are highly skewed. To handle the issue of highly skewed data distribution, we 
118 Rosser (2003) indicates that in general listed companies in Indonesia only sold a small fraction of 
their shares to investors (between 20% and 35%). 
119 See Dharmayanti (2000) for a review on the history of the establishment of joint venture banks in 
Indonesia. 
120 As in Chapter 4, we also perform a non-parametric analysis (i.e., the median difference test) to 
examine the impact of difference regulatory regime over the study period on ownership concentration 
(not reported in a table). The results suggest that, in the full sample and sub-samples, the median of 
ownership concentration is significantly higher in post-BGS. We also find that the median during a 
lower capital requirement (1998-2000) is higher than that of the sub-period 1995-1997, but is generally 
lower (but not significant) than that of the sub-period 2001-2003. For comparison purposes, we also 
perform the mean difference test. Using the latter test, a consistent result is found. 
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Table 5.2 Ownership Concentration and Government Ownership 1995-2003 
Panel A: Ownership Concentration 1995-2003 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Pooled 
1995c2003 
Full Sample 57.272 56.447 58.527 60.273 62.242 66.632 66.181 66.387 64.696 62.073 
(55.000) (51.230) (56.000) (60.000) (60.480) (73.890) (68.000) (68.000) (61.880) (60.000) 
Listed and Insured 39.180 35.071 40.439 38.151 49.261 68.041 67.679 63.943 52.716 50.498 
Banks (39.960) (39.900) (39.510) (38.510) (44.710) (59.260) (59.250) (59.250) (52.820) (48.000) 
Unlisted and Insured 53.533 52.972 55.361 57.771 58.290 60.648 61.596 61.615 60.914 58.078 
Banks (43.000) (49.000) (50.000) (50.000) (51.180) (60.000) (60.000) (60.000) (60.000) (51.200) 
Unlisted and 79.958 79.985 79.226 80.844 82.912 86.588 81.242 84.222 84.238 82.135 
Uninsured Banks (84.900) (80.000) (80.000) (80.000) (84.950) (90.000) (85.000) (96.700) (96.700) (85.000) 
Notes: The first row is the mean, and the second row (in parentheses) is the median. All numbers are presented as a percentage . 
Panel B: Government Ownership in the Sample Banks 1995-2003 
No. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1. BankLiooo - - - - 59.530 59.260 59.250 59.250 54.720 
2. Bank Bii - - - - 57.000 57.000 56.680 93.690 22.490 
3. Bank Permata - - - - - 98.230 98.230 91.330 91.330 
4. Bank Danamon - - - - 99.000 99.360 99.350 99.350 28.360 
5. BankNiaga - - - - - 97.150 97.150 50.990 26.150 
6. Bank Bukopin 24.600 24.600 22.200 33.760 79.500 79.500 21.170 21.170 21.170 
Notes: Government ownership is the percentage of bank equity owned by the Indonesian government. Bank Lippo, Bil, Permata, Danamon, and Niaga are in 
the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks. Bank Bukopin is in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks. 
transform all variables, except for EQTA and EXCHRT, using the natural logarithm 
.i: • b .i: h . . h 1 . 121 122 trans1ormat10n e1ore t elf use m t e ana ys1s. ' 
5.5.2 Relation between Ownership Concentration and Bank Risk Taking 
Table 5.3 presents the regression results of the relation between ownership 
concentration and bank risk taking in Indonesia for the full period 1995-2003 based 
on equation (5.1). The pooled bLS and panel data regressions, including both the 
fixed-effects and random effects specifications, are shown. The F-test, the LM test 
and the Hausman test are conducted to determine the most appropriate 
specification, 123 and the Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors alleviate 
heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation problems. 124 Overall risk (LNSDROA), 
leverage risk (EQTA), credit risk (LNLLRGL and LNGLTA), and liquidity risk 
121 For EQT A we use an elimination of outlier approach. As in Chapters 2 and 4, if EQT A has a value 
less than -50%, we consider this an outlier. The natural logarithm transformation approach is not 
applied to EQT A because it leads to a greater value of skewness (even after reflexing the raw data as 
suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983). 
122 In Chapter 4, we discussed several reasons for using the natural logarithm transformation instead of 
rank transformation. In this chapter, we also adopt the same reasons, and add another reason, which is 
to ensure that we can explore the economic interpretation of the coefficients on ownership 
concentration. Previous research such as Claessens and Djankov (1999) has shown the importance of 
this economic interpretation. In addition, Cheng et al. (1992) suggest that the use of rank 
transformation to test economic theories concerning the magnitudes of the coefficients may be 
inappropriate. 
123 In some regressions, the variance and covariance (VC) matrix for the Hausman test could not be 
inverted. Greene (2002) suggests using the random-effects model when such a problem occurs. 
124 As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, Greene (2003) indicates that the Newey and West (1987) 
estimator requires the number of lags to be used should be the smallest integer greater than or equal to 
T114• In this study T = 9, thus, lags= 2. 
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(LNLIQATA and LNCVCSTF) are used as dependent variables. The following 
discussions are based on the best specification for each model. 125 
Table 5.3, Panel A, shows a significant positive relation between overall risk 
(LNSDROA) and ownership concentration (LNOC), indicating that higher overall 
risk corresponds with greater ownership concentration. Because the risk-taking 
motivations for each group of banks may be different,· each group is examined 
individually. It is seen that a significant positive relation persists for the larger Listed 
and Insured Banks. These banks are monitored by both government regulators and 
market participants. But major non-government shareholders, who own 
approximately 53 percent of the shares, value the upside of risky investments and 
have the downside protected by deposit insurance and are possibly "too big to fail" 
(TBTF) under government policy. Ownership concentration increased significantly 
from 1998 to 2001 for these banks even though the risk of failure increased, possibly 
because the major owner expected the government to intervene. The dramatic 
increase in government ownership due to the bank recapitalization program in 1999 
and 2000 is consistent with the application of the TBTF policy. The regression 
results reflect the increase in government involvement as the risk of failure for these 
banks increased due to the deterioration in the value of their loan portfolios. 
125 In the full sample, the fixed-effects approach is the most appropriate specification for each model, 
except for under the LNCVCSTF model, which is in favour of the random-effects. In the sub-sample 
of Listed and Insured Banks, the fixed-effects approach is the most appropriate specification for each 
model, except for under the LNLIQATA and LNCVCSTF models, which are in favour of the pooled 
OLS. In the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks, the most appropriate specification is the 
random effects for all models. Finally, in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks, the most 
appropriate specification is the fixed-effects for the LNGLTA, LNCVCSTF and EQTA models; the 
random-effects for the LNSDROA and LNLLRGL models; and the pooled OLS for the LNLIQATA 
model. 
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Table 5.3 The Relation between Ownership Concentration and Bank Risk Taking - Regression Results 
Panel A 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is 
LNSDROA, the natural logarithm of SOROA [the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations], a proxy for overall risk. The 
independent variables include LNOC, LNTA and EXCHRT. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNT A is 
the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed effects 
models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given 
in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSaml!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNSDROA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: 
.filw. OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant -3.074*** 1.295 -7.253 7.521 3.402** 6.418*** 6.409** 4.755 
(1.023) (0.958) (4.613) (5.683) (1.554) (1.166) (3.061) (3.346) 
LNOC + 0.602*** 0.446** 0.431 *** 1.294* 0.709* 0.965** 0.072 0.248 0.088 1.012** 1.177* 1.081* 
(0.188) (0.192) (0.150) (0.701) (0.404) (0.419) (0.188) (0.178) (0.162) (0.512) (0.609) (0;601) 
LNTA +/- -0.067 -0.992*** -0.363*** 0.014 -1.857*** -0.872** -0.439*** -1.122*** -0.700*** -0.904*** -0.716*** -0.803*** 
(0.060) (0.081) (0.061) (0.301) (0.406) (0.380) (0.092) (0.091) (0.081) (0.126) (0.122) (0.144) 
EXCHRT +/- 0.238*** 0.330*** 0.270*** 0.354*** 0.659*** 0.501 *** 0.239*** 0.295*** 0.262*** 0.378*** 0.360*** 0.368*** 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.095) (0.078) (0.081) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035) 
R' 0.24 0.61 0.43 0.65 0.30 0.60 0.51 0.66 
F statistics 59.68*** 11.97*** 15.00*** 10.74*** 56.51 *** 11.44*** 39.03*** 13.25*** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 7.68*** 5.32*** 6.18*** 3.85*** 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 247.08*** 0.40 147.57*** 22.36*** 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 63.50*** 13.00*** 0.00 t 0.00 t 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 216.41 *** 7.86 108.43*** 33.11 *** 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 157.67*** 19.33*** 165.84*** 18.24*** 
Notes: *, **and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
,...... 
-..) 
V1 
Panel B 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (unbalanced panel). The dependent variable 
is LNLLRGL, the natural logarithm of LLRGL (the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans), a proxy for credit risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA and EXCHRT. LNOC is the 
natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is 
the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses, Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSaml!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNLLRGL 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: 
.filw. OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant -2.333*** 0.736 -2.009 10.353*** 0.851 3.286*** 1.512 2.307 
(0.572) (0.632) (2.281) (2.596) (0.847) (0.861) (2.035) (2.098) 
LNOC + 0.223** -0.252** -0.093 0.224 0.025 O.Q95 -0.092 -0.444*** -0.305*** 0.718** 0.719** 0.737** 
(0.114) (0.125) (0.102) (0.358) (0.168) (0.173) (0.128) (0.168) (0.123) (0.355) (0.350) (0.358) 
LNTA +/- 0.113*** -0.519*** -0.035 0.068 -1.045*** -0.705*** -0.049 -0.525*** -0.187*** -0.342*** -0.444*** -0.408*** 
(0.028) (0.063) (0.039) (0.154) (0.147) (0.171) (0.047) (0.086) (0.057) (0.084) (0.099) (0.100) 
EXCHRT +/- 0.198*** 0.270*** 0.220*** 0.265*** 0.439*** 0.385*** 0.188*** 0.238*** 0.205*** 0.319*** 0.330*** 0.327*** 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.052) (0.032) (0.035) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021) 
R' 0.34 0.61 0.54 0.80 0.26 0.50 0.61 0.76 
F slatistics 90.93*** 11.92*** 23.27*** 23.48*** 47.10*** 7.58*** 55.58"** 21.37*** 
N 584 584 584 63 63 63 405 405 405 116 116 116 
Specification tests: 
F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 5.56*** 11.34*** 3.87*** 5.23*** 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 101.71 *** 6.45*** 47.45*** 41.07*** 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 78.14*** 15.25*** 0.00 t 4.05 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 113.05*** 10.81 * 77.97*** 23.13** 
Autocorrelation test: 
. Wooldridge test 33.15*** 11.62*** 19.82*** 68.38*** 
Notes: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
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Panel C 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is 
LNGLTA, the natural logarithm of GLTA (the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets), a proxy for credit risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA and EXCHRT. LNOC is the natural log<rrithm 
of the percentage of equity owned by the l<rrgest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average 
of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares with 
Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in p<rrentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent stand<rrd 
errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSaml!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNGLTA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: ~ OLS Effects Effects w_ Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 3.230*** 3.744*** 6.935*** 7.669*** 2.872*** 3.199*** 3.540* 2.535* 
(0.461) (0.362) (0.991) (l.408) (0.712) (0.502) (2.082) (1.418) 
LNOC + 0.114* -0.208*** -0.o75 -0.459*** -0.570*** -0.509*** 0.106 0.001 0.038 -0.174 0.142 -0.101 
(0.069) (0.062) (0.058) (0.107) (0.115) (0.119) (0.092) (0.071) (0.069) (0.301) (0.205) (0.263) 
LNTA +!- 0.053** 0.128 0.070*** -0.060 -0.229* -0.096 0.087** 0.082* 0.081 ** 0.117 0.318 0.168*** 
(0.023) (0.110) (0.022) (0.066) (0.133) (0.097) (0.037) (0.044) (0.035) (0.191) (0.293) (0.061) 
EXCHRT +!- -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.026 -0.049** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.016 -0.035 -0.020 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.018) (0.029) (0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.026) (0.036) (0.017) 
R' 0.11 0.50 0.43 0.57 0.15 0.56 0.04 0.22 
F statistics 24.71 *** 7.62*** 15.14*** 7.67*** 23.72*** 9.53*** 1.65 1.85** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
- F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 6.17*** 2.66** 7.42*** 1.87** 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 257.58*** 2.10 271.79*** 0.14 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 14.77*** 5.00 0.00 t 8.63** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 406.47*** 21.29*** 237.09*** 159.45*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 24.40*** 15.93*** 116.27*** 15.56*** 
Notes: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
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PanelD 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (unbalanced panel). The dependent variable 
is EQTA (the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets), a proxy for leverage risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA and EXCHRT. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of 
equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate 
Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy 
Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSaml!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: EQTA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: ~ OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 48.491 *** 54.540*** 25.185 -60.625 64.439*** 64.888*** 56.281 89.141*** 
(6.745) (6.850) (22.563) (42.801) (10.304) (8.059) (51.919) (35.624) 
LNOC 1.224 2.447 1.752 -1.337 7.730*** 3.306 0.182 1.395 0.996 7.386 -2.501 5.956 
(1.186) (2.827) (1.130) (3.393) (2.328) (3.257) (1.436) (1.320) (1.092) (8.062) (5.089) (6.522) 
LNTA +/- -2.902*** -5.789** -3.550*** -0.546 12.480*** 3.994 -3.931 *** -4.552*** -4.231 *** -5.633 -11.075*** -7.620*** 
(0.417) (2.571) (0.414) (1.352) (4.620) (2.790) (0.634) (0.792) (0.577) (3.638) (2.624) (1.545) 
EXCHRT +/- -0.224 0.028 --0.171 -0.779 -3.335*** -1.756*** -0.188 -0.160 -0.179 0.491 0.998** 0.682* 
(0.166) (0.274) (0.126) (0.590) (0.926) (0.609) (0.209) (0.153) (0.118) (0.574) (0.473) (0.399) 
R' 0.20 0.52 0.06 0.42 0.23 0.67 0.14 0.34 
F statistics 17.84*** 8.24*** 2.13 3.95*** 40.54*** 15.53*** 0.99 3.39*** 
N 580 580 580 60 60 60 405 405 405 115 115 115 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 5.26*** 5.02*** 10.84*** 2.46*** 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 213.20*** 0.64 431.92*** 1.92 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 11.92*** 14.27*** 0.00 t 9.72** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 460.40*** 36.38*** 358.53*** 107.35*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 12.55*** 7.73** 21.81*** 8.70*** 
Notes: *, **and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
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PanelE 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is 
LNLIQATA, the natural logarithm of LIQATA (the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets), a proxy for liquidity risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA and EXCHRT. LNOC is the natural 
logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual 
average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares 
with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSaml!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNLIQATA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: .fil.w_ OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.010 -0.702 -6.675*** -7.013*** -0.793 -1.419** 1.320 1.774 
(0.551) (0.478) (l.800) (1.580) (0.722) (0.647) (3.281) (2.023) 
LNOC 0.063 0.471 *** 0.194** 0.647*** 0.719*** 0.654*** 0.158 0.258* 0.203** 0.492 0.350 0.476 
(0.087) (0.116) (0.083) (0.166) (0.227) (0.158) (0.106) (0.149) (0.095) (0.534) (0.542) (0.378) 
LNTA +!- 0.044 0.193** 0.060** 0.323** 0.607*** 0.344*** 0.097** 0.435*** 0.135*** -0.224 -0.377*** -0.253*** 
(0.028) (0.098) (0.027) (0.133) (0.195) (0.112) (0.042) (0.079) (0.Q41) (0.164) (0.093) (0.087) 
EXCHRT +!- 0.199*** 0.175*** 0.194*** 0.212*** 0.167*** 0.209*** 0.178*** 0.146*** 0.174*** 0.222••• 0.237*** 0.225*** 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.030) (0.022) (0.024) 
R1 0.37 0.52 0.77 0.80 0.37 0.49 0.42 0.51 
F statistics 114.85*** 8.36*** 67.55*** 24.27*** 77.83*** 7.32*** 27.71 *** 7.13*** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 2.49*** 1.37 1.96*** 1.57 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 27.92*** 0.16 4.50** 0,61 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 18.08*** 0.00 t 0.00 t 2.36 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 92.06*** 4.11 64.58** 11.49 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 104.89*** 48.16*** 74.88*** 10.88*** 
Notes:*,** and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
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PanelF 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is 
LNCVCSTF, the natural logarithm of CVCSTF (the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations); a proxy for liquidity risk. 
The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA and EXCHRT. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. 
LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed 
effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors 
are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSaml!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNCVCSTF 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: 
.fil&fil OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 3.293*** 3.409*** 6.329*** 6.150*** 3.028*** 2.666*** 3.299* 4.359** 
(0.397) (0.428) (1.912) (2.159) (0.501) (0.581) (l.830) (1.830) 
LNOC + -0.010 -0.040 -0.024 -0.224 -0.244 -0.232 -0.103 0.026 -0.046 0.767* -0.136 0.529 
(0.066) (0.098) (0.073) (0.154) (0.149) (0.221) (0.078) (0.124) (0.083) (0.401) (0.356) (0.341) 
LNTA +I- O.oJ5 -0.019 0.010 -0.148 0.073 -0.135 0.066** 0.100 0.078** -0.227*** -0.260*** -0.229*** 
(0.025) (0.057) (0.025) (0.118) (0.207) (0.155) (0.030) (0.064) (0.038) (0.077) (0.092) (0.079) 
EXCHRT +I- -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.005 -0.036 -0.006 ,0.048*** -0.054*** -0.051 *** -0.013 -0.008 -0.013 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.032) (0.040) (0.039) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
R1 O.Q3 0.32 0.08 0.19 O.Q7 0.35 0.13 0.28 
F statistics 6.81*** 3.56*** 1.75 1.42 9.52*** 4.06*** 5.81 *** 2.60*** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 3.32*** 1.23 3.50*** 1.69* 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 95.62*** 0.00 71.70*** 0.19 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.44 1.31 0.00 t 7.60* 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 150.44*** 16.18*** 100.68*** 9.81 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 79.58*** 82.57*** 38.94*** 30.70*** 
Notes: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
Owners of Unlisted and Insured Banks control about 58 percent of the shares. 
Although several banks in this group may be protected by a TBTF policy, in general, 
these owners cannot be assured that they will receive government assistance and, 
therefore, must be interested in their going concern value. For this group, there is no 
relation between ownership concentration and risk taking; they must temper risk 
taking with going concern value. 
Owners of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks value risky investments because 
they are major participants in the upside. For this group, the largest shareholder has a 
mean ownership claim of 82 percent. Their position parallels a call option in that 
they participate in the upside, but can walk away if bankruptcy occurs. Since these 
banks were originally established based on a scheme that foreign investors provide 85 
percent of the capital, they are not eligible for government protection. 
In Panel B of Table 5.3, a different risk proxy is used as the dependent 
variable. The loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans (LNLLRGL) serves as a proxy for 
credit risk and its relation to ownership concentration is negative and significant in 
the full sample. The results are driven by the Unlisted and Insured Banks possibly 
due to their prudent approach in providing allowances for loan losses. However, the 
other two sub-samples show a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
credit risk. These results are consistent with Listed and Insured Banks and Unlisted 
and Uninsured Banks having riskier loan portfolios than Unlisted and Insured Banks, 
so their loan loss provision is greater. Because most banks in the sub-sample of 
Listed and Insured Banks have transferred their bad loans to IBRA, the positive sign 
in the coefficient on ownership concentration is not significant. When the gross-
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loans-to-total assets ratio (GLTA) is used as a measure of credit risk (Panel C of 
Table 5.3), a consistent result is found in the full sample. In this regard, the relation 
between ownership concentration and credit risk is also negative and significant. This 
result is mostly influenced by the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks, which also 
shows a negative and significant relation. This is consistent with our previous 
explanation that most banks in this sub-sample have transferred their bad loans to 
IBRA. 126 In other sub-samples, ownership concentration does not have any 
significant impact on credit risk. 
The impact of ownership concentration on leverage risk (EQTA) is presented 
in Panel D of Table 5.3. The results suggest that ownership concentration does not 
have any significant effects on leverage risk, except for in the sub-sample of Listed 
and Insured Banks. In this sub-sample, the impact on leverage risk is negative and 
significant, possibly because most banks in this sub-sample joined recapitalization 
program that strengthened bank capital, and hence reduced leverage risk. 
Panel E of Table 5 .3 shows that the relation between ownership concentration, 
LNOC, and liquidity, LNLIQATA, is significant and positive for the full sample and 
the sub-samples of Listed and Insured Banks, and Unlisted and Insured Banks. These 
results appear inconsistent with the expectation that concentrated ownership 
corresponds with increased risk taking. However, during periods of crisis, with 
government insurance, regulators will require increased liquidity. In Indonesia, most 
new capital injections are provided by bank owners in the form of cash or other liquid 
126 As mentioned in Chapter 4, Wijaya (2003) documents that the amount of bad loans transferred to 
IBRA were Rp.289 trillion, or equivalent to 36.6% of total assets of commercial banks in December 
1999. 
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instruments. Therefore, in crisis periods, ownership becomes more concentrated in 
the hands of the majority shareholders and bank liquidity increases. 127 Moreover, the 
Listed and Insured Banks mostly participated in a bank recapitalization program. As a 
result, this program increases ownership concentration by the government, increases 
liquidity and, therefore, reduces liquidity risk. However, using LNCVCSTF as a 
proxy for liquidity risk (Table F of Table 5.3), ownership concentration does not 
significantly affect liquidity risk in the full sample and sub-samples. 
Meanwhile, as expected, the relation between the control variable for bank 
size (LNTA) and bank risk taking is mixed. When bank risk taking refers to overall 
risk and one measure of credit risk, LNLLRGL, the relation is negative and 
significant. However, using another measure of credit risk, LNGLTA, the relation is 
significantly negative in the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks, but 
significantly positive in the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks. Further, the 
relation between bank size and leverage risk is significantly positive in the full 
sample and two sub-samples, Unlisted and Insured, and Unlisted and Uninsured, but 
significantly negative in another sub-sample, Listed and Insured Banks. In addition, 
the relation between bank size and liquidity risk is generally negative, except for in 
the sub-sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks under the LNLIQATA model, and 
the sub-sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks under the LNCVCSTF model. In the 
latter cases, bank size positively affects liquidity risk. 
127 It is implicitly assumed that new capital injections are provided by the majority shareholders. This 
is a reasonable assumption because when a bank experiences a capital shortage, regulators usually 
request additional funds from the majority shareholders. 
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The relation between the general macroeconomic variable (EXCHRT) and 
bank risk taking is also mixed. When bank risk taking is stated in terms of overall risk 
and one version of credit risk (i.e., LNLLRGL), the relation is positive and 
significant. But, when bank risk taking refers to liquidity risk and another version of 
credit risk (i.e., LNGLTA), the relation is generally negative and significant. Further, 
when bank risk taking refers to leverage risk, the relation is positive and significant in 
the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks, but negative and significant in the sub-
sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks. 
5.5.3 Regulatory Changes, Ownership Concentration and Bank Risk Taking 
Table 5.4 shows how government regulation and intervention impact different 
types of banks with respect to ownership concentration and risk taking. 128 The 
changes in the capital adequacy requirement, CAR, affected all banks while the 
introduction of the BGS only affected insured banks. In addition, government 
intervention did not fall on all banks equally. Selectively, the government took an 
ownership position by injecting funds, permitting certain bad loans to be removed, 
and requiring business plans to be submitted. Accordingly, the results should reflect 
regulatory behaviour. 
128 In some regressions, the variance and covariance (VC) matrix for the Hausman test could not be 
inverted. Therefore, based on Greene (2002), when the bank specific-effect is significant, the random-
effects model is considered as the best specification. Accordingly, in the full sample and the sub-
sample of Unlisted and Insured Banks, the best specification is the random-effects for all models. In 
the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks, the best specification is the fixed-effects for the 
LNSDROA, LNGLTA, EQTA, LNLIQATA, and LNCVCSTF models, and the random-effects for the 
LNLLRGL model. In the sub-sample of Unlisted and Uninsured Banks, the best specification is the 
random-effects for LNSDROA, LNLLRGL, EQTA, and LNLIQATA, the fixed-effects for 
LNCVCSTF model, and the pooled OLS for the LNGLTA model. 
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Generally, risk taking is expected to increase when fixed premium deposit 
insurance is introduced and/or when capital adequacy requirements are reduced. 
Using the LNSDROA as the dependent variable (Panel A of Table 5.4), in the Listed 
and Insured Banks, the interaction between sub-period two (three) and ownership 
concentration is positive but not significant (significant). This suggests that the 
increase in the capital requirement under the BGS regime leads to a positive relation 
between ownership concentration and overall risk. Although not significant, we also 
find a positive sign for the third period interaction term in the full sample. For both 
Unlisted and Insured, and Unlisted and Uninsured Banks the interaction terms are 
negative, with several being significant. It appears that, for these banks, the 
regulatory changes weaken the relation between ownership concentration and overall 
risk. 
When LNLLRGL is used as the dependent variable (Panel B of Table 5.4), the 
interaction term of SUBP3*LNOC is positive and significant in the full sample. This 
is consistent with the increase in the capital requirement under the BGS regime 
leading to a positive relation between ownership concentration and overall risk. 
However, in the sub-samples, no significant coefficients are observed for the 
interaction terms. Using LNGLTA as a proxy for credit risk (Panel C of Table 5.4), 
we find a slightly inconsistent result. In this regard, not only SUBP3*LNOC but also 
SUBP2*LNOC show a positive and significant sign in the full sample. However, in 
the sub-samples of Unlisted and Insured Banks, and Unlisted and Uninsured Banks, 
only SUBP3*LNOC exhibits a positive and significant sign. In contrast, in the sub-
sample of Listed and Insured Banks, the first interaction term (SUBP2*LNOC) is 
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Table 5.4 The Effects of Regulatory Changes on the Relation between Ownership Concentration and Bank Risk Taking -
Regression Results 
Panel A 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is LNSDROA, the natural 
logarithm of SOROA [the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations], a proxy for overall risk. The independent variables include LNOC:, LNT A, EXCHRT 
and several dummy variables. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. 
EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. SUBP2 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 4% and BGS 
during 1998-2000 (1=1998-2000; O=otherwise). SUBP3 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 8% and BGS during 2001-2003 (1=2001-2003; O=otherwise). The base sub-period is 
SUBPI (1995-1997) when the minimum CAR of 8% is applied but without BGS. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
Full Sample Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNSDROA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: 
.filw. OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant -1.841 ** 4.040*** 0.465 11.732** 1.746 4.927*** 0.213 --0.131 
(0.916) (l.170) (2.458) (5.665) (l.892) (l.764) (4.348) (8.881) 
LNOC 0.465*** 0.325** 0.312* 0.261 --0.557 --0.212 0.193 0.384** 0.298 0.383 3.511 ** 2.898 
(0.146) (0.164) (0.164) (0.307) (0.430) (0.603) (0.216) (0.187) (0.190) (0.982) (1.759) (1.982) 
LNTA --0.107••• -1.208*** -0.535*** -0.268* -2.150*** --0.902*** -0.312*** -1.073*** --0.616*** -0.247 -1.313*** -1.075** 
(0.041) (0.097) (0.074) (0.157) (0.412) (0.362) (0.111) (0.150) (0.122) (0.206) (0.415) (0.443) 
EXCHRT 0.143*** 0.299*** 0.206*** 0.448*** 0.878*** 0.603*** 0.087 0.153** 0.113* 0.322*** 0.609*** 0.545*** 
(0.052) (0.064) (0.059) (0.147) (0.155) (0.209) (0.067) (0.073) (0.069) (0.094) (0.146) (0.169) 
SUBP2 0.130 -0.626 -0.529 -23.823*** -22.618*** -24.735*** 3.844 3.160* 3.493* 14.589 20.403*** 19.401 ** 
(2.118) (l.179) (1.279) (7.041) (3.680) (6.643) (3.288) (l.687) (1.907) (9.006) (7.171) (9.202) 
SUBP3 -3.758 -4.380*** -5.062*** -3.799 12.253 -1.512 0.312 -0.435 --0.324 8.098 5.859 6.534 
(2.413) (l.424) (l.455) (10.552) (11.475) (13.692) (3.207) (l.901) (2.087) (5.849) (6.442) (8.793) 
SUBP2*LNOC + -0.003 -0.105 --0.094 -0.225 0.773 0.218 -0.141 -0.426** -0.380* 0.244 -3.610** -2.867 
(0.381) (0.183) (0.193) (l.020) (0.673) (0.787) (0.416) (0.211) (0.232) (1.500) (l.808) (2.124) 
SUBP3*LNOC: + 0.454 --0.038 0.245 2.606*** 2.336*** 2.462*** -0.106 --0.386* -0.279 0.352 -2.792 -2.167 
(0.345) (0.200) (0.205) (0.668) (0.791) (0.943) (0.360) (0.222) (0.245) (l.121) (1.712) (l.957) 
SUBP2*LNTA 0.245** 0.448*** 0.369*** 1.733*** 1.691*** 1.782*** 0.006 0.220•• 0.136 -0.770** 0.116 -0.066 
(0.105) (0.063) (0.058) (0.434) (0.259) (0.427) (0.190) (0.102) (0.108) (0.365) (0.407) (0.461) 
SUBP3*LNTA -0.065 0.280*** 0.147*** -0.352 -0.990 --0.393 -0.190 0.077 -0.044 --0.765*** 0.468 0.204 
(0.102) (0.067) (0.058) (0.684) (0.735) (0.837) (0.148) (0.103) (0.107) (0.254) (0.399) (0.438) 
SUBP2*EXCHRT --0.220** -0.439*** -0.308*** --0.300 -0.910*** --0.521 * -0.208* -0.318*** --0.249** --0.441 ** -0.737*** --0.672*** 
(0.096) (0.092) (0.091) (0.324) (0.214) (0.318) (0.111) (0.109) (0.105) (0.179) (0.200) (0.221) 
SUBP3*EXCHRT 0.314** 0.085 0.234** --0.147 --0.602* -0.260 0.325** 0.175 0.273** 0.083 -0.215 -0.149 
(0.142) (0.109) (0.113) (0.380) (0.327) (0.413) (0.148) (0.128) (0.131) (0.194) (0.210) (0.260) 
R' 0.39 0.74 0.74 0.85 0.42 0.70 0.65 0.80 
F statistics 32.84••• 19.06*** 13.26*** 15.42*** 25.78*** 14.89*** 17.69*** 16.21 *** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 10.62*** 5.76*** 7.49*** 5.86*** 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 414.15*** 2.20 236.46*** 39.20*** 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 218.41 *** -314.09 118.15*** 46.06*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 46.50*** 4.39* 59.50*** 1.68 
Notes: •,••and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and I% level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
PanelB 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (unbalanced panel). The dependent variable 
is LNLLRGL, the natural logarithm of LLRGL (the ratio of Joan-Joss-reserves-to-gross-Joans), a proxy for credit risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNT A, EXCHRT and several dummy 
variables. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for 
bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. SUBP2 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation 
of the minimum CAR of 4% and BGS during 1998-2000 (1=1998-2000; O=otherwise). SUBP3 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 8% and BGS during 
2001-2003 (1=2001-2003; O=otherwise). The base sub-period is SUBPl (1995-1997) when the minimum CAR of 8% is applied but without BGS. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models 
(REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSaml!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNLLRGL 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: ~ OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects. Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant --0.920 2.883*** -0.188 9.898*** 0.635 2.565** 0.613 3.402 
(0.646) (0.768) (2.561) (2.742) (1.115) (l.294) (4.573) (4.573) 
LNOC 0.067 -0.408*** -0.283*** 
--0.296 -0.026 0.033 --0.090 -0.425*** --0.266* -0.528 1.130 J.104 
(0.104) (0.108) (0.110) (0.352) (0.154) (0.259) (0.134) (0.145) (0.143) (l.294) (1.063) (0.991) 
LNTA 0.058** -0.630*** --0.140*** 0.100 -1.172*** --0.636*** --0.032 --0.379*** --0.139 0.161 -0.774*** --0.609*** 
(0.028) (0.068) (O.Q48) (0.165) (0.169) (0.174) (0.065) (0.113) (0.088) (0.202) (0.161) (0.224) 
EXCHRT 0.139*** 0.245*** 0.174*** 0.072 0.320*** 0.207** 0.165*** 0.207*** 0.180*** 0.104 0.349*** 0.307*** 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.130) (0.066) (O.Q90) (0.039) (0.044) (0.054) (0.102) (0.070) (0.083) 
SUBP2 --0.231 --0.595 --0.543 -2.858 -1.072 -2.115 1.404 1.255 1.353 3.884 5.600 5.890 
(l.172) (0.974) (0.875) (4.222) (1.959) (2.822) (J.757) (l.669) (1.494) (5.683) (4.659) (4.512) 
SUBP3 -3.927*** -3.563*** -4.195*** -10.735 -4.137 -9.673* -2.396 -2.187 -2.194 3.462 J.165 2.374 
(l.286) (0.861) (0.998) (8.302) (5.433) (5.907) (l.842) (1.381) (1.633) (5.507) (5.261) (4.377) ,_. 
SUBP2*LNOC + 0.044 0.036 0.047 0.198 0.129 --0.032 --0.115 -0.209 --0.157 1.195 --0.711 --0.620 00 
0\ (0.193) (0.147) (0.132) (0.468) (0.228) (0.338) (0.246) (0.213) (0.181) (l.451) (1.024) (1.048) 
SUBP3*LNOC + 0.498** 0.150 0.350*** 0.863 --0.328 -0.171 0.260 -0.025 0.089 1.025 -0.860 -0.778 
(0.208) (0.119) (0.140) (0.540) (0.258) (0.405) (0.218) (0.156) (0.190) (1.358) (l.077) (0.971) 
SUBP2*LNTA 0.105** 0.217*** 0.156*** 0.180 0.235** 0.267 0.019 0.101 0.050 --0.445* 0.111 0.046 
(0.051) (0.039) (0.040) (0.269) (0.104) (0.182) (0.092) (0.083) (0.085) (0.242) (0.165) (0.225) 
SUBP3*LNTA 0.094* 0.290*** 0.193*** 0.502 0.496 0.712** 0.069 0.201 *** 0.124 --0.588*** 0.265* 0.135 
(0.051) (0.034) (0.040) (0.505) (0.313) (0.360) (0.087) (0.069) (0.083) (0.232) (0.160) (0.217) 
SUBP2*EXCHRT --0.031 --0.184*** --0.083 0.122 -0.229** -0.068 .{).Q45 --0.111 --0.068 --0.135 --0.382*** --0.340*** 
(0.071) (0.070) (0.062) (0.199) (0.115) (0.137) (0.091) (0.096) (0.082) (0.125) (O.Q98) (0.108) 
SUBP3*EXCHRT 0.066 --0.109* O.QJ5 -0.023 --0.228 -0.091 0.150 --0.057 --0.006 0.133 --0.147 .{).Q98 
(0.084) (0.066) (0.077) (0.259) (0.177) (0.177) (0.095) (0.085) (0.102) (0.180) (0.124) (0.130) 
R2 0.51 0.75 0.77 0.91 0.45 0.65 0.76 0.90 
F statistics 48.75*** 20.81 *** 15.11 *** 26.93*** 29.25*** 11.94*** 26.47*** 36.52*** 
N 584 584 584 63 63 63 405 405 405 116 116 116 
Specification tests: 
F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 7.90*** 12.18*** 4.64*** 11.05*** 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 225.67*** 5.28** 102.13*** 88.96*** 
Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 197.28*** 14.60** 113.33*** 89.19*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
. Wooldridge test 13.44*** 4.29* 9.96*** 17.02*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
Panel C 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is 
LNGLTA, the natural logarithm of GLTA (the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets), a proxy for credit risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA, EXCHRT and several dummy variables. 
LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. 
EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. SUBP2 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the 
minimum CAR of 4% and BGS during 1998-2000 (1=1998-2000; O=otherwise). SUBP3 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 8% and BGS during 2001-
2003 (1=2001-2003; O=otherwise). The base sub-period is SUBPl (1995-1997) when the minimum CAR of 8% is applied but without BGS. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models 
(REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
FullSami!le Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNGLTA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: 
.filw. OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 3.181*** 3.930*** 3.949*** 4.310*** 2.780*** 4.274*** 6.443*** 5.960 
(0.311) (0.500) (0.485) (l.553) (0.653) (0.780) (0.941) (4.103) 
LNOC 0.065 ..0.296*** -0.168** 0.128 ..0.129 0.030 0.039 -0.101 ..().076 ..().649*** 0.304 -0.516 
(0.042) (0.069) (0.073) (0.096) (0.180) (0.200) (0.055) (0.080) (0.083) (0.260) (0.889) (0.961) 
LNTA 0.061 *** 0.164 0.073** ..().008 -0.142 ..().009 0.102** -0.063 0.012 0.052 0.157 0.044 
(0.017) (0.153) (0.031) (0.028) (0.145) (0.100) (0.045) (0.083) (0.055) (0.057) (0.279) (0.216) 
EXCHRT 0.000 -0.006 0.004 -0.009 0.032 0.004 -0.004 O.oJ5 0.007 0.016 ..().008 O.oJ8 
(0.015) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (O.Q45) (0.071) (0.021) (0.026) (0.030) (0.018) (0.079) (0.088) 
SUBP2 -1.940** -2.321 *** -2.285*** ..().588 ..().871 ..().846 ..0.331 -1.382 -1.224 2.714 4.430 2.846 
(0.858) (0.667) (0.588) (l.864) (2.355) (2.289) (l.384) (J.075) (0.823) (l.728) (3.499) (4.863) 
SUBP3 -0.309 -1.312 -1.008 7.901 ••• 9.850*** 8.021 * ..().671 -1.571 -1.447 -8.070** -4.676 -7.849* 
(1.240) (0.834) (0.668) (3.072) (3.109) (4.591) (l.853) (l.182) (0.901) (3.610) (3.962) (4.386) 
,_.. SUBP2*LNOC + 0.117 0.160* 0.162* -0.898*** ..0.571 ** ..().780*** 0.037 0.082 0.081 0.515 ..().259 0.396 00 (0.137) (0.090) (0.089) (0.163) (0.250) (0.263) (0.163) (0.118) (0.100) (0.407) (0.788) (1.086) 
-..J 
SUBP3*LNOC + 0.064 0.231 *** 0.178* -0.308** ..().117 -0.226 0.185 0.256** 0.259*** 0.619* -0.197 0.494 
(0.147) (0.085) (0.094) (0.153) (0.262) (0.310) (0.202) (0.123) (0.106) (0.354) (0.889) (0.984) 
SUBP2*LNTA ..0.001 0.013 O.oJ5 0.052 O.oJ5 0.042 ..().087 ..().001 -0.021 -0.405*** -0.299*** -0.377 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.027) (0.122) (0.151) (0.147) (0.071) (0.058) (0.047) (0.118) (0.116) (0.246) 
SUBP3*LNTA ..().019 -0.009 -0.002 -0.371 * -0.502*** ..().394 0.016 0.091 0.068 0.164 0.171 0.188 
(0.046) (0.028) (0.027) (0.191) (0.178) (0.281) (0.080) (0.060) (0.046) (0.196) (0.112) (0.221) 
SUBP2*EXCHRT 0.111 *** 0.118*** 0.105*** 0.290*** 0.239*** 0.286*** 0.072* 0.046 0.059 0.085** 0.109 0.082 
(0.036) (0.048) (0.042) (0.Q98) (0.092) (0.108) (0.042) (0.046) (O.Q45) (0.040) (0.086) (0.118) 
SUBP3*EXCHRT -0.010 0.012 -0.008 ..0.111 -0.161 ..0.116 -0.071 -0.105** ..().089 0.287 0.306 0.284** 
(0.068) (0.075) (0.052) (0.092) (0.104) (0.141) (0.066) (0.049) (0.056) (0.207) (0.200) (0.140) 
R' 0.16 0.55 0.68 0.74 0.23 0.64 0.27 0.38 
F statistics 10.14*** 8.26*** 9.66*** 7.57*** 10.92*** ll.41 *** 3.53*** 2.52*** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 6.81*** 1.88* 9.06*** 1.43 
. LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 302.84*** 0.73 348.39*** 0.21 
. Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 475.48*** 32.32*** 291.86*** 165.43*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 16.32*** 3.53 75.51 *** 14.04*** 
Notes:*,** and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and l % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
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PanelD 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (unbalanced panel). The dependent variable 
is EQTA (the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets), a proxy for leverage risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA, EXCHRT and several dummy variables. LNOC is the natural 
logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNT A is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual 
average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. SUBP2 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 4% and 
BGS during 1998-2000 (l=i998-2000; O=otherwise). SUBP3 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 8% and BGS during 2001-2003 (1=2001-2003; 
O=otherwise). The base sub-period is SUBPl (1995-1997) when the minimum CAR of 8% is applied but without BGS. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated 
using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
Full Sample Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: EQTA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: ~ OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 57.969*** 75.843*** 34.249*** 22.140 91.403*** 94.111*** 54.962* 187.381 ** 
(9.046) (9.440) (7.092) (44.240) (17.916) (13.066) (30.023) (86.796) 
LNOC -0.544 0.013 -0.625 -1.374 5.929* 1.390 -1.762 -0.323 -0.803 4.398 -48.095*** -22.960 
(l.151) (2.810) (1.383) (1.392) (3.337) (5.485) (1.550) (l.735) (1.367) (6.677) (16.405) (19.777) 
LNTA -3.325*** -9.656** -4.746*** -1.370*** 6.974 -1.193 -5.940*** -7.768*** -6.479*** -4.396*** -9.516*** -5.357 
(0.577) (4.232) (0.576) (0.391) (6.191) (2.839) (1.277) (1.330) (0.926) (l.412) (3.245) (4.407) 
EXCHRT 0.751 ** 1.616** 0.950* 0.365 -1.732 0.185 1.455*** 1.590*** 1.481 *** -0.420 0.695 -0.277 
(0.388) (0.676) (0.510) (0.391) (1.437) (1.926) (0.510) (0.489) (0.483) (0.577) (1.024) (1.710) 
SUBP2 15.975 15.955 15.386 222.053*** 185.524* 223.553*** -33.149 -22.699 -22.846* -168.165 -325.117***-253.305*** 
(17.574) (13.980) (11.241) (78.378) (110.784) (69.021) (27.076) (16.205) (13.427) (115.812) (87.711) (94.330) 
SUBP3 -13.163 -8.891 -15.098 4.520 -68.390 11.816 -36.212 -25.680 -26.705* 96.216 -142.092* -19.188 
(19.266) (23.368) (12.519) (83.917) (137.144) (125.272) (30.435) (15.976) (14.701) (61.551) (74.364) (88.069) 
SUBP2*LNOC 0.067 0.646 0.730 -7.748 -6.715 -7.199 2.005 1.652 1.671 5.784 56.604*** 34.215 
(2.465) (l.851) (l.705) (11.097) (7.468) (8.197) (2.772) (l.926) (1.632) (21.561) (16.853) (21.556) 
SUBP3*LNOC 4.994* 3.607 5.430*** -0.930 -2.316 -2.351 3.183 2.202 2.488 2.241 52.887*** 30.358 
(2.651) (3.703) (l.754) (4.514) (6.133) (8.546) (3.522) (l.806) (l.729) (9.139) (15.568) (19.717) 
SUBP2*LNTA -0.293 0.162 -0.346 -4.951 -5.792 -5.683 2.304 1.766** 1.652** 11.686*** 7.650** 9.018* 
(0.892) (0.804) (0.507) (4.125) (5.062) (4.137) (1.626) (0.861) (0.765) (4.319) (3.245) (4.722) 
SUBP3*LNTA 0.939 1.996*** 1.179** 1.479 4.962 1.386 2.536* 2.396*** 2.155*** -3.244 -1.762 -3.764 
(0.909) (0.695) (0.497) (4.545) (7.224) (7.677) (l.557) (0.756) (0.757) (2.842) (2.573) (4.420) 
SUBP2*EXCHRT -2.300*** -3.511*** -2.518*** -13.647*** -8.076 -12.710*** -1.466* -1.774** -1.579** -3.175 -4.453** -3.345 
(0.906) (1.212) (0.794) (5.088) (5.239) (3.396) (0.834) (0.789) (0.740) (2.046) (2.066) (2.309) 
SUBP3*EXCHRT -2.490** -3.936** -2.835*** -2.835 -0.763 -2.867 -1.866* -2.339*** -2.051 ** -4.984** -5.916*** -5.051 * 
(1.065) (l.637) (0.969) (2.545) (3.148) (3.827) (l.004) (0.853) (0.921) (2.259) (l.911) (2.665) 
R' 0.26 0.60 0.44 0.57 0.26 0.69 0.53 0.68 
F statistics 8.24*** 10.12*** 3.99*** 3.31 *** 12.34*** 14.29*** 6.34*** 8.32*** 
N 580 580 580 60 60 60 405 405 405 115 115 115 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 6.19*** 2.23* 11.24*** 3.39*** 
. LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 267.40*** 0.81 446.58*** 5.46** 
. Hausman test (FEM vs REM) O.OOt 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
. Likelihood ratio test 468.31 *** 55.21 *** 394.95*** 94.10*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
. Wooldridge test 16.03*** 78.92*** 20.07*** 10.29*** 
Notes: *,**and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
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PanelE 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is 
LNLIQATA, the natural logarithm of LIQATA (the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets), a proxy for liquidity risk. The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA, EXCHRT and several dummy 
variables. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of ownership concentration. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for 
bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. SUBP2 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation 
of the minimum CAR of 4% and BGS during 1998-2000 (1=1998-2000; O=otherwise). SUBP3 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 8% and BGS during 
2001-2003 (1=2001-2003; O=otherwise). The base sub-period is SUBPl (1995-1997) when the minimum CAR of 8% is applied but without BGS. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models 
(REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
Full Sample Listed and Insured Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNLIQATA 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: ~ OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 2.546*** 2.495*** 0.782 1.100 2.042** 2.726*** -15.149*** - -13.985*** 
(0.608) (0.565) (0.867) (l.649) (0.960) (0.894) (2.729) (4.344) 
LNOC --0.105 0.268*** 0.107 0.038 0.061 0.060 0.006 0.098 0.027 2.600*** 2.928*** 2.797*** 
(0.096) (0.097) (0.084) (0.146) (0.158) (0.211) (0.126) (0.117) (0.100) (0.662) (l.036) (0.997) 
LNTA --0.090*** --0.402*** --0.152*** -0.011 --0.215 --0.037 --0.078 .{).409*** -0.143** 0.352*** 0.029 0.195 
(0.025) (0.047) (0.034) (0.059) (0.155) (0.106) (0.050) (0.084) (0.060) (0.119) (0.179) (0.223) 
EXCHRT 0.141 *** 0.176*** 0.144*** 0.189*** 0.230*** 0.193*** 0.136*** 0.\64*** 0.141 *** 0.003 0.088 0.044 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.038) (0.048) (0.074) (0.039) (0.034) (0.038) (O.Q45) (0.065) (0.087) 
SUBP2 -1.187 -1.162* -1.134* -4.932* -4.842** -5.030** -0.738 --0.958 --0.765 20.386*** 17.828*** 18.915*** 
(0.907) (0.659) (0.682) (2.610) (2.420) (2.407) (l.167) (0.979) (1.059) (2.977) (4.151) (4.807) 
SUBP3 --0.500 0.327 -0.138 -11.157*** -11.198*** -11.986** --0.902 -1.224 -1.131 20.929*** 17.720*** 19.338*** 
(1.261) (0.783) (0.775) (4.026) (3.869) (4.833) (l.755) (1.166) (1.157) (3.449) (4.935) (4.465) 
SUBP2*LNOC 0.138 0.122 0.114 0.621* 0.591** 0.581 ** 0.149 0.146 0.145 -2.924*** -2.846*** -2.882*** 
(0.131) (0.091) (0.103) (0.322) (0.281) (0.277) (0.150) (0.110) (0.128) (0.700) (0.986) (1.095) 
SUBP3*LNOC 0.192 -0.023 0.091 0.364 0.132 0.268 0.055 ·0.024 0.062 -2.084*** -2.259** -2.191 ** 
(0.179) (0.112) (0.108) (0.259) (0.294) (0.327) (0.220) (0.144) (0.135) (0.719) (1.027) (1.001) 
SUBP2*LNTA 0.193*** 0.217*** 0.197*** 0.434*** 0.462*** 0.453*** 0.121* 0.170*** 0.131 ** -0.442*** --0.261 --0.340 
(O.o48) (0.030) (0.031) (0.137) (0.131) (0.154) (0.064) (0.054) (0.060) (0.142) (0.164) (0.242) 
SUBP3*LNTA 0.100** 0.148*** 0.111 *** 0.653*** 0.719*** 0.719** 0.126* 0.217*** 0.152*** --0.622*** --0.315* .{).463** 
(0.045) (0.028) (0.031) (0.237) (0.227) (0.296) (0.076) (0.057) (0.059) (0.145) (0.174) (0.225) 
SUBP2*EXCHRT -0.238*** --0.283*** --0.241 *** -0.474*** --0.534*** --0.481 *** --0.190*** -0.240*** --0.200*** --0.102 -0.179** --0.139 
(0.Q41) (0.043) (0.048) (0.121) (0.129) (0.114) (0.047) (0.052) (0.058) (0.071) (0.081) (0.116) 
SUBP3*EXCHRT --0.057 --0.125** -0.069 --0.030 -0.049 -0.020 0.010 -0.060 -0.002 -0.130 .{).211 .{).170 
(0.071) (0.057) (0.060) (0.109) (0.121) (0.148) (0.083) (0.070) (0.073) (0.148) (0.137) (0.137) 
R1 0.66 0.80 0.91 0.93 0.68 0.60 0.78 0.84 
F statistics 98.88*** 27.34*** 47.75*** 35.16*** 74.89*** 11.44*** 33.72*** 20.71 *** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 5.84*** 1.98* 3.86*** 2.72*** 
LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 196.75*** 1.42 71.01*** 9.64*** 
. Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
. Likelihood ratio test 116.55*** 13.60** 66.63** -213.07 
Autocorrelation test: 
. Wooldridge test 28.56*** 6.31 ** 25.37*** 0.63 
Notes:*,** and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and l % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
PanelF 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel). The dependent variable is 
LNCVCSTF, the natural logarithm of CVCSTF (the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations), a proxy for liquidity risk. 
The independent variables include LNOC, LNTA, EXCHRT and several dummy variables. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder, a measure of 
ownership concentration. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general 
macroeconomic conditions. SUBP2 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 4% and BGS during 1998-2000 (1=1998-2000; O=otherwise). SUBP3 is a time 
dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 8% and BGS during 2001-2003 (1=2001-2003; O=otherwise). The base sub-period is SUBPl (1995-1997) when the minimum 
CAR of 8% is applied but without BGS. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
Ful1Sam2Ie Listed and Insnred Banks Unlisted and Insured Banks Unlisted and Uninsured Banks 
Dependent variable: LNCVCSTF 
Independent Expected Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: ~ OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 2.693*** 2.384*** 1.075 -0.950 3.390*** 1.855* 2.482 3.770 
(0.557) (0.627) (l.089) (3.360) (l.038) (0.997) (4.896) (5.168) 
LNOC 0.056 0.058 0.063 0.293* 0.356 0.260 -0.097 0.061 -0.004 0.767 -0.196 0.606 
(O.Q90) (0.110) (0.097) (0.154) (0.339) (0.411) (0.116) (0.136) (0.lll) (1.154) (l.510) (l.'197) 
LNTA 0.051 0.194** 0.074** 0.066 0.900*** 0.206 0.061 0.402*** 0.162** -0.214 -0.362 -0.259 
(0.034) (0.096) (0.036) (0.054) (0.235) (0.216) (0.070) (0.103) (0.067) (0.260) (0.284) (0.267) 
EXCHRT -0.080** -0.100*** -0.083** 0.021 -0.155* -0.007 -0.160*** -0.196*** -0.172*** 0.217** 0.251 ** 0.228** 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.059) (0.082) (0.144) (0.041) (0.039) (0.042) (0.109) (0.123) (0.106) 
SUBP2 -1.242 -1.098 -1.141 2.783 0.685 2.272 -1.551 -0.858 -1.130 -8.499 -8.745 -7.948 
(0.849) (0.843) (0.816) (4.105) (3.033) (4.632) (1.365) (l.155) (1.172) (6.045) (7.673) (5.866) 
SUBP3 -0.158 -0.231 -0.104 7.445 1.877 8.383 -1.300 -0.267 -0.565 -1.056 -3.819 -1.224 
(l.208) (0.934) (0.925) (8.412) (7.907) (9.370) (l.698) (l.263) (l.281) (5.356) (7.499) (5.389) 
....... SUBP2*LNOC + 0.093 0.098 0.097 -0.447* -0.787* -0.508 0.162 0.187 0.167 0.744 0.647 0.497 \0 (0.125) (0.120) (0.123) (0.269) (0.422) (0.539) (0.160) (0.146) (0.142) (1.329) (l.584) (1.327) 0 SUBP3*LNOC + -0.263 -0.203* -0.253** -0.659 -0.306 -0.488 -0.148 -0.094 -0.142 -0.256 -0.047 -0.378 
(0.174) (0.122) (0.128) (0.501) (0.532) (0.640) (0.208) (0.145) (0.149) (1.197) (l.528) (l.210) 
SUBP2*LNTA 0.012 -O.oJ5 0.001 -0.135 -O.Q30 -0.104 0.024 -0.074 -0.021 0.333 0.406 0.379 
(0.047) (0.040) (0.037) (0.253) (0.198) (0.297) (0.083) (0.060) (0.066) (0.306) (0.282) (0.296) 
SUBP3*LNTA -0.079 -0.112*** -0.089** -0.588 -0.440 -0.686 0.029 -0.122** -0.043 -0.130 0.021 -0.073 
(0.055) (0.038) (0.037) (0.504) (0.460) (0.574) (0.083) (0.062) (0.065) (0.270) (0.274) (0.272) 
SUBP2*EXCHRT 0.119*** 0.147*** 0.123** 0.098 0.338** 0.132 0.158*** 0.214*** 0.175*** -0.079 -0.130 -0.097 
(O.Q47) (0.055) (0.058) (0.124) (0.154) (0.219) (0.055) (0.060) (0.065) (0.148) (0.143) (0.142) 
SUBP3*EXCHRT 0.248*** 0.280*** 0.253*** 0.456 0.641 *** 0.465* 0.228*** 0.294*** 0.243*** 0.231 0.185 0.215 
(0.084) (0.073) (0.072) (0.280) (0.251) (0.285) (0.093) (0.075) (0.080) (0.176) (0.177) (0.168) 
R' 0.11 0.39 0.28 0.47 0.12 0.42 0.41 0.54 
F statistics 6.32*** 4.40*** 1.78* 2.30*** 4.68*** 4.51 *** 6.65*** 4.70*** 
N 585 585 585 63 63 63 405 405 405 117 117 117 
Specification tests: 
. F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 3:73••• 2.63** 4.07*** 2.12•• 
. LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 121.77*** 0.44 84.28*** 1.89 
. Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 0.00 t 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
Likelihood ratio test 168.13*** 27.78*** 119.84*** 26.08*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
Wooldridge test 69.81 *** 53.42*** 28.42*** 32.26*** 
Notes:*,** and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. t indicates no result - could not invert VC matrix for Hausman test. 
negative and significant, suggesting that the lower capital requirement weakens the 
relation between ownership concentration and credit risk. This result is also 
consistent with our explanation that most banks in this sub-sample transferred their 
bad loans to IBRA. 
When EQTA is used as the dependent variable (Panel D of Table 5.4), the 
second interaction term (SUBP3*LNOC) shows a positive and significant sign in the 
full sample. This indicates that the increase in capital requirement during BGS regime 
weakens the relation between ownership concentration and leverage risk. This result 
makes sense given an increase in capital requirement would encourage bank owners 
to increase bank capital. If the majority shareholders provide the new capital 
injections, this then leads to a negative relation between ownership concentration and 
leverage risk. However, we do not find a significant result in the sub-samples. 
Further, when LNLIQATA is used as the risk measure (Panel E of Table 5.4), 
the interaction terms are significant for Listed and Insured Banks and Unlisted and 
Uninsured Banks. This suggests that Listed and Insured Banks have improved 
liquidity during 1998-2000, presumably from the government intervention, while 
Unlisted and Uninsured Banks exhibit liquidity deficits due to the regulatory changes. 
Using LNCVCSTF as a proxy for liquidity risk (Panel F of Table 5.4), a consistent 
result is found in the sub-sample of Listed and Insured Banks. Moreover, in the full 
sample, the second interaction term (SUBP3*LNOC) shows a negative and 
significant sign. This suggests that the increase in capital requirement during the BGS 
regime weakens the relation between ownership concentration and liquidity risk. This 
result is also consistent with our previous discussions that most new capital injections 
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are provided in cash by the majority shareholders, and thus, the increase in the capital 
requirement leads to an improvement in bank liquidity. 
5.5.4 Government Ownership Concentration and Bank Risk Taking 
The role of government ownership in banks has been largely discussed in the 
existing literature (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 2002). In the present study, the impact of 
government ownership concentration on bank risk taking is reported in Table 5.5. 
Here, government ownership is represented by the dummy variable DGOVOWN, 129 
and is found to be significantly related to all six risk measures. 130 
The relation between government ownership and overall risk (LNSDROA) is 
positive and significant. This result is consistent with a government bailout of the 
insured banks. Moreover, the relation between government ownership and credit risk 
is mixed. When LNLLRGL is used as a proxy for credit risk, the relation is positive 
and significant, whereas when LNGLT A is used as a proxy for credit risk, the relation 
is negative and significant. The positive relation is consistent with a government 
bailout of the insured banks, whereas the negative relation is consistent with our 
previous discussion that most banks transferred their bad loans to IBRA as a part of 
bank recapitalization program. 
The relation between government ownership and EQTA is positive and 
significant, indicating a significantly negative link between government ownership 
129 A dummy variable is used because the government is not always the largest shareholder. 
130 The specification tests (the F test, LM test and Hausman test) indicate that the fixed-effect approach 
is the best specification for each model, except for under the LNGLTA and LNCVCSTF models, 
which are in favour of the random-effects. 
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Table 5.5 The Impact of Government Ownership Concentration on Bank Risk Taking - Regression Results 
Panel A 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel, except for the LNLLRGL 
model). The dependent variable is one of the followings: LNSDROA, LNLLRGL, and LNLIQAT A. LNSDROA is the natural logarithm of SDROA [the standard deviation of the before-tax return on 
assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations], a proxy for overall risk. LNLLRGL is the natural logarithm of LLRGL (the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans), a proxy 
for credit risk. LNLIQATA is the natural logarithm of LIQATA (the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets), a proxy for liquidity risk. The independent variables include DGOVOWN, LNTA, and 
EXCHRT. DGOVOWN is a dummy variable to indicate that a bank has government ownership concentration at particular year during the study period (l= bank with government ownership, 0 = 
otherwise). LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic 
conditions. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
Dependent variables: LNSDROA LNLLRGL LNLIQATA 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 0.732 4.235*** -1.408*** 0.673 1.159*** 1.049*** 
(0.794) (0.804) (0.434) (0.533) (0.359) (0.354) 
DGOVOWN 1.703*** 1.523*** 1.673*** 0.049 0.362* 0.324 1.086*** 1.386*** 1.175*** 
(0.437) (0.511) (0.311) (0.199) (0.221) (0.219) (0.229) (0.104) (0.181) 
LNTA -0.184*** -1.039*** -0.465*** 0.108*** -0.550*** --0.058 --0.028 0.153 --0.019 
(0.062) (0.082) (0.063) (0.034) (0.065) (0.042) (0.027) (0.097) (0.027) 
EXCHRT 0.248*** 0.331 *** 0.275*** 0.203*** 0.264*** 0.217*** 0.198*** 0.178*** 0.196*** 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) 
Rz 0.25 0.62 0.33 0.61 0.42 0.54 
F statistics 63.03*** 12.51*** 90.27*** 11.85*** 137.98*** 9.02*** 
N 585 585 585 584 584 584 585 585 585 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 7.90*** 5.68*** 2.15*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 280.29*** 131.14*** 20.58*** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 56.00*** 69.42*** 10.53*** 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 186.70*** 110.08*** 138.99*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 161.58*** 33.52*** 97.18*** 
Note:*,** and*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
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PanelB 
Results from panel data regressions. The estimation uses annual observations of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks over the nine year period 1995-2003 (balanced panel, except for the EQTA 
model). The dependent variable is one of the followings: LNGLTA, EQTA, and LNCVCSTF. LNGLTA is the natural logarithm of GLTA [the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets), a proxy for credit risk. 
EQTA is the ratio of book-value-equity-to-total-assets, a proxy for credit risk. LNCVCSTF is the natural logarithm of CVCSTF (the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds estimated in 
a three-year moving window of annual observations), a proxy for liquidity risk. The independent variables include DGOVOWN, LNTA, and EXCHRT. DGOVOWN is a dummy variable to indicate that 
a bank has government ownership concentration at particular year during the study period (l= bank with government ownership, 0 = otherwise). LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for 
bank size. EXCHRT is the annual average of exchange rate Rp/USD (scaled in Rp,000), a proxy for general macroeconomic conditions. Fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) 
are estimated using Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS), respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Newey-West heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported for the pooled OLS and the FEM. 
Dependent variables: LNGLTA EQTA LNCVCSTF 
Independent Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random Pooled Fixed Random 
variables: OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects 
Constant 3.065*** 2.821*** 55.152*** 67.347*** ·2.725*** 2.794*** 
(0.274) (0.292) (6.984) (5.661) (0.307) (0.337) 
DGOVOWN -0.748*** -0.876*** -0.845*** 2.165 9.491 ** 7.509*** -0.640*** -0.684*** -0.657*** 
(0.165) (0.121) (0.119) (2.695) (4.471) (2.412) (0.211) (0.224) (0.159) 
LNTA 0.101 *** 0.158 0.121 *** -3.055*** -6.044** -4.029*** 0.057*** 0.010 0.051 ** 
(0.022) (0.110) (0.023) (0.523) (2.498) (0.443) (0.023) (0.057) (0.026) 
EXCHRT -0.058*** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.202 0.023 -0.153 -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.041 *** 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.166) (0.267) (0.123) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
R1 0.17 0.53 0.20 0.53 O.Q7 0.33 
F statistics 39.32*** 8.68*** 20.60*** 8.52*** 13.88*** 3.85*** 
N 585 585 585 580 580 580 585 585 585 
Specification tests: 
• F test (Pooled OLS vs FEM) 6.19*** 5.52*** 3.22*** 
• LM test (Pooled OLS vs REM) 302.83*** 221.33*** 88.41 *** 
• Hausman test (FEM vs REM) 1.89 14.64*** 0.80 
Heteroskedasticity test: 
• Likelihood ratio test 389.29*** 457.63*** 136.75*** 
Autocorrelation test: 
• Wooldridge test 25.63*** 19.03*** 76.48*** 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively. 
and leverage risk. This is understandable since the government ownership is aimed at 
strengthening bank capital and hence reduce leverage risk. Moreover, the relation 
between government ownership and liquidity risk (LNLIQATA and LNCVCSTF) is 
negative and significant, and this is consistent with regulators requiring more cash 
infusion from shareholders during the crisis. 
Because the Indonesian government intervenes selectively, caution should be 
exercised in the interpretation of the above results. The significant coefficients 
associated with government ownership would suggest that banks with higher 
government ownership take greater risk. In fact, the reverse is true. Banks in greater 
financial distress attract more government funds, but the owners are also required to 
inject new capital, and hence, provide more liquidity. Therefore, greater 
governmental intervention results in a positive relation between overall risk and 
government ownership. The greater the financial distress, the more additional funds 
or capital are required from owners, and this results in a positive relation between 
liquidity and government ownership, and/or a negative relation between leverage risk 
d h. 131 an government owners 1p. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This study examines the relation between ownership concentration and bank 
risk taking in Indonesia over the period 1995-2003, along with the impact of the 
131 The relation between government ownership and bank risk taking is an interesting issue. In addition 
to the above discussion, another interpretation is that bank risk taking affects government ownership 
(i.e., reverse direction). This interpretation is based on an argument that perhaps the government 
injected funds because the banks were at risk. However, since this interpretation is consistent with the 
idea of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) as discussed earlier, the present study does not explore this issue. We 
leave it to further research. 
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regulatory changes. Using panel data analysis on 65 banks over the full period and 
full sample, we find that the relation between ownership concentration and overall 
risk is significant and positive, whereas the relation between ownership concentration 
and credit and liquidity risk is negative and significant. The finding that there is a 
positive relation between ownership concentration and overall risk is consistent with 
the positive relation between bank ownership concentration and risk reported by 
Laeven (2002). 
By partitioning banks into categories based on listing and msurance 
characteristics, the impact of selective governmental intervention can· be better 
understood. The relation between ownership concentration, bank risk taking and 
governmental intervention is relatively stronger for Listed and Insured Banks than for 
Unlisted and Insured Banks, and for Unlisted and Uninsured Banks. 
An examination of the interaction between ownership concentration and the 
sub-period dummy variables reveals how regulatory changes affect the sub-samples. 
The results suggest that the increase in the capital requirement under the BGS regime 
leads to a positive and significant relation between ownership concentration and 
overall risk for Listed and Insured Banks during 2001-2003. These findings are 
inconsistent with Kim and Rhee (2000) and Kim et al. (2002) who document that 
when the Japanese government increased the coverage of deposit insurance and 
reduced the capital requirement in 1986-1988, bank risk was positively related to 
ownership concentration. 
The results also indicate that as long as banks are the primary source of debt 
finance, the Indonesian government will be forced to intervene to protect the banking 
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system during periods of crisis. Selective intervention, including changing the capital 
adequacy requirement and applying the TBTF policy is necessary to maintain 
confidence in the banking system. Diversification of the source of finance available to 
firms, risk-sensitive deposit insurance, and less ownership concentration should be 
encouraged to reduce the impact of crises on the banking system. 
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6.1 Conclusions 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Implications 
Through four essays, this thesis empirically examines bank risk taking in 
Asian countries. The overall framework of this thesis is presented in Figure 6.1. The 
first essay (Chapter 2) explored the relation between accounting and capital market 
measures of risk in Asian banks during the period 1998-2003. The second essay 
(Chapter 3) investigated the presence of bank moral hazard and the disciplining 
factors of risk taking in Asian banks during the period 1998-2003. The third essay 
(Chapter 4) examined the impact of the introduction of deposit insurance (the Blanket 
Guarantee Scheme - BOS) and the changes in capital regulation on bank risk taking 
in Indonesia during the period 1995-2003. The fourth essay (Chapter 5) investigated 
the relation between ownership structure and bank risk taking along with the impact 
of the regulatory changes on this relation in Indonesia during the period 1995-2003. 
The first and second essays used a sample of 46 capital market listed banks 
from 10 countries in Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand), whereas the last two 
essays employed a sample of 65 Indonesian private commercial banks. The third 
essay also included two control groups. The first control group comprised uninsured 
banks, and was used to examine the impact of the BOS on bank risk taking. The 
second control group comprised a sample of non-banking financial firms, and was 
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Figure 6.1 The Overall Framework of the Study 
Essay 1(Chapter2) - Asian Banks 1998-2003 
Capital Market Risk Measures 
(Total return risk, Systematic 
risk & Non-systematic risk) 
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) - Asian Banks 1998-2003 
Leverage risk 
(LEVRISK) & 
Fair DI premium (IPP) 
Asset risk (ARISK) 
Bank Risk Shifting 
Asset risk* A dummy 
variable for explicit DI 
(ARISK*DEXDI) 
Charter Value 
(Market-to-book-equity 
ratio, MTBE) 
Bank Self Discipline 
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) - Indonesian Banks 1995-2003 
Leverage risk 
(LEVRISK) & 
Fair DI premium (IPP) 
Asset risk (ARISK) 
Bank Risk Shifting - Listed Banks 
Blanket Guarantee Scheme 
(BGS) - [Insured vs 
Uninsured banks] 
Minimum CAR of 4% 
(CAR4)- [Banks vs Non-
banking financial firms] 
Essay 4 (Chapter 5) - Indonesian Banks 1995-2003 
Notes: 
DI Deposit insurance 
t The sub-samples include Listed 
and Insured, Unlisted and 
Insured, and Unlisted and 
Uninsured Banks. 
Ownership Concentration 
(QC) - [Full Sample & 
Sub-samples] t 
Accounting Risk Measures 
(SD ROA, LLRGL, GL TA, 
EQTA, LIQATA, & CVCSTF) 
Sub-period 2 *OC 
Sub-period 3*0C 
(Sub-period Analysis) § 
§ The base sub-period is Sub-
period 1 ( 1995-1997). 
Sub-period 2= 1998-2000 
Sub-period 3 = 2001-2003 
A dummy variable for 
Government Ownership 
Concentration (DGOVOWN) 
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used in investigating the impact of the changes in capital regulation on bank risk 
taking. Because not many Indonesian banks are listed on the stock exchange, only 
accounting risk measures were used in the third and last essays. A panel data 
methodology was employed throughout the thesis. 
Based on an empirical analysis in each essay, the following results are 
obtained (see Appendix 6.1 for a summary). First, during the period 1998-2003, 
several accounting risk measures are significantly related to capital market risk 
measures in Asian banks. In particular, the standard deviation of the before-tax retqm 
on assets (SDROA) and loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans (LLRGL) are significantly 
related to total risk, whereas gross-loans-to-total-assets (GLTA) and loan-loss-
reserves-to-gross-loans (LLRGL) are significantly related to non-systematic risk. 
These findings can be useful in the analysis of bank risk taking across countries in 
Asia. 
Second, during the same study period, there is strong evidence of bank risk 
shifting, indicating the presence of moral hazard in Asian banks. This result suggests 
that market and regulatory disciplines are insufficient to prevent banks from 
exploiting the safety nets. Bank self discipline (charter value) is effective in limiting 
leverage risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk, but it fails to alleviate asset risk. Charter 
value also fails to reduce bank risk taking when the fair deposit insurance premium is 
used as a proxy for bank risk. Further, implicit guarantees seem to be the main source 
of bank moral hazard, while explicit deposit insurance might have promoted financial 
stability following the recent crises. 
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Third, during the period 1995-2003, the introduction of deposit insurance (the 
BGS) increases leverage risk in Indonesian banks. Moreover, a lower capital 
requirement raises leverage risk and liquidity risk. Bank moral hazard exists 
following the adoption of the BGS, and the extent of moral hazard is stronger under a 
lower capital requirement. In addition, selective government intervention and poor 
economic conditions following the 1997 /1998 banking crisis may provide an 
important explanation for bank risk taking. 
Finally, during the same study period m Indonesian banks, ownership 
concentration is positively related to overall risk, but it is negatively related to credit 
. 
risk and liquidity risk. When deposit insurance is introduced and capital requirements 
are changed, the Listed and Insured banks show a greater reaction than the Unlisted 
and Insured, and Unlisted and Uninsured banks. The temporary government 
ownership is positively related to overall risk, but negatively related to liquidity risk 
and leverage risk. Further, the impact of the government ownership on credit risk is 
mixed (i.e., positive when the loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans ratio is used as the 
dependent variable, but negative when the gross-loans-to-total-assets ratio is used as 
the dependent variable). Selective government intervention and poor economic 
conditions following the recent crisis may largely explain the overall results. 
Taken together, the present study has documented important relations between 
accounting and capital market measures of risk in Asian banks. Moreover, moral 
hazard exists, indicating that market and regulatory disciplines are insufficient to 
prevent banks from taking excessive risk and exploiting the safety nets. Bank self 
discipline appears to play a limited role in mitigating risk taking. In addition, 
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evidence from Indonesian banks suggests that deposit insurance, capital regulation 
and ownership structure affect bank risk taking. However, in general, bank risk taking 
seems to be driven by selected government intervention and poor economic 
conditions following the 199711998 crisis. These findings are important because 
Indonesia is typical of Asian countries where the economy and the banking system 
are highly correlated, and government intervention would be most pronounced during 
economic crises. 
6.2 Implications 
The present study provides several important implications. First, because 
there is strong evidence that several accounting ratios have a significant relation with 
capital market risk measures, these ratios may be used interchangeably and 
complementarily with their associated capital market risk measures in the analysis of 
bank risk taking. In addition, regulators may increase their reliance on capital market 
risk measures in supervising banks. Weaknesses in accounting risk measures such as 
window dressing and presenting stale data may be compensated by the forward 
looking capabilities of capital market risk measures. 
Second, since market and regulatory disciplines are insufficient to combat 
bank moral hazard, banking authorities in Asian countries may need to require 
commercial banks to strengthen their capital, increase capital requirements, or adopt a 
risk-based capital strategy. Also, it is important to improve prudential regulation and 
banking supervision along with continuous efforts to enhance banking practices and 
governance. Moreover, because implicit guarantees seem to encourage bank moral 
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hazard and explicit deposit insurance might have promoted financial stability, 
countries that currently do not have explicit deposit insurance are recommended to 
adopt an official deposit insurance scheme. In addition, to ensure that Asian banks 
can use charter value as a self-discipline tool for controlling risk taking, encouraging 
banks to be listed in the capital markets seems to be an important policy. By doing so, 
bank regulators can also use market data and rely on market discipline in controlling 
bank risk taking. 
Third, because the introduction of the BGS increases leverage risk and bank 
moral hazard exists following the adoption of the BGS in Indonesia, bank regulators 
may need to implement a risk-based premium. Since September 2005 the government 
replaced the BGS with a limited deposit insurance scheme. However, because the 
premium is not risk-based, there is a possibility that banks will continue to take a 
higher risk, which may endanger the country's financial stability. Further, a lower 
capital requirement increases leverage risk and liquidity risk, and leads to a greater 
extent of bank moral hazard. Therefore, lowering capital requirements when the 
banking industry was under a bailout from the government through a blanket 
guarantee scheme appears to be an inappropriate policy and should be avoided in the 
future. 
Lastly, smce there is a significantly positive relation between ownership 
concentration and overall risk in Indonesia, bank regulators may need to find the best 
measure to prevent a higher concentration of ownership. The negative relation 
between ownership concentration and several types of bank risk (e.g., credit risk and 
liquidity risk) should not make bank regulators ignore the fact that the link between 
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ownership concentration and overall risk remains positive and significant. 
Encouraging banks to be listed in the capital market is one way to reduce ownership 
concentration. In addition, more frequent examination or strengthened supervision 
should be applied to banks that have a higher ownership concentration. Also, bank 
regulators need to understand the business groups of the bank majority shareholders 
to ensure that their activities will not increase bank risk. Failure to address the issue 
of bank ownership concentration would make Indonesian banks remain riskier and 
could lead to a recurrent banking crisis. 
6.3 Limitations 
The present study has several limitations. The first limitation originates from 
the use of the specific sample selection criteria. This study uses a sample of 
commercial banks that has a December accounting year end during specific years 
(i.e., 1998-2003 for Asian banks and 1995-2003 for Indonesian banks). Because there 
are several other types of banks (e.g., merchant banks, rural banks), and some 
commercial banks have a non-December accounting year end, the results of this study 
may not be generalized into the banks outside the sample or outside the study period. 
For the same reason, our results may not be applicable to other countries outside the 
10 countries in our sample. 
Second, our sample is mostly based on a balanced panel and relies on banks 
with available data that survived from the crises. In other words, we do not use a 
random sample selection procedure. Therefore, this study may suffer from selectivity 
or survivorship bias. Although the use of a balanced panel is to ensure that our results 
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are not due to the different mix of banks, our results may be inconsistent with those 
from unbalanced panels. This may limit the external validity of the present study. 
Third, in examining the impact of the changes in capital regulations m 
Indonesia, due to the data availability problems, we only use 18 non-banking 
financial firms that are continuously listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange during 
1995-2003 as the control group. Tlie use of a larger number of firms for the control 
group could result in a better result and reduce the limitations of the present study. 
Fourth, the present study does not use a comprehensive list of risk measures. 
For example, it does not include interest rate risk, foreign exchange rate risk and off-
balance sheet risk. Also, for capital market measures of risk, only the single index 
market model with the three standard capital market risk measures (i.e., total risk, 
systematic risk and non-systematic risk) is included. In addition, the accounting 
measure for overall risk (the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets) and 
liquidity risk (the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term funds) are 
estimated on a three-year moving window of annual observations. Even though the 
use of the risk measures in this study is mainly dictated by the data availability, we 
consider these issues as a limitation. 
Fifth, the study period for Asian banks is not exactly similar to Indonesian 
banks (1998-2003 for Asian banks versus 1995-2003 for Indonesian banks). In 
addition, the data for ownership concentration are only available for Indonesian 
banks. Therefore, our results may not be comparable directly between the two 
samples of banks. 
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Sixth, in examining the presence of bank risk shifting or moral hazard, we use 
the Ronn and Verma ( 1986) methodology to estimate the market value of bank assets 
and the implied volatility of bank assets or the standard deviation of asset returns 
(asset risk). Duan (1994 and 2000) argue that this methodology has a weakness 
because it imposes constant equity volatility. Although the Duan (1994 and 2000) 
methodology is technically more consistent, in the absence of audited high-frequency 
data on bank deposits and because our focus is the occurrence of risk shifting (not 
under or over-pricing of deposit insurance premiums), we consider that our approach 
is appropriate. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the deficiency of our approach in this 
study. 
Finally, our study periods may not be the best time to conduct such kind of a 
research. This is because in several years during these periods a significant number of 
Asian and Indonesian banks faced a crisis. As a result, our study may not be able to 
investigate the normal risk behaviour of Asian and Indonesian banks. Nevertheless, 
the use of the crisis period has allowed us to explore the role of selected government 
intervention because it is in a crisis period where government has to act. 
6.4 Future Studies 
Having identified the limitations of the present research, several opportunities 
for future research are considered. First, future studies may apply more flexible 
sample selection criteria, or if possible, use a random sample. Also, future studies 
may examine a different set of countries in Asia during a different study period, 
preferably with a non-crisis setting. A more comprehensive type of risk may be used, 
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and the estimates for overall risk (the standard deviation of the before-tax return on 
assets) and liquidity risk (the coefficient of variation of customer and short-term 
funds) may include a longer time frame or more than three years as applied in the 
present study. Futures studies may examine not only commercial banks but also other 
types of banks with balanced and unbalanced panels. The studies can also be 
.extended by including banks without December year-end financial statements, and 
may include a longer study period for Asian banks. 
Moreover, in the presence of audited high-frequency data on bank deposits, 
future studies may use the Duan (1994 and 2000) methodology to estimate the market 
value of bank assets and the implied volatility of bank assets (asset risk). This may 
increase the accuracy of the fair deposit insurance premium estimates, and h{'.nce may 
provide a more convincing result in examining bank risk shifting or moral hazard. 
Further, in investigating the impact of the changes in capital regulation in 
Indonesia, future studies may employ a greater number of non-banking financial 
firms as a control group. Also, future works may examine the relation between 
ownership structure and bank risk taking in Asian banks instead of only in Indonesian 
banks as we have done in the present study. In addition, future research may explore 
the reverse direction of the relation between ownership concentration and bank risk 
taking to follow the idea of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). 132 Finally, since we have 
shown the important role of government intervention following the 1997/1998 crisis, 
future studies may examine further the role that government plays in Asian banks. 
132 This means that future studies may examine the impact of bank risk taking on ownership 
concentration. Here, ownership concentration may also include government ownership concentration. 
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Appendix 6.1 Summary of the Major Results 
Essay 1(Chapter2) Accounting and Capital Market Measures of Risk - Asian 
Banks 1998-2003 
Capital market risk measures (Dependent variables) 
Accounting risk measures Total return risk Systematic risk Non-systematic risk 
(Independent variables) Expected Results Expected Results Expected Results 
Signs Signs Signs 
SD ROA + +S + + + + 
LLRGL + +S + + + +S 
GLTA + + + + + +S 
EQTA - - - - - -
LIQATA - + - - - + 
CVCSTF + - + + + -
Notes: Total return nsk 1s the annualized standard deviauon of the banks' daliy stock returns. Systematic nsk 1s the beta of the 
banks' stock returns. Non-systematic risk is the annualized standard deviation of residual errors from the market model. SDROA 
is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year moving window of annual observations. 
LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. GLTA is the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets. EQTA is the ratio of 
book-value-equity-to-total-assets. LIQ A TA is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. CVCSTF is the coefficient of variation of 
customer and short-term funds estimated over a three-year moving window of annual observations. S =significant at least at the 
5% level. 
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) Moral Hazard and the Disciplining 
Risk Taking - Asian Banks 1998-2003 
Factors of 
1. Bank Risk Sh~ftinf( (Moral Hazard) 
Dependent variables 
Independent LEVRISK IPP 
variable Expected 
I 
Result Expected I Result 
Sign Sign 
ARISK - I -S + I +S 
Notes: LEVRISK is leverage risk, measured as the ratio of the face value of liabilities to the market value of bank assets. IPP is 
the fair deposit insurance (DI) premium, expressed as a percentage of liabilities, calculated using Merton (1977). ARISK is asset 
risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset returns. S =significant at least at the 1 % level. 
2. The Impact of the Explicit Deposit Insurance 
Dependent variables 
Independent LEVRISK IPP 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign 
ARISK*DEXDI - I -S + I -S 
.. Notes: ARISK*DEXDI 1s a dummy mteracuon variable. DEXDI 1s a dummy vanable to mdicate countnes that have explicit 
deposit insurance (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand). S = significant at least at 
the5% level. 
3. Bank Se{f Discipline (Charter Value) 
Dependent variables 
Independent LEVRISK IPP ARISK 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Sign 
MTBE - I -S - I +S - I +S 
(continued) 
Dependent variables 
Independent GLTA LIQATA EQTA 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Sign 
MTBE - I -S + I +S + I + 
Notes: MTBE 1s the rat10 of the market value of equity to the book value eqmty. S = s1gn1ficant at least at the 10% level. 
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Essay 3 (Chapter 4) Blanket Guarantee, Capital Regulation and Risk Taking -
Indonesian Banks during 1995-2003 
1. The Impact of BGS: Insured versus Uninsured Banks (Control Group) 
Dependent variable: EQT A 
Independent Insured B anlcs Uninsured Banks 
variable (Control group) 
Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign 
BGS - I -S + I + 
Notes: EQTA is the ratio of book-value-eqmty-to-total-assets. BGS 1s the lime dummy vanable to md1cate the implementation of 
the Blanket Guarantee Scheme (BGS) during 1998-2003 (hence 1 = 1998-2003; 0 = otherwise). S = significant at least at the 
10% level. 
2. The Impact of the Changes in Capital Regulation: Banks versus Non-Banking 
Financial Firms (Control Group) 
Dependent variable: EQTA 
Independent Banks Non-Banking Financial 
variable Firms (Control group) 
Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign 
CAR4 - I -S + I + 
(continued) 
Dependent variable: LIQATA 
Independent Banks Non-Banking Financial 
variable Firms (Control group) 
Expected 
I 
Result Expected I Result 
Sign Sign 
CAR4 - I -S + I +S 
Notes: LIQATA 1s the ratio of liqmd-assets-to-total-assets. CAR4 1s the time dummy vanable to md1cate the 1mplementat1on 
of the minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) regulation of 4% during 1998-2000 (hence 1 = 1998-2000; 0 =otherwise). 
S = significant at least at the 1 % level. 
3. Bank Risk Shifting (Moral Hazard) - Listed Banks 
Pre-BGS (1995-1997) or Minimum CAR of 8% Post-BGS (1998-2003) 
Dependent variables Dependent variables 
Independent LEVRISK IPP LEVRISK IPP 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Si_gn Sign 
ARISK - I -s + I + - I -S + I +S 
(continued) 
Minimum CAR of 4% (1998-2000) Minimum CAR of 8% (2001-2003) 
Dependent variables Dependent variables 
Independent LEVRISK IPP LEVRISK IPP 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Sign Sign 
ARISK - I -S + I +S - I -S + I +S 
Notes: LEVRISK 1s leverage risk, measured as the ratio of the face value of liabilities to the market value of banlc assets. IPP is 
the fair deposit insurance (DI) premium, expressed as a percentage of liabilities, calculated using Merton (1977). ARISK is asset 
risk, measured as the standard deviation of asset returns. S =significant at least at the 1 % level. 
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Essay 4 (Chapter 5) Risk Taking, Ownership and Regulatory Changes 
Indonesian Banks 1995-2003 
1. The Impact of Ownership Concentration 
F llS l u amp.e 
Dependent variables 
Independent SD ROA LLRGL GLTA LIQATA 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Sign Sign 
oc + I +S + I -S + I -S - I +S 
Notes: SOROA is the standard deviation of the before-tax return on assets estimated in a three-year movmg wmdow of annual 
observations. LLRGL is the ratio of loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans. GLTA is the ratio of gross-loans-to-total-assets. LIQATA 
is the ratio of liquid-assets-to-total-assets. OC is the ownership concentration, defined as the percentage of equity owned by the 
largest shareholder. S =significant at least at the 5% level. 
Listed and Insured Banks 
Dependent variables 
Independent SOROA LLRGL GLTA LIQATA 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Sign Sign 
oc + I +S + I + + I -S - I +S 
Note: S =significant at least at the 10% level. 
2. The Impact of the Regulatory Changes on the Relation between Ownership 
Concentration and Bank Risk Taking 
F llS l u amp.e 
Dependent variables 
Independent SD ROA LLRGL GLTA LIQATA 
variables Expected Result Expected Result Expected Result Expected Result 
Sign Sign Sign Sign 
SUBP2*0C + - + + + +S - + 
SUBP3*0C + + + +S + +S - + 
Listed and Insured Banks 
Dependent variables 
Independent SD ROA LLRGL GLTA LIQATA 
variables Expected Result Expected Result Expected Result Expected Result 
Sign Sign Sign Sign 
SUBP2*0C + + + - + -S - +S 
SUBP3*0C + +S + - + - - + 
.. Notes: SUBP2 is a time dummy vanable to md1cate the implementation of the rrummum CAR of 4% and BGS dunng 1998-2000 
(1=1998-2000; O=otherwise). SUBP3 is a time dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the minimum CAR of 8% and 
BGS during 200.1-2003 (1=2001-2003; O=otherwise). The base sub-period is SUBPl (1995-1997) when the minimum CAR of 
8% is applied but without BGS. S =significant at least at the 5% level. 
3. The Impact of Government Ownership Concentration 
Dependent variables 
Independent SD ROA LLRGL GLTA 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Sign 
DGOVOWN + I +S + I +S + I -S 
(contmued) 
Dependent variables 
Independent EQTA LIQATA CVCSTF 
variable Expected I Result Expected I Result Expected I Result Sign Sign Sign 
DGOVOWN - I +S - I +S + I -S 
Notes: DGOVOWN 1s a dummy vanable to mdicate that a bank has government ownership concentration at particular year 
during the study period (1= bank with government ownership, 0 =otherwise). S =significant at least at the 10% level. 
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